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From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, cmr <cmr@informatik.wtf>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	linuxppc-dev <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V32 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 14:54:03 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87tvehxvh0.fsf@dja-thinkpad.axtens.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87wojdy8ro.fsf@dja-thinkpad.axtens.net>

Hi, 

>>> I'm thinking about whether we should lock down the powerpc xmon debug
>>> monitor - intuitively, I think the answer is yes if for no other reason
>>> than Least Astonishment, when lockdown is enabled you probably don't
>>> expect xmon to keep letting you access kernel memory.
>>
>> The original patchset contained a sysrq hotkey to allow physically
>> present users to disable lockdown, so I'm not super concerned about
>> this case - I could definitely be convinced otherwise, though.

So Mimi contacted me offlist and very helpfully provided me with a much
better and less confused justification for disabling xmon in lockdown:

On x86, physical presence (== console access) is a trigger to
disable/enable lockdown mode.

In lockdown mode, you're not supposed to be able to modify memory. xmon
allows you to modify memory, and therefore shouldn't be allowed in
lockdown.

So, if you can disable lockdown on the console that's probably OK, but
it should be specifically disabling lockdown, not randomly editing
memory with xmon.

Regards,
Daniel

  reply	other threads:[~2019-04-29  4:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
     [not found] ` <20190404003249.14356-2-matthewgarrett@google.com>
2019-04-16  8:40   ` [PATCH V32 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Andrew Donnellan
2019-04-18  6:38     ` Daniel Axtens
2019-04-18 19:35     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-29  0:06       ` Daniel Axtens
2019-04-29  4:54         ` Daniel Axtens [this message]
2019-04-30  5:15           ` Andrew Donnellan

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