From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>,
Nathaniel McCallum <nathaniel@profian.com>
Cc: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de,
mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com,
cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com,
mark.shanahan@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/25] x86/sgx: Introduce runtime protection bits
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 14:53:28 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <04761b2b4a77bda145a1fdb975da50da18c9d2d0.camel@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <eb696213-b066-0b6f-19ff-dd655b13209c@intel.com>
On Tue, 2022-01-18 at 12:59 -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> Hi Jarkko,
>
> On 1/17/2022 6:22 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Tue, Jan 18, 2022 at 03:59:29AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Mon, Jan 17, 2022 at 08:13:32AM -0500, Nathaniel McCallum
> > > wrote:
> > > > On Sat, Jan 15, 2022 at 6:57 AM Jarkko Sakkinen
> > > > <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On Sat, Jan 15, 2022 at 03:18:04AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > On Fri, Jan 14, 2022 at 04:41:59PM -0800, Reinette Chatre
> > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > Hi Jarkko,
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On 1/14/2022 4:27 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 14, 2022 at 04:01:33PM -0800, Reinette
> > > > > > > > Chatre wrote:
> > > > > > > > > Hi Jarkko,
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > On 1/14/2022 3:15 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Jan 14, 2022 at 03:05:21PM -0800, Reinette
> > > > > > > > > > Chatre wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > Hi Jarkko,
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > How enclave can check a page range that EPCM has
> > > > > > > > > > the expected permissions?
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Only way to change EPCM permissions from outside
> > > > > > > > > enclave is to run ENCLS[EMODPR]
> > > > > > > > > that needs to be accepted from within the enclave via
> > > > > > > > > ENCLU[EACCEPT]. At that
> > > > > > > > > time the enclave provides the expected permissions
> > > > > > > > > and that will fail
> > > > > > > > > if there is a mismatch with the EPCM permissions
> > > > > > > > > (SGX_PAGE_ATTRIBUTES_MISMATCH).
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > This is a very valid point but that does make the
> > > > > > > > introspection possible
> > > > > > > > only at the time of EACCEPT.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > It does not give tools for enclave to make sure that
> > > > > > > > EMODPR-ETRACK dance
> > > > > > > > was ever exercised.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Could you please elaborate? EACCEPT is available to the
> > > > > > > enclave as a tool
> > > > > > > and it would fail if ETRACK was not completed (error
> > > > > > > SGX_NOT_TRACKED).
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Here is the relevant snippet from the SDM from the
> > > > > > > section where it
> > > > > > > describes EACCEPT:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > IF (Tracking not correct)
> > > > > > > THEN
> > > > > > > RFLAGS.ZF := 1;
> > > > > > > RAX := SGX_NOT_TRACKED;
> > > > > > > GOTO DONE;
> > > > > > > FI;
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Reinette
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Yes, if enclave calls EACCEPT it does the necessary
> > > > > > introspection and makes
> > > > > > sure that ETRACK is completed. I have trouble understanding
> > > > > > how enclave
> > > > > > makes sure that EACCEPT was called.
> > > > >
> > > > > I'm not concerned of anything going wrong once EMODPR has
> > > > > been started.
> > > > >
> > > > > The problem nails down to that the whole EMODPR process is
> > > > > spawned by
> > > > > the entity that is not trusted so maybe that should further
> > > > > broke down
> > > > > to three roles:
> > > > >
> > > > > 1. Build process B
> > > > > 2. Runner process R.
> > > > > 3. Enclave E.
> > > > >
> > > > > And to the costraint that we trust B *more* than R. Once B
> > > > > has done all the
> > > > > needed EMODPR calls it would send the file descriptor to R.
> > > > > Even if R would
> > > > > have full access to /dev/sgx_enclave, it would not matter,
> > > > > since B has done
> > > > > EMODPR-EACCEPT dance with E.
> > > > >
> > > > > So what you can achieve with EMODPR is not protection against
> > > > > mistrusted
> > > > > *OS*. There's absolutely no chance you could use it for that
> > > > > purpose
> > > > > because mistrusted OS controls the whole process.
> > > > >
> > > > > EMODPR is to help to protect enclave against mistrusted
> > > > > *process*, i.e.
> > > > > in the above scenario R.
> > > >
> > > > There are two general cases that I can see. Both are valid.
> > > >
> > > > 1. The OS moves from a trusted to an untrusted state. This
> > > > could be
> > > > the multi-process system you've described. But it could also be
> > > > that
> > > > the kernel becomes compromised after the enclave is fully
> > > > initialized.
> > > >
> > > > 2. The OS is untrustworthy from the start.
> > > >
> > > > The second case is the stronger one and if you can solve it,
> > > > the first
> > > > one is solved implicitly. And our end goal is that if the OS
> > > > does
> > > > anything malicious we will crash in a controlled way.
> > > >
> > > > A defensive enclave will always want to have the least number
> > > > of
> > > > privileges for the maximum protection. Therefore, the enclave
> > > > will
> > > > want the OS to call EMODPR. If that were it, the host could
> > > > just lie.
> > > > But the enclave also verifies that the EMODPR operation was, in
> > > > fact,
> > > > executed by doing EACCEPT. When the enclave calls EACCEPT, if
> > > > the
> > > > kernel hasn't restricted permissions then we get a controlled
> > > > crash.
> > > > Therefore, we have solved the second case.
> > >
> > > So you're referring to this part of the SDM pseude code in the
> > > SDM:
> > >
> > > (* Check the destination EPC page for concurrency *)
> > > IF ( EPC page in use )
> > > THEN #GP(0); FI;
> > >
> > > I wonder does "EPC page in use" unconditionally trigger when
> > > EACCEPT
> > > is invoked for a page for which all of these conditions hold:
> > >
> > > - .PR := 0 (no EMODPR in progress)
> > > - .MODIFIED := 0 (no EMODT in progress)
> > > - .PENDING := 0 (no EMODPR in progress)
> > >
> > > I don't know the exact scope and scale of "EPC page in use".
> > >
> > > Then, yes, EACCEPT could be at least used to validate that one of
> > > the
> > > three operations above was requested. However, enclave thread
> > > cannot say
> > > which one was it, so it is guesswork.
> >
> > OK, I got it, and this last paragraph is not true. SECINFO given
> > EACCEPT
> > will lock in rest of the details and make the operation
> > deterministic.
>
> Indeed - so the SDM pseudo code that is relevant here can be found
> under
> the "(* Verify that accept request matches current EPC page settings
> *)"
> comment where the enclave can verify that all EPCM values are as they
> should
> and would fail with SGX_PAGE_ATTRIBUTES_MISMATCH if there is anything
> amiss.
>
> >
> > The only question mark then is the condition when no requests are
> > active.
>
> Could you please elaborate what you mean with this question? If no
> request
> is active then I understand that to mean that no request has started.
My issue was that when:
- .PR := 0 (no EMODPR in progress)
- .MODIFIED := 0 (no EMODT in progress)
- .PENDING := 0 (no EMODPR in progress)
Does this trigger #GP when you call EACCEPT?
I don't think the answer matters that much tho sice if e.g. EMODPR was never
done, and enclave expected a change, #GP would trigger eventually in SECINFO
validation.
The way I look at EACCEPT is a memory verification tool it does the same at
run-time as EINIT does before run-time.
/Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-20 12:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 155+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-12-01 19:22 [PATCH 00/25] x86/sgx and selftests/sgx: Support SGX2 Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:22 ` [PATCH 01/25] x86/sgx: Add shortlog descriptions to ENCLS wrappers Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 18:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:13 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 5:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 22:06 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 02/25] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for SGX2 functions Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 22:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:15 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 03/25] x86/sgx: Support VMA permissions exceeding enclave permissions Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 22:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-04 22:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:16 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 5:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 22:08 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 04/25] x86/sgx: Add pfn_mkwrite() handler for present PTEs Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 22:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:18 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 7:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 22:09 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-28 14:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 05/25] x86/sgx: Introduce runtime protection bits Reinette Chatre
2021-12-03 19:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-12-03 22:12 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 0:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-12-04 1:14 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 17:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-12-04 23:55 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-13 22:34 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:57 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:20 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 7:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 22:10 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-28 14:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-06 17:46 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-07 12:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-07 16:14 ` Haitao Huang
2022-01-08 15:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-08 15:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-08 16:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-10 22:05 ` Haitao Huang
2022-01-11 1:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-11 1:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-11 2:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-11 2:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-11 3:48 ` Haitao Huang
2022-01-12 23:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-13 2:41 ` Haitao Huang
2022-01-14 21:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-11 17:13 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-12 23:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-12 23:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-13 20:09 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2022-01-13 21:42 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-14 21:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-14 21:57 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-14 22:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-14 22:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-14 22:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-14 22:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-14 23:05 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-14 23:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-15 0:01 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-15 0:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-15 0:41 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-15 1:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-15 11:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-15 11:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-17 13:13 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2022-01-18 1:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-18 2:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-18 3:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-18 20:59 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-20 12:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2022-01-20 16:52 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-26 14:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-15 16:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-18 21:18 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-17 13:27 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2022-01-18 21:11 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 22:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:28 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 06/25] x86/sgx: Use more generic name for enclave cpumask function Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 22:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:29 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 07/25] x86/sgx: Move PTE zap code to separate function Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 22:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:30 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 7:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 22:11 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-28 14:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-01-06 17:46 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-01-07 12:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 08/25] x86/sgx: Make SGX IPI callback available internally Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:36 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 7:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 09/25] x86/sgx: Keep record of SGX page type Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 10/25] x86/sgx: Support enclave page permission changes Reinette Chatre
2021-12-02 23:48 ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-03 18:18 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-03 0:32 ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-03 18:18 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-03 18:14 ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-03 18:49 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-03 19:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-12-03 22:34 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 0:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-12-04 1:35 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 20:19 ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-11 5:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:42 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 7:57 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 22:12 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-28 14:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 11/25] selftests/sgx: Add test for EPCM " Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 12/25] selftests/sgx: Add test for TCS page " Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 13/25] x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to initialized enclave Reinette Chatre
2021-12-03 0:38 ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-03 18:47 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:44 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 8:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 22:12 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-28 14:57 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-01 15:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-03-01 17:08 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 14/25] x86/sgx: Tighten accessible memory range after enclave initialization Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:45 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 8:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 15/25] selftests/sgx: Test two different SGX2 EAUG flows Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 16/25] x86/sgx: Support modifying SGX page type Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:48 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-11 8:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-13 17:43 ` Dave Hansen
2021-12-21 8:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 17/25] x86/sgx: Support complete page removal Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 21:49 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 18/25] selftests/sgx: Introduce dynamic entry point Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 19/25] selftests/sgx: Introduce TCS initialization enclave operation Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 20/25] selftests/sgx: Test complete changing of page type flow Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 21/25] selftests/sgx: Test faulty enclave behavior Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 22/25] selftests/sgx: Test invalid access to removed enclave page Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 23/25] selftests/sgx: Test reclaiming of untouched page Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 24/25] x86/sgx: Free up EPC pages directly to support large page ranges Reinette Chatre
2021-12-04 23:47 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-12-06 22:07 ` Reinette Chatre
2021-12-01 19:23 ` [PATCH 25/25] selftests/sgx: Page removal stress test Reinette Chatre
2021-12-02 18:30 ` [PATCH 00/25] x86/sgx and selftests/sgx: Support SGX2 Dave Hansen
2021-12-02 20:38 ` Nathaniel McCallum
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