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From: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
To: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 6/6] powerpc: Implement user_access_begin and friends
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2020 12:40:23 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0c2855c2-a6d6-6b35-7f69-f55add58dfb8@c-s.fr> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87ftg6icc8.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au>



Le 23/01/2020 à 13:31, Michael Ellerman a écrit :
> Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> writes:
>> Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> writes:
>>> Today, when a function like strncpy_from_user() is called,
>>> the userspace access protection is de-activated and re-activated
>>> for every word read.
>>>
>>> By implementing user_access_begin and friends, the protection
>>> is de-activated at the beginning of the copy and re-activated at the
>>> end.
>>>
>>> Implement user_access_begin(), user_access_end() and
>>> unsafe_get_user(), unsafe_put_user() and unsafe_copy_to_user()
>>>
>>> For the time being, we keep user_access_save() and
>>> user_access_restore() as nops.
>>
>> That means we will run with user access enabled in a few more places, but
>> it's only used sparingly AFAICS:
>>
>>    kernel/trace/trace_branch.c:    unsigned long flags = user_access_save();
>>    lib/ubsan.c:    unsigned long flags = user_access_save();
>>    lib/ubsan.c:    unsigned long ua_flags = user_access_save();
>>    mm/kasan/common.c:      unsigned long flags = user_access_save();
>>
>> And we don't have objtool checking that user access enablement isn't
>> leaking in the first place, so I guess it's OK for us not to implement
>> these to begin with?
> 
> It looks like we can implement them on on all three KUAP
> implementations.
> 
> For radix and 8xx we just return/set the relevant SPR.
> 
> For book3s/32/kup.h I think we'd just need to add a KUAP_CURRENT case to
> allow_user_access()?

Can't do that, we don't want to keep the info in current->thread.kuap 
after user_access_save(), otherwise we might unexpectedly re-open access 
through an interrupt.

And if we use KUAP_CURRENT case of prevent_user_access(), it means we'll 
read current->thread.kuap twice.

So, just regenerate addr and end from the flags, and use 
allow_user_access() and prevent_user_access() as usual.

I'll have it in v4

Christophe

  reply	other threads:[~2020-01-24 11:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-01-22 17:52 [PATCH v2 1/6] fs/readdir: Fix filldir() and filldir64() use of user_access_begin() Christophe Leroy
2020-01-22 17:52 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] powerpc/32s: Fix bad_kuap_fault() Christophe Leroy
2020-01-22 17:52 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] powerpc/kuap: Fix set direction in allow/prevent_user_access() Christophe Leroy
2020-01-22 17:52 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] powerpc/32s: Drop NULL addr verification Christophe Leroy
2020-01-22 17:52 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] powerpc/32s: prepare prevent_user_access() for user_access_end() Christophe Leroy
2020-01-23 10:59   ` Michael Ellerman
2020-01-22 17:52 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] powerpc: Implement user_access_begin and friends Christophe Leroy
2020-01-23 12:05   ` Michael Ellerman
2020-01-23 12:31     ` Michael Ellerman
2020-01-24 11:40       ` Christophe Leroy [this message]
     [not found] ` <CAHk-=wgNQ-rWoLg0OCJYYYbKBnRAUK4NPU-OD+vv-6fWnd=8kA@mail.gmail.com>
2020-01-22 20:00   ` [PATCH v2 1/6] fs/readdir: Fix filldir() and filldir64() use of user_access_begin() Linus Torvalds
2020-01-22 20:15     ` Linus Torvalds
2020-01-22 20:37     ` Linus Torvalds
2020-01-23  6:27       ` Christophe Leroy
2020-01-23 11:56 ` Michael Ellerman
2020-01-23 12:00   ` Michael Ellerman
2020-01-23 12:43     ` Christophe Leroy
2020-01-23 18:38     ` Linus Torvalds
2020-01-24 10:42       ` Michael Ellerman

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