From: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Meredydd Luff <meredydd@senatehouse.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 02/11] selftests: Add test of O_BENEATH_ONLY & openat(2)
Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2014 11:28:02 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1404124096-21445-3-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1404124096-21445-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com>
At simple tests of openat(2) variations, including examples that
check the new O_BENEATH_ONLY flag.
Signed-off-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/openat/.gitignore | 3 +
tools/testing/selftests/openat/Makefile | 24 +++++
tools/testing/selftests/openat/openat.c | 146 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 173 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat/.gitignore
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat/Makefile
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat/openat.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/openat/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0a2446e89ad5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+openat
+subdir
+topfile
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/openat/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..dc28ce943edf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+CC = $(CROSS_COMPILE)gcc
+CFLAGS = -Wall
+BINARIES = openat
+DEPS = subdir topfile subdir/bottomfile subdir/symlinkup subdir/symlinkout
+all: $(BINARIES) $(DEPS)
+
+subdir:
+ mkdir -p subdir
+topfile:
+ echo 0123456789 > $@
+subdir/bottomfile: | subdir
+ echo 0123456789 > $@
+subdir/symlinkup:
+ ln -s ../topfile $@
+subdir/symlinkout:
+ ln -s /etc/passwd $@
+%: %.c
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $^
+
+run_tests: all
+ ./openat
+
+clean:
+ rm -rf $(BINARIES) $(DEPS)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat/openat.c b/tools/testing/selftests/openat/openat.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6171af6001c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat/openat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+
+/* Bypass glibc */
+static int openat_(int dirfd, const char *pathname, int flags)
+{
+ return syscall(__NR_openat, dirfd, pathname, flags);
+}
+
+static int openat_or_die(int dfd, const char *path, int flags)
+{
+ int fd = openat_(dfd, path, flags);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to openat(%d, '%s'); "
+ "check prerequisites are available\n", dfd, path);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ return fd;
+}
+
+static int check_openat(int dfd, const char *path, int flags)
+{
+ int rc;
+ int fd;
+ char buffer[4];
+
+ errno = 0;
+ printf("Check success of openat(%d, '%s', %x)... ",
+ dfd, path?:"(null)", flags);
+ fd = openat_(dfd, path, flags);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ printf("[FAIL]: openat() failed, rc=%d errno=%d (%s)\n",
+ fd, errno, strerror(errno));
+ return 1;
+ }
+ errno = 0;
+ rc = read(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ printf("[FAIL]: read() failed, rc=%d errno=%d (%s)\n",
+ rc, errno, strerror(errno));
+ return 1;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ printf("[OK]\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define check_openat_fail(dfd, path, flags, errno) \
+ _check_openat_fail(dfd, path, flags, errno, #errno)
+static int _check_openat_fail(int dfd, const char *path, int flags,
+ int expected_errno, const char *errno_str)
+{
+ errno = 0;
+ printf("Check failure of openat(%d, '%s', %x) with %s... ",
+ dfd, path?:"(null)", flags, errno_str);
+ int rc = openat_(dfd, path, flags);
+ if (rc > 0) {
+ printf("[FAIL] (unexpected success from openat(2))\n");
+ close(rc);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (errno != expected_errno) {
+ printf("[FAIL] (expected errno %d (%s) not %d (%s)\n",
+ expected_errno, strerror(expected_errno),
+ errno, strerror(errno));
+ return 1;
+ }
+ printf("[OK]\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ int fail = 0;
+ int dot_dfd = openat_or_die(AT_FDCWD, ".", O_RDONLY);
+ int subdir_dfd = openat_or_die(AT_FDCWD, "subdir", O_RDONLY);
+ int file_fd = openat_or_die(AT_FDCWD, "topfile", O_RDONLY);
+
+ /* Sanity check normal behavior */
+ fail |= check_openat(AT_FDCWD, "topfile", O_RDONLY);
+ fail |= check_openat(AT_FDCWD, "subdir/bottomfile", O_RDONLY);
+
+ fail |= check_openat(dot_dfd, "topfile", O_RDONLY);
+ fail |= check_openat(dot_dfd, "subdir/bottomfile", O_RDONLY);
+ fail |= check_openat(dot_dfd, "subdir/../topfile", O_RDONLY);
+
+ fail |= check_openat(subdir_dfd, "../topfile", O_RDONLY);
+ fail |= check_openat(subdir_dfd, "bottomfile", O_RDONLY);
+ fail |= check_openat(subdir_dfd, "../subdir/bottomfile", O_RDONLY);
+ fail |= check_openat(subdir_dfd, "symlinkup", O_RDONLY);
+ fail |= check_openat(subdir_dfd, "symlinkout", O_RDONLY);
+
+ fail |= check_openat(AT_FDCWD, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ fail |= check_openat(dot_dfd, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+ fail |= check_openat(subdir_dfd, "/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);
+
+ fail |= check_openat_fail(AT_FDCWD, "bogus", O_RDONLY, ENOENT);
+ fail |= check_openat_fail(dot_dfd, "bogus", O_RDONLY, ENOENT);
+ fail |= check_openat_fail(999, "bogus", O_RDONLY, EBADF);
+ fail |= check_openat_fail(file_fd, "bogus", O_RDONLY, ENOTDIR);
+
+#ifdef O_BENEATH_ONLY
+ /* Test out O_BENEATH_ONLY */
+ fail |= check_openat(AT_FDCWD, "topfile", O_RDONLY|O_BENEATH_ONLY);
+ fail |= check_openat(AT_FDCWD, "subdir/bottomfile",
+ O_RDONLY|O_BENEATH_ONLY);
+
+ fail |= check_openat(dot_dfd, "topfile", O_RDONLY|O_BENEATH_ONLY);
+ fail |= check_openat(dot_dfd, "subdir/bottomfile",
+ O_RDONLY|O_BENEATH_ONLY);
+ fail |= check_openat(subdir_dfd, "bottomfile", O_RDONLY|O_BENEATH_ONLY);
+
+ /* Can't open paths with ".." in them */
+ fail |= check_openat_fail(dot_dfd, "subdir/../topfile",
+ O_RDONLY|O_BENEATH_ONLY, EACCES);
+ fail |= check_openat_fail(subdir_dfd, "../topfile",
+ O_RDONLY|O_BENEATH_ONLY, EACCES);
+ fail |= check_openat_fail(subdir_dfd, "../subdir/bottomfile",
+ O_RDONLY|O_BENEATH_ONLY, EACCES);
+
+ /* Can't open paths starting with "/" */
+ fail |= check_openat_fail(AT_FDCWD, "/etc/passwd",
+ O_RDONLY|O_BENEATH_ONLY, EACCES);
+ fail |= check_openat_fail(dot_dfd, "/etc/passwd",
+ O_RDONLY|O_BENEATH_ONLY, EACCES);
+ fail |= check_openat_fail(subdir_dfd, "/etc/passwd",
+ O_RDONLY|O_BENEATH_ONLY, EACCES);
+ /* Can't sneak around constraints with symlinks */
+ fail |= check_openat_fail(subdir_dfd, "symlinkup",
+ O_RDONLY|O_BENEATH_ONLY, EACCES);
+ fail |= check_openat_fail(subdir_dfd, "symlinkout",
+ O_RDONLY|O_BENEATH_ONLY, EACCES);
+#else
+ printf("Skipping O_BENEATH_ONLY tests due to missing #define\n");
+#endif
+
+ return fail ? -1 : 0;
+}
--
2.0.0.526.g5318336
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-06-30 10:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-06-30 10:28 [RFC PATCH 00/11] Adding FreeBSD's Capsicum security framework (part 1) David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 01/11] fs: add O_BENEATH_ONLY flag to openat(2) David Drysdale
2014-06-30 14:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-30 15:49 ` David Drysdale
2014-06-30 15:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-08 12:07 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-07-08 12:48 ` Meredydd Luff
2014-07-08 12:51 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-07-08 13:04 ` Meredydd Luff
2014-07-08 13:12 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-06-30 20:40 ` Andi Kleen
2014-06-30 21:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-01 9:53 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-01 18:58 ` Loganaden Velvindron
2014-07-08 12:03 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-07-08 16:54 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-09 8:48 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-06-30 10:28 ` David Drysdale [this message]
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 03/11] capsicum: rights values and structure definitions David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 04/11] capsicum: implement fgetr() and friends David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 05/11] capsicum: convert callers to use fgetr() etc David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 06/11] capsicum: implement sockfd_lookupr() David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 07/11] capsicum: convert callers to use sockfd_lookupr() etc David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 08/11] capsicum: add new LSM hooks on FD/file conversion David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 09/11] capsicum: implementations of new LSM hooks David Drysdale
2014-06-30 16:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-02 13:49 ` Paul Moore
2014-07-02 17:09 ` David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 10/11] capsicum: invocation " David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 11/11] capsicum: add syscalls to limit FD rights David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 1/5] man-pages: open.2: describe O_BENEATH_ONLY flag David Drysdale
2014-06-30 22:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 2/5] man-pages: capsicum.7: describe Capsicum capability framework David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 3/5] man-pages: rights.7: Describe Capsicum primary rights David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 4/5] man-pages: cap_rights_limit.2: limit FD rights for Capsicum David Drysdale
2014-06-30 14:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-30 15:35 ` David Drysdale
2014-06-30 16:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-30 16:32 ` David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 5/5] man-pages: cap_rights_get: retrieve Capsicum fd rights David Drysdale
2014-06-30 22:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-01 9:19 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-01 14:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-03 9:12 ` [RFC PATCH 00/11] Adding FreeBSD's Capsicum security framework (part 1) Paolo Bonzini
2014-07-03 10:01 ` Loganaden Velvindron
2014-07-03 18:39 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-04 7:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2014-07-07 10:29 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-07 12:20 ` Paolo Bonzini
2014-07-07 14:11 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-07 22:33 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2014-07-08 14:58 ` Kees Cook
2014-08-16 15:41 ` Pavel Machek
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