From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@gmail.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 1/2] procfs: use an enum for possible hidepid values
Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2017 14:23:03 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1484572984-13388-2-git-send-email-djalal@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1484572984-13388-1-git-send-email-djalal@gmail.com>
From: Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@gmail.com>
Previously, the hidepid parameter was checked by comparing literal
integers 0, 1, 2. Let's add a proper enum for this, to make the checking
more expressive:
0 → HIDEPID_OFF
1 → HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS
2 → HIDEPID_INVISIBLE
This changes the internal labelling only, the userspace-facing interface
remains unmodified, and still works with literal integers 0, 1, 2.
No functional changes.
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@gmail.com>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++----
fs/proc/inode.c | 2 +-
fs/proc/root.c | 3 ++-
include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 6 ++++++
4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 8e7e61b..cd8dd15 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -729,11 +729,11 @@ static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
- has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 1);
+ has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS);
put_task_struct(task);
if (!has_perms) {
- if (pid->hide_pid == 2) {
+ if (pid->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
/*
* Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open()
* consistent with each other. If a process
@@ -1725,7 +1725,7 @@ int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
stat->gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
if (task) {
- if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 2)) {
+ if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* This doesn't prevent learning whether PID exists,
@@ -3179,7 +3179,7 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
iter.tgid += 1, iter = next_tgid(ns, iter)) {
char name[PROC_NUMBUF];
int len;
- if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, 2))
+ if (!has_pid_permissions(ns, iter.task, HIDEPID_INVISIBLE))
continue;
len = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%d", iter.tgid);
diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c
index 842a5ff..5d9bafb 100644
--- a/fs/proc/inode.c
+++ b/fs/proc/inode.c
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static int proc_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
if (!gid_eq(pid->pid_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID))
seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, pid->pid_gid));
- if (pid->hide_pid != 0)
+ if (pid->hide_pid != HIDEPID_OFF)
seq_printf(seq, ",hidepid=%u", pid->hide_pid);
return 0;
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index 1988440..b90da88 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid)
case Opt_hidepid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
- if (option < 0 || option > 2) {
+ if (option < HIDEPID_OFF ||
+ option > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
pr_err("proc: hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
index 34cce96..c2a989d 100644
--- a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h
@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ struct pidmap {
struct fs_pin;
+enum { /* definitions for pid_namespace's hide_pid field */
+ HIDEPID_OFF = 0,
+ HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS = 1,
+ HIDEPID_INVISIBLE = 2,
+};
+
struct pid_namespace {
struct kref kref;
struct pidmap pidmap[PIDMAP_ENTRIES];
--
2.5.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-01-16 13:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-01-16 13:23 [PATCH v4 0/2] procfs/tasks: introduce per-task procfs hidepid= field Djalal Harouni
2017-01-16 13:23 ` Djalal Harouni [this message]
2017-02-13 22:16 ` [PATCH v4 1/2] procfs: use an enum for possible hidepid values Kees Cook
2017-02-15 0:34 ` Andrew Morton
2017-02-15 8:56 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-01-16 13:23 ` [PATCH v4 2/2] procfs/tasks: add a simple per-task procfs hidepid= field Djalal Harouni
2017-01-16 18:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-01-17 9:54 ` Lafcadio Wluiki
[not found] ` <CAEiveUfDvSoW9Hy2Y_uxU2YQ+vR8OvXMqRhxAANTGG7QaQbJeg@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <CALCETrWEGLhEHO_6sTXreVyWFVsEeYmZSrLNNXx-ma5gd+nTQQ@mail.gmail.com>
2017-01-18 22:50 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-01-18 23:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-19 13:53 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-01-19 19:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-20 15:56 ` Lafcadio Wluiki
2017-01-20 16:33 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-01-21 0:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-23 11:46 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-01-23 20:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-26 13:20 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-02-10 14:40 ` Lafcadio Wluiki
2017-02-10 16:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-01-20 15:44 ` Lafcadio Wluiki
2017-02-10 23:44 ` Kees Cook
2017-02-13 19:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-02-13 19:15 ` Kees Cook
2017-02-14 4:11 ` Christian Kujau
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