From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S934535AbdKBWBh (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Nov 2017 18:01:37 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:33234 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753623AbdKBWBf (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Nov 2017 18:01:35 -0400 Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown From: Mimi Zohar To: David Howells , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, matthew.garrett@nebula.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jforbes@redhat.com Date: Thu, 02 Nov 2017 18:01:26 -0400 In-Reply-To: <150842463163.7923.11081723749106843698.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <150842463163.7923.11081723749106843698.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 17110222-0016-0000-0000-000004FCECC5 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 17110222-0017-0000-0000-000028387EFB Message-Id: <1509660086.3416.15.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:,, definitions=2017-11-02_07:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1707230000 definitions=main-1711020269 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi David, >>From the man page: > Only validly signed modules may be loaded. > .P > Only validly signed binaries may be kexec'd. > .P > Only validly signed device firmware may be loaded. fw_get_filesystem_firmware() calls kernel_read_file_from_path() to read the firmware, which calls into the security hooks. Is there another place that validates the firmware signatures.  I'm not seeing which patch requires firmware to be signed? Mimi