linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
To: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	tglx@linutronix.de, Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, x86@kernel.org,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 12/12] x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 21:46:34 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515707194-20531-13-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515707194-20531-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

In accordance with the Intel and AMD documentation, we need to overwrite
all entries in the RSB on exiting a guest, to prevent malicious branch
target predictions from affecting the host kernel. This is needed both
for retpoline and for IBRS.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                   |  4 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                   |  4 ++
 3 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index ea034fa..475ab0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -7,6 +7,43 @@
 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
 
+/*
+ * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
+ *
+ * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
+ * infinite 'pause; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
+ *
+ * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
+ * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
+ * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
+ * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
+ * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
+ *
+ * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
+ * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
+ * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
+ */
+
+#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS		32	/* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
+#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS		16	/* To avoid underflow */
+
+#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp, uniq)	\
+	mov	$(nr/2), reg;			\
+.Ldo_call1_ ## uniq:				\
+	call	.Ldo_call2_ ## uniq;		\
+.Ltrap1_ ## uniq:				\
+	pause;					\
+	jmp	.Ltrap1_ ## uniq;		\
+.Ldo_call2_ ## uniq:				\
+	call	.Ldo_loop_ ## uniq;		\
+.Ltrap2_ ## uniq:				\
+	pause;					\
+	jmp	.Ltrap2_ ## uniq;		\
+.Ldo_loop_ ## uniq:				\
+	dec	reg;				\
+	jnz	.Ldo_call1_ ## uniq;		\
+	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
+
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
 
 /*
@@ -76,6 +113,20 @@
 #endif
 .endm
 
+ /*
+  * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
+  * monstrosity above, manually.
+  */
+.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@",				\
+		__stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP,\@))	\
+		\ftr
+.Lskip_rsb_\@:
+#endif
+.endm
+
 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE				\
@@ -119,7 +170,7 @@
 	X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
 
 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
-#else /* No retpoline */
+#else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
 # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
 #endif
@@ -134,5 +185,25 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
 };
 
+/*
+ * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
+ * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
+ * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ */
+static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+	unsigned long loops = RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS / 2;
+
+	asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+		      ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
+				  __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1, __LINE__)),
+				  X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
+		      "910:"
+		      : "=&r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
+		      : "r" (loops) : "memory" );
+#endif
+}
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 #endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 0e68f0b..2744b973 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 #include <asm/debugreg.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_para.h>
 #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #include <asm/virtext.h>
 #include "trace.h"
@@ -4985,6 +4986,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 #endif
 		);
 
+	/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
+	vmexit_fill_RSB();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
 #else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 62ee436..d1e25db 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #include "trace.h"
 #include "pmu.h"
@@ -9403,6 +9404,9 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 #endif
 	      );
 
+	/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
+	vmexit_fill_RSB();
+
 	/* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */
 	if (debugctlmsr)
 		update_debugctlmsr(debugctlmsr);
-- 
2.7.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-11 21:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 85+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-11 21:46 [PATCH v8 00/12] Retpoline: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 01/12] objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:22   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 02/12] objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:22   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-18 19:09   ` [v8,02/12] " Guenter Roeck
2018-01-18 19:33     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-18 19:41       ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-22 19:34         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-22 20:25           ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-22 20:27             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-28 21:06             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-29  1:26               ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-29 17:15               ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-29 17:30                 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-22 19:27       ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 03/12] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:23   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:58   ` [PATCH v8 03/12] " Tom Lendacky
2018-01-12 10:28     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-12 14:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-14 15:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-14 15:53     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-14 15:59       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:23   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 22:40   ` [PATCH v8 04/12] " Borislav Petkov
2018-01-23 22:53     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 23:05       ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-23 22:55     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-23 23:05       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-24  0:32         ` Kees Cook
2018-01-24  9:58           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-23 23:06       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-23 23:21       ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-23 23:24         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-23 23:45           ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-23 23:49             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-24  4:26               ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-24  9:56                 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-24 13:58                   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-24 14:03                     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-24 14:22                       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 05/12] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:24   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 06/12] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:24   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 07/12] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace " David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:25   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 08/12] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:25   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 09/12] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall " David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:25   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 10/12] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler " David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:26   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 21:46 ` [PATCH v8 11/12] x86/retpoline/irq32: " David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:26   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for Andi Kleen
2018-01-11 21:46 ` David Woodhouse [this message]
2018-01-11 23:27   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 23:51   ` [PATCH v8 12/12] " Andi Kleen
2018-01-12 11:11     ` [PATCH v8.1 " David Woodhouse
2018-01-12 11:15       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-12 11:21         ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-12 11:37       ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-14 14:50         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-14 15:28           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-14 15:35         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 12:07         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 12:20           ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 12:45             ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 15:10               ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-25 15:51                 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 16:03                   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 16:56                     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-25 17:00                       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 17:05                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-25 17:44                           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-25 18:41                           ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-25 17:10                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 17:32                         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-25 17:53                         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 18:04                           ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 18:32                             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-25 19:07                             ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 19:10                               ` Borislav Petkov

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1515707194-20531-13-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk \
    --to=dwmw@amazon.co.uk \
    --cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk \
    --cc=gregkh@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=jikos@kernel.org \
    --cc=jpoimboe@redhat.com \
    --cc=keescook@google.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=pjt@google.com \
    --cc=riel@redhat.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).