From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 43656C43381 for ; Fri, 1 Mar 2019 01:44:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0E58720863 for ; Fri, 1 Mar 2019 01:44:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731314AbfCABod (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Feb 2019 20:44:33 -0500 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:57366 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725967AbfCABod (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Feb 2019 20:44:33 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098421.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x211hxDg087578 for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2019 20:44:31 -0500 Received: from e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.97]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2qxsxg34rp-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Thu, 28 Feb 2019 20:44:31 -0500 Received: from localhost by e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Fri, 1 Mar 2019 01:44:29 -0000 Received: from b06cxnps3075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (9.149.109.195) by e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com (192.168.101.131) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Fri, 1 Mar 2019 01:44:26 -0000 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06cxnps3075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x211iPE861210718 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Fri, 1 Mar 2019 01:44:26 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id C49FEAE057; Fri, 1 Mar 2019 01:44:25 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0A217AE045; Fri, 1 Mar 2019 01:44:25 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.80.108.117]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Fri, 1 Mar 2019 01:44:24 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches From: Mimi Zohar To: Matthew Garrett Cc: jmorris@namei.org, LSM List , Linux Kernel Mailing List , David Howells Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 20:44:14 -0500 In-Reply-To: References: <1551392438.10911.227.camel@linux.ibm.com> <1551398720.10911.270.camel@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19030101-4275-0000-0000-000003155751 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19030101-4276-0000-0000-000038239FF7 Message-Id: <1551404654.10911.276.camel@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-03-01_02:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1903010008 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, 2019-02-28 at 17:01 -0800, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > That's not a valid reason for preventing systems that do use IMA for > > verifying the kexec kernel image signature or kernel module signatures > > from enabling "lock down". This just means that there needs to be > > some coordination between the different signature verification > > methods. [1][2] > > I agree, but the current form of the integration makes it impossible > for anyone using an IMA-enabled kernel (but not using IMA) to do > anything unless they have IMA signatures. It's a problem we need to > solve, I just don't think it's a problem we need to solve before > merging the patchset. That's simply not true.  Have you even looked at the IMA architecture patches? fcf338449af5 x86/ima: require signed kernel modules d958083a8f64 x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86 Mimi