From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>, jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 27/27] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 11:33:55 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1553614435.4115.19.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190325220954.29054-28-matthewgarrett@google.com>
On Mon, 2019-03-25 at 15:09 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels.
> For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating
> a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those
> platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to
> determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type,
> and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down.
> This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set
> in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime.
>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> include/linux/ima.h | 9 ++++++
> kernel/kexec_file.c | 7 +++-
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index b5e16b8c50b7..05921227d700 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -127,4 +127,13 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> return 0;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
> +
> +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
> +extern bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func);
> +#else
> +static inline bool ima_appraise_kexec_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
> #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> index 0cfe4f6f7f85..8ffa4b75c620 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> @@ -240,7 +240,12 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
>
> ret = 0;
>
> - if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason)) {
> + /* If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec
> + * image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked
> + * down.
> + */
> + if (!ima_appraise_signature(READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) &&
> + kernel_is_locked_down(reason)) {
> ret = -EPERM;
> goto out;
> }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index cc12f3449a72..fe03cc6f1ca4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {
> u64 count;
> };
>
> +extern const int read_idmap[];
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
> void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void);
> #else
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 4ffac4f5c647..106f06dee9d1 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
> +const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
> [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 122797023bdb..f8f1cdb74a4f 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -1341,3 +1341,53 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> return 0;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
> +
> +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
> +/*
> + * ima_appraise_signature: whether IMA will appraise a given function using
> + * an IMA digital signature. This is restricted to cases where the kernel
> + * has a set of built-in trusted keys in order to avoid an attacker simply
> + * loading additional keys.
> + */
> +bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> +{
> + struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
> + bool found = false;
> + enum ima_hooks func;
> +
> + if (id >= READING_MAX_ID)
> + return false;
> +
> + func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
> +
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
> + if (entry->action != APPRAISE)
> + continue;
> +
> + /*
> + * A generic entry will match, but otherwise require that it
> + * match the func we're looking for
> + */
> + if (entry->func && entry->func != func)
> + continue;
> +
> + /*
> + * We require this to be a digital signature, not a raw IMA
> + * hash.
> + */
> + if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
> + found = true;
> +
> + /*
> + * We've found a rule that matches, so break now even if it
> + * didn't require a digital signature - a later rule that does
> + * won't override it, so would be a false positive.
> + */
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + return found;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-26 15:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-25 22:09 [PULL REQUEST] Lockdown patches for 5.2 Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 5:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 02/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 03/27] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 04/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 05/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 06/27] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 23:40 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 13/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 14/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 17/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 18/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 19/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 20/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 23:35 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 21/27] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 22/27] Lock down kprobes Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 12:29 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-26 17:41 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 22:47 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 23/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 23:42 ` Stephen Hemminger
2019-03-25 23:59 ` Stephen Hemminger
2019-03-26 0:00 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-03-26 13:54 ` Jordan Glover
2019-03-26 0:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-26 18:57 ` James Morris
2019-03-26 19:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-28 3:15 ` James Morris
2019-03-28 18:07 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-28 19:23 ` James Morris
2019-03-28 20:08 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 20:19 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 24/27] Lock down perf Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 25/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 0:31 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-03-26 0:38 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 0:43 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 26/27] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-03-25 22:09 ` [PATCH 27/27] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-03-26 15:33 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
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