From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CEAD9C31E45 for ; Thu, 13 Jun 2019 15:35:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A3C602082C for ; Thu, 13 Jun 2019 15:35:06 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=linaro.org header.i=@linaro.org header.b="YkW4wOsm" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731105AbfFMPfF (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 Jun 2019 11:35:05 -0400 Received: from mail-pl1-f196.google.com ([209.85.214.196]:39245 "EHLO mail-pl1-f196.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727944AbfFMKbX (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 Jun 2019 06:31:23 -0400 Received: by mail-pl1-f196.google.com with SMTP id b7so2917510pls.6 for ; Thu, 13 Jun 2019 03:31:23 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=c4lD5Ja/W68zU30yx+ZIDKDyIrqaAIZ94VRiCyeCO0Y=; b=YkW4wOsmtRXKF39IQeQs8ZdcwD+6X2M5iCF/r6jKCp49Ml1bgkwnn9qLqERse4MXnS JvE/JUr1cR6fI4sYp9RHlrto71AB7k+bS6GVAtsKrhT2Wmz0R/Nn7NUSf9qGlSMRGqGX VFRL05138Hd3JVcXhBoLNfRo+SP5MpLwlqKq3bPblTc9ut7nk6RpFrhz/AS0kQLMdp7W NYPunno5BmFlawT6AG9mFdUyJvmrBka68PEWDGES8yBZtUknvd3nXlEXBJq+d80A2PuT pOlbAZYM12CmFbPUcdVThV/+qdhyEwwMTvqzkqBEoGhYmCw5qx4Uu3CqrowG+fxR70zk EXuQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=c4lD5Ja/W68zU30yx+ZIDKDyIrqaAIZ94VRiCyeCO0Y=; b=G9mrUWk4xZ2jgdTDrADLLFdea2b7cDQzIN0HmlmfydFlzuxSR4N0DZdNSwwpbq3bkp 4xY5tuxwyxMAtvlLHORSpLIq//IsjuR2XnF6A8D1u4GzB+cMMdxwbdKbRMVAX8Wg60WM 3bAQfaROOl5ZBbisO08Sm1a9Yj5zW3Mds7Typ/PK5i9EpbOfGwJRW3gXfKdNQG3OWOu2 cbGkByvEEkTjCUAs7Lvt8UMVWdd1ztKAvDqvYZd7EKb2vd8fSo9EOR+oGuEMaNZU7fWM uJs5s5K42VSfjH6jBBr3CJ8F18K/eW095naAYgbiw44Bkg/wIq38LNtJgWB5ymgQb/Ko /ijg== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWmDD+dRG58svYc9iOjDB/C62pguPsoDtSffEKXuxri/0cT6ojG KQZODprzByHstlLG2oi+9CV4UA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwf629GmUVbhLZnIAU/FAePATiykUd+OC7xErJfaA+0pIRy9XJpSrc4JheBzy9dpn/uP2D0ug== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:106:: with SMTP id 6mr23919253plb.64.1560421882686; Thu, 13 Jun 2019 03:31:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([117.196.234.139]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a12sm2265078pgq.0.2019.06.13.03.31.10 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Thu, 13 Jun 2019 03:31:21 -0700 (PDT) From: Sumit Garg To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: jens.wiklander@linaro.org, corbet@lwn.net, dhowells@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, daniel.thompson@linaro.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tee-dev@lists.linaro.org, Sumit Garg Subject: [RFC 0/7] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 16:00:26 +0530 Message-Id: <1560421833-27414-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device. This series also adds some TEE features like: Patch #1, #2 enables support for registered kernel shared memory with TEE. Patch #3 enables support for private kernel login method required for cases like trusted keys where we don't wan't user-space to directly access TEE service to retrieve trusted key contents. Rest of the patches from #4 to #7 adds support for TEE based trusted keys. This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based pseudo TA which can be found here [1]. Looking forward to your valuable feedback/suggestions. [1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3082 Sumit Garg (7): tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm tee: enable support to register kernel memory tee: add private login method for kernel clients KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys KEYS: encrypted: Allow TEE based trusted master keys doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst | 93 +++++ MAINTAINERS | 9 + drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 7 + drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 6 + drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 16 +- include/keys/tee_trusted.h | 84 ++++ include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + include/linux/tee_drv.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 2 + security/keys/Kconfig | 3 + security/keys/Makefile | 3 + security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c | 10 +- security/keys/tee_trusted.c | 506 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 13 files changed, 737 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst create mode 100644 include/keys/tee_trusted.h create mode 100644 security/keys/tee_trusted.c -- 2.7.4