From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.7 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC104C31E5B for ; Tue, 18 Jun 2019 00:05:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A16EC208E4 for ; Tue, 18 Jun 2019 00:05:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728225AbfFRAFs (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Jun 2019 20:05:48 -0400 Received: from mga04.intel.com ([192.55.52.120]:49795 "EHLO mga04.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726568AbfFRAFs (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Jun 2019 20:05:48 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 17 Jun 2019 17:05:47 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 Received: from khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com ([10.255.91.82]) by fmsmga008.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 17 Jun 2019 17:05:43 -0700 Message-ID: <1560816342.5187.63.camel@linux.intel.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH, RFC 45/62] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call for MKTME From: Kai Huang To: Andy Lutomirski , Dave Hansen Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Andrew Morton , X86 ML , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Borislav Petkov , Peter Zijlstra , David Howells , Kees Cook , Jacob Pan , Alison Schofield , Linux-MM , kvm list , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, LKML , Tom Lendacky Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 12:05:42 +1200 In-Reply-To: References: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> <20190508144422.13171-46-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> <3c658cce-7b7e-7d45-59a0-e17dae986713@intel.com> <5cbfa2da-ba2e-ed91-d0e8-add67753fc12@intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.24.6 (3.24.6-1.fc26) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, 2019-06-17 at 12:12 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Mon, Jun 17, 2019 at 11:37 AM Dave Hansen wrote: > > > > Tom Lendacky, could you take a look down in the message to the talk of > > SEV? I want to make sure I'm not misrepresenting what it does today. > > ... > > > > > > > > I actually don't care all that much which one we end up with. It's not > > > > like the extra syscall in the second options means much. > > > > > > The benefit of the second one is that, if sys_encrypt is absent, it > > > just works. In the first model, programs need a fallback because > > > they'll segfault of mprotect_encrypt() gets ENOSYS. > > > > Well, by the time they get here, they would have already had to allocate > > and set up the encryption key. I don't think this would really be the > > "normal" malloc() path, for instance. > > > > > > How do we > > > > eventually stack it on top of persistent memory filesystems or Device > > > > DAX? > > > > > > How do we stack anonymous memory on top of persistent memory or Device > > > DAX? I'm confused. > > > > If our interface to MKTME is: > > > > fd = open("/dev/mktme"); > > ptr = mmap(fd); > > > > Then it's hard to combine with an interface which is: > > > > fd = open("/dev/dax123"); > > ptr = mmap(fd); > > > > Where if we have something like mprotect() (or madvise() or something > > else taking pointer), we can just do: > > > > fd = open("/dev/anything987"); > > ptr = mmap(fd); > > sys_encrypt(ptr); > > I'm having a hard time imagining that ever working -- wouldn't it blow > up if someone did: > > fd = open("/dev/anything987"); > ptr1 = mmap(fd); > ptr2 = mmap(fd); > sys_encrypt(ptr1); > > So I think it really has to be: > fd = open("/dev/anything987"); > ioctl(fd, ENCRYPT_ME); > mmap(fd); This requires "/dev/anything987" to support ENCRYPT_ME ioctl, right? So to support NVDIMM (DAX), we need to add ENCRYPT_ME ioctl to DAX? > > But I really expect that the encryption of a DAX device will actually > be a block device setting and won't look like this at all. It'll be > more like dm-crypt except without device mapper. Are you suggesting not to support MKTME for DAX, or adding MKTME support to dm-crypt? Thanks, -Kai