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From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, luto@amacapital.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH v4 02/14] x86/boot: Add setup_indirect support in early_memremap_is_setup_data
Date: Fri, 27 Aug 2021 09:28:25 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1630070917-9896-3-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1630070917-9896-1-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

The x86 boot documentation describes the setup_indirect structures and
how they are used. Only one of the two functions in ioremap.c that needed
to be modified to be aware of the introduction of setup_indirect
functionality was updated. This adds comparable support to the other
function where it was missing.

Fixes: b3c72fc9a78e ("x86/boot: Introduce setup_indirect")

Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index ab74e4f..f2b34c5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -669,17 +669,34 @@ static bool __init early_memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
 
 	paddr = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
 	while (paddr) {
-		unsigned int len;
+		unsigned int len, size;
 
 		if (phys_addr == paddr)
 			return true;
 
 		data = early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, sizeof(*data));
+		size = sizeof(*data);
 
 		paddr_next = data->next;
 		len = data->len;
 
-		early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
+		if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + len))) {
+			early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
+			return true;
+		}
+
+		if (data->type == SETUP_INDIRECT) {
+			size += len;
+			early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
+			data = early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, size);
+
+			if (((struct setup_indirect *)data->data)->type != SETUP_INDIRECT) {
+				paddr = ((struct setup_indirect *)data->data)->addr;
+				len = ((struct setup_indirect *)data->data)->len;
+			}
+		}
+
+		early_memunmap(data, size);
 
 		if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + len)))
 			return true;
-- 
1.8.3.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-08-27 13:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-27 13:28 [PATCH v4 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 01/14] x86/boot: Fix memremap of setup_indirect structures Ross Philipson
2021-09-22 12:01   ` Daniel Kiper
2021-08-27 13:28 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2021-09-22 12:03   ` [PATCH v4 02/14] x86/boot: Add setup_indirect support in early_memremap_is_setup_data Daniel Kiper
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 03/14] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 04/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2021-12-02 17:26   ` Robin Murphy
2021-12-03 15:47     ` Ross Philipson
2021-12-03 16:03       ` Robin Murphy
2021-12-03 17:48         ` Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 05/14] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 06/14] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 07/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 09/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 10/14] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 11/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 12/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 13/14] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:28 ` [PATCH v4 14/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2021-08-27 13:30   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2021-08-30 19:45     ` Daniel P. Smith
2021-12-01  1:06 ` [PATCH v4 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Paul Moore
2021-12-02 16:09   ` Daniel P. Smith
2021-12-06 20:56     ` Paul Moore
2022-01-21 21:39       ` Paul Moore
2022-02-15 15:50         ` Daniel P. Smith

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