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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 
	<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@kernel.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Raj Ashok <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v1 26/26] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for TD guest
Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2021 14:17:54 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1741d632-0ed0-6a5b-efae-4fdb2689e20f@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <72ebe1575ff79bce7be38b8093aeb41032562a22.1612563142.git.sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>

On 2/5/21 3:38 PM, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan wrote:
> From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> 
> TDX doesn't allow to perform DMA access to guest private memory.
> In order for DMA to work properly in TD guest, user SWIOTLB bounce
> buffers.
> 
> Move AMD SEV initialization into common code and adopt for TDX.

This would be best if it can draw a parallel between TDX and SEV.

>  arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c    |  2 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/tdx.c            |  3 +++
>  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c        | 44 -------------------------------
>  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
> index c2cfa5e7c152..020e13749758 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
> @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int __init pci_swiotlb_detect_4gb(void)
>  	 * buffers are allocated and used for devices that do not support
>  	 * the addressing range required for the encryption mask.
>  	 */
> -	if (sme_active())
> +	if (sme_active() || is_tdx_guest())
>  		swiotlb = 1;
>  
>  	return swiotlb;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tdx.c
> index f51a19168adc..ccb9401bd706 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tdx.c
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
>  #include <asm/vmx.h>
>  #include <asm/insn.h>
>  #include <linux/sched/signal.h> /* force_sig_fault() */
> +#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST
>  #include "tdx-kvm.c"
> @@ -472,6 +473,8 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)
>  
>  	legacy_pic = &null_legacy_pic;
>  
> +	swiotlb_force = SWIOTLB_FORCE;

Dumb question time.  But, what is the difference between

	swiotlb = 1;

and

	swiotlb_force = SWIOTLB_FORCE;

It would be nice of the patch to enable me to be a lazy reviewer.

>  	cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "tdx:cpu_hotplug",
>  			  NULL, tdx_cpu_offline_prepare);
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> index 11a6a7b3af7e..7fbbb2f3d426 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c

Should we be renaming this to amd_mem_encrypt.c or something?

...
> -	 */
> -	if (sev_active())
> -		static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key);
> -
> -	print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
> -}
> -
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
> index b6d93b0c5dcf..6f3d90d4d68e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
> @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>  #include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
>  #include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
> +#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
>  
>  /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
>  bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
> @@ -36,3 +37,47 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
>  
>  	return false;
>  }
> +
> +static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
> +{

This function is now named wrong IMNHO.  If it's about AMD only, it
needs AMD in the name.

> +	pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:");
> +
> +	/* Secure Memory Encryption */
> +	if (sme_active()) {
> +		/*
> +		 * SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV
> +		 * features below.
> +		 */
> +		pr_cont(" SME\n");
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
> +	if (sev_active())
> +		pr_cont(" SEV");
> +
> +	/* Encrypted Register State */
> +	if (sev_es_active())
> +		pr_cont(" SEV-ES");
> +
> +	pr_cont("\n");
> +}

I'm really tempted to say this needs to be off in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c

> +/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
> +void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
> +{
> +	if (!sme_me_mask && !is_tdx_guest())
> +		return;

The direct check of sme_me_mask looks odd now.  What does this *MEAN*?
Are we looking to jump out of here if no memory encryption is enabled?

I'd much rather this look more like:

	if (!x86_memory_encryption())
		return;

> +	/* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
> +	swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
> +	/*
> +	 * With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions.
> +	 */
> +	if (sev_active())
> +		static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key);
> +
> +	if (!is_tdx_guest())
> +		print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
> +}


  reply	other threads:[~2021-04-01 21:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 161+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-06  3:02 Test Email sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 00/26] Add TDX Guest Support Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 01/26] x86/paravirt: Introduce CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XL Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add TDX Guest CPU feature Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 03/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add is_tdx_guest() interface Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-04-01 21:08   ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-01 21:15     ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-04-01 21:19       ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-01 22:25         ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 04/26] x86/tdx: Get TD execution environment information via TDINFO Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-08 10:00   ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-02-08 19:10     ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 05/26] x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-08 10:20   ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-02-08 16:23     ` Andi Kleen
2021-02-08 16:33       ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-02-08 16:46         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-08 16:59           ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-02-08 19:05             ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-08 16:46         ` Andi Kleen
2021-02-12 19:20   ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-12 19:47   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-12 20:06     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-12 20:17       ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-12 20:37         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-12 20:46           ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-12 20:54             ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-12 21:06               ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-12 21:37                 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-12 21:47                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-12 21:48                     ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-14 19:33                       ` Andi Kleen
2021-02-14 19:54                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-12 20:20       ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-12 20:44         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 06/26] x86/tdx: Add HLT " Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 07/26] x86/tdx: Wire up KVM hypercalls Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 08/26] x86/tdx: Add MSR support for TDX guest Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 09/26] x86/tdx: Handle CPUID via #VE Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:42   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-07 14:13     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-07 16:01       ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-07 20:29         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-07 22:31           ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-07 22:45             ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-08 17:10               ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-08 17:35                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-08 17:47                   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-18 21:30               ` [PATCH v1 1/1] x86/tdx: Add tdcall() and tdvmcall() helper functions Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-03-19 16:55                 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-19 17:42                   ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-03-19 18:22                     ` Dave Hansen
2021-03-19 19:58                       ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-03-26 23:38                         ` [PATCH v2 1/1] x86/tdx: Add __tdcall() and __tdvmcall() " Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-04-20 17:36                           ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-20 19:20                             ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-04-20 19:59                               ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-20 23:12                                 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-04-20 23:42                                   ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-23  1:09                                     ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-04-23  1:21                                       ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-23  1:35                                         ` Andi Kleen
2021-04-23 15:15                                           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-23 15:28                                             ` Dan Williams
2021-04-23 15:38                                               ` Andi Kleen
2021-04-23 15:50                                               ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-23 15:47                                             ` Andi Kleen
2021-04-23 18:18                                             ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-04-20 23:53                                   ` Dan Williams
2021-04-20 23:59                                     ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 10/26] x86/io: Allow to override inX() and outX() implementation Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 11/26] x86/tdx: Handle port I/O Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 12/26] x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-04-01 19:56   ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-01 22:26     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-01 22:53       ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 13/26] x86/tdx: Handle MWAIT, MONITOR and WBINVD Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:43   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-02-05 23:54     ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-06  1:05       ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-03-27  0:18         ` [PATCH v1 1/1] " Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-03-27  2:40           ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-03-27  3:40             ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-03-27 16:03               ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-03-27 22:54                 ` [PATCH v2 " Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-03-29 17:14                   ` Dave Hansen
2021-03-29 21:55                     ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-03-29 22:02                       ` Dave Hansen
2021-03-29 22:09                         ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-03-29 22:12                           ` Dave Hansen
2021-03-29 22:42                             ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-03-29 23:16                             ` [PATCH v3 " Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-03-29 23:23                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-03-29 23:37                                 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-03-29 23:42                                   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-29 23:58                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-03-30  2:04                                       ` Andi Kleen
2021-03-30  2:58                                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-03-30 15:14                                           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-30 16:37                                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-03-30 16:57                                               ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-07 15:24                                                 ` Andi Kleen
2021-03-31 21:09                                           ` [PATCH v4 " Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-03-31 21:49                                             ` Dave Hansen
2021-03-31 22:29                                               ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-03-31 21:53                                             ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-31 22:00                                               ` Dave Hansen
2021-03-31 22:06                                                 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-31 22:11                                                   ` Dave Hansen
2021-03-31 22:28                                                     ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-03-31 22:32                                                       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-03-31 22:34                                                       ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-01  3:28                                                         ` Andi Kleen
2021-04-01  3:46                                                           ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-01  4:24                                                             ` Andi Kleen
2021-04-01  4:51                                                               ` [PATCH v5 " Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-03-29 23:39                                 ` [PATCH v3 " Sean Christopherson
2021-03-29 23:38                               ` Dave Hansen
2021-03-30  4:56           ` [PATCH v1 " Xiaoyao Li
2021-03-30 15:00             ` Andi Kleen
2021-03-30 15:10               ` Dave Hansen
2021-03-30 17:02                 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 14/26] ACPI: tables: Add multiprocessor wake-up support Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 15/26] x86/boot: Add a trampoline for APs booting in 64-bit mode Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 16/26] x86/boot: Avoid #VE during compressed boot for TDX platforms Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 17/26] x86/boot: Avoid unnecessary #VE during boot process Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 18/26] x86/topology: Disable CPU hotplug support for TDX platforms Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 19/26] x86/tdx: Forcefully disable legacy PIC for TDX guests Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 20/26] x86/tdx: Introduce INTEL_TDX_GUEST config option Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 21/26] x86/mm: Move force_dma_unencrypted() to common code Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-04-01 20:06   ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-06 15:37     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-06 16:11       ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-06 16:37         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 22/26] x86/tdx: Exclude Shared bit from __PHYSICAL_MASK Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-04-01 20:13   ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-06 15:54     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-06 16:12       ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 23/26] x86/tdx: Make pages shared in ioremap() Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-04-01 20:26   ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-06 16:00     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-06 16:14       ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 24/26] x86/tdx: Add helper to do MapGPA TDVMALL Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 25/26] x86/tdx: Make DMA pages shared Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-04-01 21:01   ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-06 16:31     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-06 16:38       ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-06 17:16         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-05 23:38 ` [RFC v1 26/26] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for TD guest Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2021-04-01 21:17   ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2021-02-06  3:04 ` Test Email sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy
2021-02-06  6:24 ` [RFC v1 00/26] Add TDX Guest Support sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy
2021-03-31 21:38 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-04-02  0:02 ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-02  2:48   ` Andi Kleen
2021-04-02 15:27     ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-02 21:32       ` Andi Kleen
2021-04-03 16:26         ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-03 17:28           ` Andi Kleen
2021-04-04 15:02 ` Dave Hansen
2021-04-12 17:24   ` Dan Williams

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