From: Glenn Fowler <gsf@research.att.com>
To: davem@redhat.com, dgk@research.att.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@oss.sgi.com
Subject: Re: kernel bug in socketpair()
Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2003 12:56:12 -0400 (EDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <200307231656.MAA69129@raptor.research.att.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20030723074615.25eea776.davem@redhat.com
you can eliminate the security implications for all fd types by
simply translating
open("/dev/fd/N",...)
to
dup(atoi(N))
w.r.t. fd N in the current process
the problem is that linux took an implementation shortcut by symlinking
/dev/fd/N -> /proc/self/fd/N
and by the time the kernel sees /proc/self/fd/N the "self"-ness is apparently
lost, and it is forced to do the security checks
if the /proc fd open code has access to the original /proc/PID/fd/N path
then it can do dup(atoi(N)) when the PID is the current process without
affecting security
otherwise there is a bug in the /dev/fd/N -> /proc/self/fd/N implementation
and /dev/fd/N should be separated out to its (original) dup(atoi(N))
semantics
see http://mail-index.netbsd.org/current-users/1994/03/29/0027.html for
an early (bsd) discussion of /dev/fd/N vs. /proc/self/fd/N
-- Glenn Fowler <gsf@research.att.com> AT&T Labs Research, Florham Park NJ --
On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 07:46:15 -0700 David S. Miller wrote:
> On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 10:28:22 -0400 (EDT)
> David Korn <dgk@research.att.com> wrote:
> > This make sense for INET sockets, but I don't understand the security
> > considerations for UNIX domain sockets. Could you please elaborate?
> > Moreover, /dev/fd/n, (as opposed to /proc/$$/n) is restricted to
> > the current process and its decendents if close-on-exec is not specified.
> > Again, I don't understand why this would create a security problem
> > either since the socket is already accesible via the original
> > descriptor.
> Someone else would have to comment, but I do know we've had
> this behavior since day one.
> And therefore I wouldn't be doing many people much of a favor
> by changing the behavior today, what will people do who need
> their things to work on the bazillion existing linux kernels
> running out there? :-)
> Also, see below for another reason why this behavior is unlikely
> to change.
> > Finally if this is a security problem, why is the errno is set to ENXIO
> > rather than EACCESS?
> Look at the /proc file we put there for socket FD's. It's a symbolic
> link with a readable string of the form ("socket:[%d]", inode_nr)
> So your program ends up doing a follow of a symbolic link with that
> string name, which does not exist.
> Thinking more about this, changing this behavior would probably break
> more programs than it would help begin to function, so this is unlikely
> to ever change.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2003-07-23 16:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2003-07-23 14:28 Re: kernel bug in socketpair() David Korn
2003-07-23 14:46 ` David S. Miller
2003-07-23 16:56 ` Glenn Fowler [this message]
2003-07-23 17:00 ` David S. Miller
2003-07-23 17:24 ` Glenn Fowler
2003-07-23 17:31 ` David S. Miller
2003-07-23 18:14 ` Glenn Fowler
2003-07-23 18:23 ` David S. Miller
2003-07-23 18:54 ` Glenn Fowler
2003-07-23 19:04 ` David S. Miller
2003-07-23 19:11 ` Glenn Fowler
2003-07-23 19:14 ` David S. Miller
2003-07-23 19:29 ` Glenn Fowler
2003-07-23 19:56 ` David S. Miller
2003-07-23 22:24 ` jw schultz
2003-07-23 19:08 ` Alan Cox
2003-07-23 19:41 ` Andreas Jellinghaus
2003-07-23 17:50 ` Alan Cox
2003-07-23 23:27 ` Bill Rugolsky Jr.
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2003-07-23 13:32 David Korn
2003-07-23 14:04 ` David S. Miller
2003-07-23 14:20 ` Alan Cox
2003-07-23 15:36 ` David S. Miller
2003-07-23 16:13 ` Alan Cox
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