From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Subject: rowhammer and pagemap (was Re: [RFC, PATCH] pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace)
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 12:16:53 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150317111653.GA23711@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrU8SeOTSexLOi36sX7Smwfv0baraK=A3hq8twoyBN7NBg@mail.gmail.com>
> > Given that, I think it would still be worthwhile to disable /proc/PID/pagemap.
>
> Having slept on this further, I think that unprivileged pagemap access
> is awful and we should disable it with no option to re-enable. If we
> absolutely must, we could allow programs to read all zeros or to read
> addresses that are severely scrambled (e.g. ECB-encrypted by a key
> generated once per open of pagemap).
> - It could easily leak direct-map addresses, and there's a nice paper
> detailing a SMAP bypass using that technique.
Do you have a pointer?
> Can we just try getting rid of it except with global CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
>
> (Hmm. Rowhammer attacks targeting SMRAM could be interesting.)
:-).
> >> Can we do anything about that? Disabling cache flushes from userland
> >> should make it no longer exploitable.
> >
> > Unfortunately there's no way to disable userland code's use of
> > CLFLUSH, as far as I know.
> >
> > Maybe Intel or AMD could disable CLFLUSH via a microcode update, but
> > they have not said whether that would be possible.
>
> The Intel people I asked last week weren't confident. For one thing,
> I fully expect that rowhammer can be exploited using only reads and
> writes with some clever tricks involving cache associativity. I don't
> think there are any fully-associative caches, although the cache
> replacement algorithm could make the attacks interesting.
We should definitely get Intel/AMD to disable CLFLUSH, then.
Because if it can be exploited using reads, it is _extremely_
important to know. As it probably means rowhammer can be exploited
using Javascript / Java... and affected machines are unsafe even
without remote users.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-03-17 11:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-03-09 21:11 [RFC, PATCH] pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace Kirill A. Shutemov
2015-03-09 21:20 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2015-03-09 22:09 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-03-10 0:11 ` Kees Cook
2015-03-10 0:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-03-10 2:36 ` Dave Hansen
2015-03-16 21:11 ` Pavel Machek
2015-03-17 0:49 ` Mark Seaborn
2015-03-17 1:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-03-17 11:16 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2015-03-17 17:58 ` rowhammer and pagemap (was Re: [RFC, PATCH] pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace) One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-23 21:26 ` Pavel Machek
2015-03-19 12:51 ` [RFC, PATCH] pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace Vlastimil Babka
2015-03-23 21:26 ` Pavel Machek
2015-03-23 22:36 ` Vlastimil Babka
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