linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	<iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 17/18] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables
Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2016 17:58:55 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160426225855.13567.53070.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160426225553.13567.19459.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

Update the KVM support to include the memory encryption mask when creating
and using nested page tables.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c              |    7 +++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c              |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |    3 ++-
 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index b7e3944..75f1e30 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_setup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
 void kvm_mmu_uninit_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
 void kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(u64 user_mask, u64 accessed_mask,
-		u64 dirty_mask, u64 nx_mask, u64 x_mask);
+		u64 dirty_mask, u64 nx_mask, u64 x_mask, u64 me_mask);
 
 void kvm_mmu_reset_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(struct kvm *kvm,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index 4c6972f..5c7d939 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ module_param(dbg, bool, 0644);
 					    * PT32_LEVEL_BITS))) - 1))
 
 #define PT64_PERM_MASK (PT_PRESENT_MASK | PT_WRITABLE_MASK | shadow_user_mask \
-			| shadow_x_mask | shadow_nx_mask)
+			| shadow_x_mask | shadow_nx_mask | shadow_me_mask)
 
 #define ACC_EXEC_MASK    1
 #define ACC_WRITE_MASK   PT_WRITABLE_MASK
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ static u64 __read_mostly shadow_user_mask;
 static u64 __read_mostly shadow_accessed_mask;
 static u64 __read_mostly shadow_dirty_mask;
 static u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mask;
+static u64 __read_mostly shadow_me_mask;
 
 static void mmu_spte_set(u64 *sptep, u64 spte);
 static void mmu_free_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -282,13 +283,14 @@ static bool check_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 spte)
 }
 
 void kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(u64 user_mask, u64 accessed_mask,
-		u64 dirty_mask, u64 nx_mask, u64 x_mask)
+		u64 dirty_mask, u64 nx_mask, u64 x_mask, u64 me_mask)
 {
 	shadow_user_mask = user_mask;
 	shadow_accessed_mask = accessed_mask;
 	shadow_dirty_mask = dirty_mask;
 	shadow_nx_mask = nx_mask;
 	shadow_x_mask = x_mask;
+	shadow_me_mask = me_mask;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes);
 
@@ -2549,6 +2551,7 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
 		pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
 
 	spte |= (u64)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	spte |= shadow_me_mask;
 
 	if (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK) {
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index d5908bd..5d8eb4b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -6351,7 +6351,7 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
 		kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(0ull,
 			(enable_ept_ad_bits) ? VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT : 0ull,
 			(enable_ept_ad_bits) ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull,
-			0ull, VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK);
+			0ull, VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK, 0ull);
 		ept_set_mmio_spte_mask();
 		kvm_enable_tdp();
 	} else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 12f33e6..9432e27 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
 #include <asm/pvclock.h>
 #include <asm/div64.h>
 #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
 
 #define MAX_IO_MSRS 256
 #define KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS 32
@@ -5859,7 +5860,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init(void *opaque)
 	kvm_x86_ops = ops;
 
 	kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(PT_USER_MASK, PT_ACCESSED_MASK,
-			PT_DIRTY_MASK, PT64_NX_MASK, 0);
+			PT_DIRTY_MASK, PT64_NX_MASK, 0, sme_me_mask);
 
 	kvm_timer_init();
 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-04-26 22:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-04-26 22:55 [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:00 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:30     ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:58         ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:47         ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:21   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/18] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for AMD processors Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:33   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:44     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:47       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:05         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:12           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:31             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:34               ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:01   ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:17     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:30       ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 16:41           ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 17:07             ` Robin Murphy
2016-04-27 17:12             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:03   ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 16:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/18] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/18] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/18] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/18] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/18] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/18] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-05-10 13:43   ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-10 13:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-12 18:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-24 14:54         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-25 16:09           ` Daniel Kiper
2016-05-25 19:30           ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-26 13:45             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 10:07               ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 16:16                 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 12:03                   ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:34                     ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 15:16                     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 11:18   ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 18:33     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 13:51       ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-15 13:17         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-16 14:38           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-17 15:51             ` Matt Fleming
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/18] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/18] x86: Access device tree in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/18] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160429071743.GC11592@char.us.oracle.com>
2016-04-29 15:12     ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]       ` <20160429162757.GA1191@char.us.oracle.com>
2016-04-29 23:49         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/18] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/18] x86: Enable memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-05-01 22:10   ` Huang, Kai
2016-05-03 15:59     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/18] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2016-04-26 22:59 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/18] x86: Add support to turn on Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:13   ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 20:10   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-02 18:31     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-09 15:13       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-09 21:08         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-10 11:23           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-10 12:04             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-30  6:13 ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2016-05-03 15:55   ` Tom Lendacky

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20160426225855.13567.53070.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net \
    --to=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=aryabinin@virtuozzo.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dvyukov@google.com \
    --cc=glider@google.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=konrad.wilk@oracle.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).