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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	will.deacon@arm.com, elena.reshetova@intel.com, arnd@arndb.de,
	tglx@linutronix.de, hpa@zytor.com, dave@progbits.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 7/7] kref: Implement using refcount_t
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2016 11:46:08 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161115104608.GH3142@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161115100359.GA7757@gmail.com>

On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 11:03:59AM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > Should I also make a CONFIG knob that implements refcount_t with the
> > 'normal' atomic_t primitives?
> 
> I'd suggest doing the saturation/safe-wrap semantics only for now (i.e. the 
> current patch, split into two perhaps), and reconsider if there's any complaints?
> 
> > And possibly another knob to toggle the BUG()s into WARN()s. With the
> > full saturation semantics WARN() is a lot safer and will not corrupt
> > kernel state as much.
> 
> I'd suggest changing it to a WARN() straight away, no extra knobs.

OK, a little like so then? Note that the overflow tests went away
because increments guarantee we saturate before we overflow.

---
Subject: refcount_t: A special purpose refcount type
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Date: Mon Nov 14 18:06:19 CET 2016

Provide refcount_t, an atomic_t like primitive built just for
refcounting.

It provides saturation semantics such that overflow becomes impossible
and thereby 'spurious' use-after-free is avoided.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 include/linux/refcount.h |  229 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 229 insertions(+)

--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/refcount.h
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+#ifndef _LINUX_REFCOUNT_H
+#define _LINUX_REFCOUNT_H
+
+/*
+ * Variant of atomic_t specialized for refcounting.
+ *
+ * The interface matches the atomic_t interface (to aid in porting) but only
+ * provides the few functions one should use for refcounting.
+ *
+ * It differs in that the counter saturates at UINT_MAX and will not move once
+ * there. This avoids wrapping the counter and causing 'spurious'
+ * use-after-free issues.
+ *
+ * Memory ordering rules are slightly relaxed wrt regular atomic_t functions
+ * and provide only what is strictly required for refcounts.
+ *
+ * The increments are fully relaxed; these will not provide ordering. The
+ * rationale is that whatever is used to obtain the object we're increasing the
+ * reference count on will provide the ordering. For locked data structures,
+ * its the lock acquire, for RCU/lockless data structures its the dependent
+ * load.
+ *
+ * Do note that inc_not_zero() provides a control dependency which will order
+ * future stores against the inc, this ensures we'll never modify the object
+ * if we did not in fact acquire a reference.
+ *
+ * The decrements will provide release order, such that all the prior loads and
+ * stores will be issued before we proceed with freeing the object.
+ *
+ * Note: the implementation hard relies on increments, bigger than 1 additions
+ *       need explicit overflow -> saturation logic.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+typedef struct refcount_struct {
+	atomic_t refs;
+} refcount_t;
+
+#define REFCOUNT_INIT(n)	{ .refs = ATOMIC_INIT(n), }
+
+static inline void refcount_set(refcount_t *r, int n)
+{
+	atomic_set(&r->refs, n);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int refcount_read(const refcount_t *r)
+{
+	return atomic_read(&r->refs);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Similar to atomic_inc(), will saturate at UINT_MAX and WARN.
+ *
+ * Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller already has a
+ * reference on the object, will WARN when this is not so.
+ */
+static inline void refcount_inc(refcount_t *r)
+{
+	unsigned int old, new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs);
+
+	for (;;) {
+		WARN(!val, "refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free.\n");
+
+		if (unlikely(val == UINT_MAX))
+			return;
+
+		new = val + 1;
+		old = atomic_cmpxchg_relaxed(&r->refs, val, new);
+		if (old == val)
+			break;
+
+		val = old;
+	}
+
+	WARN(new == UINT_MAX, "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Similar to atomic_inc_not_zero(), will saturate at UINT_MAX and WARN.
+ *
+ * Provides no memory ordering, it is assumed the caller has guaranteed the
+ * object memory to be stable (RCU, etc.). It does provide a control dependency
+ * and thereby orders future stores.
+ */
+static inline __must_check
+bool refcount_inc_not_zero(refcount_t *r)
+{
+	unsigned int old, new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs);
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if (!val)
+			return false;
+
+		if (unlikely(val == UINT_MAX))
+			return true;
+
+		new = val + 1;
+		old = atomic_cmpxchg_relaxed(&r->refs, val, new);
+		if (old == val)
+			break;
+
+		val = old;
+	}
+
+	WARN(new == UINT_MAX, "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n");
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Similar to atomic_dec_and_test(), it will WARN on underflow and fail to
+ * decrement when saturated at UINT_MAX.
+ *
+ * Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done
+ * before a subsequent free.
+ */
+static inline __must_check
+bool refcount_dec_and_test(refcount_t *r)
+{
+	unsigned int old, new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs);
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if (val == UINT_MAX)
+			return false;
+
+		new = val - 1;
+		if (WARN(new > val, "refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\n"))
+			return false;
+
+		old = atomic_cmpxchg_release(&r->refs, val, new);
+		if (old == val)
+			break;
+
+		val = old;
+	}
+
+	return !new;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Similar to atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(), it will WARN on underflow and fail
+ * to decrement when saturated at UINT_MAX.
+ *
+ * Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done
+ * before a subsequent free. This allows free() while holding the mutex.
+ */
+static inline __must_check
+bool refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock(refcount_t *r, struct mutex *lock)
+{
+	unsigned int old, new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs);
+	bool locked = false;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if (val == UINT_MAX)
+			return false;
+
+		if (val == 1 && !locked) {
+			locked = true;
+			mutex_lock(lock);
+		}
+
+		new = val - 1;
+		if (WARN(new > val, "refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\n")) {
+			if (locked)
+				mutex_unlock(lock);
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		old = atomic_cmpxchg_release(&r->refs, val, new);
+		if (old == val)
+			break;
+
+		val = old;
+	}
+
+	if (new && locked)
+		mutex_unlock(lock);
+
+	return !new;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Similar to atomic_dec_and_lock(), it will WARN on underflow and fail to
+ * decrement when saturated at UINT_MAX.
+ *
+ * Provides release memory ordering, such that prior loads and stores are done
+ * before a subsequent free. This allows free() while holding the lock.
+ */
+static inline __must_check
+bool refcount_dec_and_lock(refcount_t *r, spinlock_t *lock)
+{
+	unsigned int old, new, val = atomic_read(&r->refs);
+	bool locked = false;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if (val == UINT_MAX)
+			return false;
+
+		if (val == 1 && !locked) {
+			locked = true;
+			spin_lock(lock);
+		}
+
+		new = val - 1;
+		if (WARN(new > val, "refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\n")) {
+			if (locked)
+				mutex_unlock(lock);
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		old = atomic_cmpxchg_release(&r->refs, val, new);
+		if (old == val)
+			break;
+
+		val = old;
+	}
+
+	if (new && locked)
+		spin_unlock(lock);
+
+	return !new;
+}
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_REFCOUNT_H */

  reply	other threads:[~2016-11-15 10:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-14 17:39 [RFC][PATCH 0/7] kref improvements Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 17:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/7] kref: Add KREF_INIT() Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 17:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/7] kref: Add kref_read() Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 18:16   ` Christoph Hellwig
2016-11-15  7:28     ` Greg KH
2016-11-15  7:47       ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15  8:37       ` [PATCH] printk, locking/atomics, kref: Introduce new %pAr and %pAk format string options for atomic_t and 'struct kref' Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15  8:43         ` [PATCH v2] " Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15  9:21           ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15  9:41             ` [PATCH v3] printk, locking/atomics, kref: Introduce new %pAa " Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15 10:10           ` [PATCH v2] printk, locking/atomics, kref: Introduce new %pAr " kbuild test robot
2016-11-15 16:42         ` [PATCH] " Linus Torvalds
2016-11-16  8:13           ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15  7:33   ` [RFC][PATCH 2/7] kref: Add kref_read() Greg KH
2016-11-15  8:03     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15 20:53       ` Kees Cook
2016-11-16  8:21         ` Greg KH
2016-11-16 10:10           ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-16 10:18             ` Greg KH
2016-11-16 10:11           ` Daniel Borkmann
2016-11-16 10:19             ` Greg KH
2016-11-16 10:09         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-16 18:58           ` Kees Cook
2016-11-17  8:34             ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 12:30               ` David Windsor
2016-11-17 12:43                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 13:01                   ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-17 13:22                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 15:42                       ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-17 18:02                       ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-17 19:10                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 19:29                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 19:34               ` Kees Cook
2016-11-14 17:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 3/7] kref: Kill kref_sub() Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 17:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 4/7] kref: Use kref_get_unless_zero() more Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 17:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 5/7] kref: Implement kref_put_lock() Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 20:35   ` Kees Cook
2016-11-15  7:50     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 17:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 6/7] kref: Avoid more abuse Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 17:39 ` [RFC][PATCH 7/7] kref: Implement using refcount_t Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15  8:40   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15  9:47     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15 10:03       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15 10:46         ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2016-11-15 13:03           ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15 18:06             ` Kees Cook
2016-11-15 19:16               ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15 19:23                 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-16  8:31                   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-16  8:51                     ` Greg KH
2016-11-16  9:07                       ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-16  9:24                         ` Greg KH
2016-11-16 10:15                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-16 18:55                       ` Kees Cook
2016-11-17  8:33                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 19:50                           ` Kees Cook
2016-11-16 18:41                     ` Kees Cook
2016-11-15 12:33   ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-15 13:01     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15 14:19       ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-17  9:28         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17  9:48           ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-17 10:29             ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 10:39               ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 11:03                 ` Greg KH
2016-11-17 12:48                   ` Peter Zijlstra
     [not found]               ` <CAL0jBu-GnREUPSX4kUDp-Cc8ZGp6+Cb2q0HVandswcLzPRnChQ@mail.gmail.com>
2016-11-17 12:08                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 12:08           ` Will Deacon
2016-11-17 16:11             ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 16:36               ` Will Deacon
2016-11-18  8:26                 ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-18 10:16                   ` Will Deacon
2016-11-18 10:07   ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-18 11:37     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-18 17:06       ` Will Deacon
2016-11-18 18:57         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-21  4:06         ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-21  7:48           ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-21  8:38             ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-21  8:44       ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-21  9:02         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-21  9:37           ` Boqun Feng
2016-11-18 10:47   ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-18 10:52     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-18 16:58       ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-18 18:53         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-19  7:14           ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-19 11:45             ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-01-26 23:14   ` Kees Cook
2017-01-27  9:58     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-01-27 21:07       ` Kees Cook
2017-01-30 13:40         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15  7:27 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/7] kref improvements Greg KH
2016-11-15  7:42   ` Ingo Molnar
2016-11-15 15:05     ` Greg KH
2016-11-15  7:48   ` Peter Zijlstra

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