From: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
To: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack
Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2018 14:10:13 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180718211013.14512-3-labbott@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180718211013.14512-1-labbott@redhat.com>
Implementation of stackleak based heavily on the x86 version
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
---
Since last time: Minor style cleanups. Re-wrote check_alloca to
correctly handle all stack types. While doing that, I also realized
current_top_of_stack was incorrect so I fixed that as well.
---
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 17 ++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 7 ++++++
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile | 3 ++-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 ++-
include/linux/stackleak.h | 1 +
7 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 42c090cf0292..216d36a49ab5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ config ARM64
select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+ select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
index a73ae1e49200..4f3062ee22c6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -266,5 +266,22 @@ extern void __init minsigstksz_setup(void);
#define SVE_SET_VL(arg) sve_set_current_vl(arg)
#define SVE_GET_VL() sve_get_current_vl()
+/*
+ * For CONFIG_STACKLEAK
+ *
+ * These need to be macros because otherwise we get stuck in a nightmare
+ * of header definitions for the use of task_stack_page.
+ */
+
+#define current_top_of_stack() \
+({ \
+ unsigned long _low = 0; \
+ unsigned long _high = 0; \
+ \
+ current_stack_type(current, current_stack_pointer, &_low, &_high); \
+ _high; \
+})
+#define on_thread_stack() (on_task_stack(current, current_stack_pointer, NULL, NULL))
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __ASM_PROCESSOR_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index 28ad8799406f..67d12016063d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -431,6 +431,11 @@ tsk .req x28 // current thread_info
.text
+ .macro stackleak_erase
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+ bl stackleak_erase
+#endif
+ .endm
/*
* Exception vectors.
*/
@@ -910,6 +915,7 @@ ret_fast_syscall:
and x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK
cbnz x2, work_pending
enable_step_tsk x1, x2
+ stackleak_erase
kernel_exit 0
ret_fast_syscall_trace:
enable_daif
@@ -936,6 +942,7 @@ ret_to_user:
cbnz x2, work_pending
finish_ret_to_user:
enable_step_tsk x1, x2
+ stackleak_erase
kernel_exit 0
ENDPROC(ret_to_user)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
index e10bc363f533..904defa36689 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
@@ -493,3 +493,35 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void)
{
current->mm->context.flags = is_compat_task() ? MMCF_AARCH32 : 0;
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+void __used stackleak_check_alloca(unsigned long size)
+{
+ unsigned long stack_left;
+ enum stack_type type;
+ unsigned long current_sp = current_stack_pointer;
+ unsigned long low, high;
+
+ type = current_stack_type(current, current_sp, &low, &high);
+ BUG_ON(type == STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
+
+ stack_left = current_sp - low;
+
+ if (size >= stack_left) {
+ /*
+ * Kernel stack depth overflow is detected, let's report that.
+ * If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is enabled, we can safely use BUG().
+ * If CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is disabled, BUG() handling can corrupt
+ * the neighbour memory. CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK calls
+ * panic() in a similar situation, so let's do the same if that
+ * option is on. Otherwise just use BUG() and hope for the best.
+ */
+#if !defined(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK) && defined(CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK)
+ panic("alloca() over the kernel stack boundary\n");
+#else
+ BUG();
+#endif
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_check_alloca);
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile
index 4313f7475333..2fabc2dc1966 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
# Makefile for Kernel-based Virtual Machine module, HYP part
#
-ccflags-y += -fno-stack-protector -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
+ccflags-y += -fno-stack-protector -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \
+ $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
KVM=../../../../virt/kvm
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index a34e9290a699..25dd2a14560d 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt
KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(cflags-y) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \
-D__NO_FORTIFY \
$(call cc-option,-ffreestanding) \
- $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector)
+ $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) \
+ $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
GCOV_PROFILE := n
KASAN_SANITIZE := n
diff --git a/include/linux/stackleak.h b/include/linux/stackleak.h
index b911b973d328..08420ec6b7c3 100644
--- a/include/linux/stackleak.h
+++ b/include/linux/stackleak.h
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
+#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
/*
* Check that the poison value points to the unused hole in the
* virtual memory map for your platform.
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-07-18 21:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <1531341400-12077-1-git-send-email-alex.popov@linux.com>
2018-07-18 21:10 ` [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott
2018-07-18 21:10 ` [PATCH 1/2] arm64: Introduce current_stack_type Laura Abbott
2018-07-19 11:07 ` Mark Rutland
2018-07-18 21:10 ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2018-07-19 2:20 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Kees Cook
2018-07-19 10:41 ` Alexander Popov
2018-07-19 11:41 ` Mark Rutland
2018-07-19 23:28 ` [PATCHv2 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott
2018-07-19 23:28 ` [PATCHv2 1/2] arm64: Add stack information to on_accessible_stack Laura Abbott
2018-07-20 6:38 ` Mark Rutland
2018-07-19 23:28 ` [PATCHv2 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott
2018-07-20 4:33 ` Kees Cook
2018-07-20 6:39 ` Mark Rutland
2018-07-20 21:41 ` [PATCHv3 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott
2018-07-20 21:41 ` [PATCHv3 1/2] arm64: Add stack information to on_accessible_stack Laura Abbott
2018-07-20 21:41 ` [PATCHv3 2/2] arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin Laura Abbott
2018-07-24 12:44 ` Alexander Popov
2018-07-24 16:35 ` Kees Cook
2018-07-24 16:38 ` [PATCHv3 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Will Deacon
2018-07-25 11:49 ` Will Deacon
2018-07-25 22:05 ` Laura Abbott
2018-07-26 9:55 ` Will Deacon
2018-05-02 20:33 [PATCH " Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 20:33 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 21:31 ` Kees Cook
2018-05-02 23:07 ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-02 23:37 ` Kees Cook
2018-05-03 16:05 ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-03 16:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-05-03 7:19 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-03 11:37 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-05-03 17:33 ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-03 19:09 ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-04 8:30 ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-04 11:09 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-06 8:22 ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-11 15:50 ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-11 16:13 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-13 8:40 ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-14 5:15 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-14 9:35 ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-14 10:06 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-14 13:53 ` Alexander Popov
2018-05-14 14:07 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-03 19:00 ` Laura Abbott
2018-05-04 11:16 ` Mark Rutland
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-02-21 1:13 [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott
2018-02-21 1:13 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott
2018-02-21 15:38 ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-21 23:53 ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-22 1:35 ` Laura Abbott
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