From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
linux@roeck-us.net, shuah@kernel.org, patches@kernelci.org,
ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk, lkft-triage@lists.linaro.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 4.18 00/79] 4.18.1-stable review
Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2018 19:16:19 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180814171336.799314117@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.18.1 release.
There are 79 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu Aug 16 17:13:16 UTC 2018.
Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.18.1-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.18.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Linux 4.18.1-rc1
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list
Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr()
Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d
Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h
Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d
Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16
Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush()
Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
x86/KVM/VMX: Replace 'vmx_l1d_flush_always' with 'vmx_l1d_flush_cond'
Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush()
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Documentation/l1tf: Fix typos
Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
x86/KVM/VMX: Initialize the vmx_l1d_flush_pages' content
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
x86/speculation/l1tf: Unbreak !__HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED architectures
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
x86/bugs, kvm: Introduce boot-time control of L1TF mitigations
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cpu/hotplug: Set CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED early
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
cpu/hotplug: Expose SMT control init function
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/kvm: Allow runtime control of L1D flush
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/kvm: Serialize L1D flush parameter setter
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/kvm: Add static key for flush always
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/kvm: Move l1tf setup function
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/l1tf: Handle EPT disabled state proper
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/kvm: Drop L1TF MSR list approach
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/litf: Introduce vmx status variable
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cpu/hotplug: Online siblings when SMT control is turned on
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
x86/KVM/VMX: Use MSR save list for IA32_FLUSH_CMD if required
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
x86/KVM/VMX: Extend add_atomic_switch_msr() to allow VMENTER only MSRs
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
x86/KVM/VMX: Separate the VMX AUTOLOAD guest/host number accounting
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
x86/KVM/VMX: Add find_msr() helper function
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
x86/KVM/VMX: Split the VMX MSR LOAD structures to have an host/guest numbers
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush logic
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D MSR based flush
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush algorithm
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
x86/KVM/VMX: Add module argument for L1TF mitigation
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
x86/KVM: Warn user if KVM is loaded SMT and L1TF CPU bug being present
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Revert "x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force"
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix up pte->pfn conversion for PAE
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PAE swap entries against L1TF
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
x86/CPU/AMD: Move TOPOEXT reenablement before reading smp_num_siblings
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
x86/cpufeatures: Add detection of L1D cache flush support.
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
x86/speculation/l1tf: Extend 64bit swap file size limit
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/cpu/AMD: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
x86/CPU/AMD: Do not check CPUID max ext level before parsing SMP info
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/cpu/intel: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/cpu/topology: Provide detect_extended_topology_early()
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/cpu/common: Provide detect_ht_early()
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/cpu/AMD: Remove the pointless detect_ht() call
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/cpu: Remove the pointless CPU printout
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cpu/hotplug: Split do_cpu_down()
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cpu/hotplug: Make bringup/teardown of smp threads symmetric
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/topology: Provide topology_smt_supported()
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
x86/smp: Provide topology_is_primary_thread()
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
sched/smt: Update sched_smt_present at runtime
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
x86/bugs: Move the l1tf function and define pr_fmt properly
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
x86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reserved
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect swap entries against L1TF
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
x86/speculation/l1tf: Change order of offset/type in swap entry
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
x86/speculation/l1tf: Increase 32bit PAE __PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
x86/irqflags: Provide a declaration for native_save_fl
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
kprobes/x86: Fix %p uses in error messages
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests
-------------
Diffstat:
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 24 +
Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst | 9 +
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 78 +++
Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst | 610 +++++++++++++++++++++
Makefile | 4 +-
arch/Kconfig | 3 +
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h | 9 +
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 +
arch/x86/include/asm/dmi.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/hardirq.h | 26 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 6 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 7 +
arch/x86/include/asm/page_32_types.h | 9 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-2level.h | 17 +
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h | 37 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-invert.h | 32 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 74 ++-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h | 38 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 17 +
arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h | 6 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 11 +
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 16 +
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 51 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 171 ++++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 56 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 7 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c | 16 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c | 41 +-
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/irq.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 5 +-
arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c | 14 +-
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 6 +
arch/x86/kernel/smp.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 18 +
arch/x86/kernel/time.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 455 ++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 34 +-
arch/x86/mm/init.c | 23 +
arch/x86/mm/kmmio.c | 25 +-
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 21 +
arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 8 +-
arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 1 +
.../intel-mid/device_libs/platform_mrfld_wdt.c | 1 +
arch/x86/platform/uv/tlb_uv.c | 1 +
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c | 1 +
drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 +
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_pmu.c | 1 +
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_lpe_audio.c | 1 +
drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c | 1 +
include/asm-generic/pgtable.h | 12 +
include/linux/cpu.h | 21 +
include/linux/swapfile.h | 2 +
kernel/cpu.c | 280 +++++++++-
kernel/sched/core.c | 30 +-
kernel/sched/fair.c | 1 +
kernel/smp.c | 2 +
mm/memory.c | 37 +-
mm/mprotect.c | 49 ++
mm/swapfile.c | 46 +-
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 +
74 files changed, 2206 insertions(+), 300 deletions(-)
next reply other threads:[~2018-08-14 17:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 87+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-14 17:16 Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 01/79] x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 02/79] x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 03/79] kprobes/x86: Fix %p uses in error messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 04/79] x86/irqflags: Provide a declaration for native_save_fl Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 05/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Increase 32bit PAE __PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 06/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Change order of offset/type in swap entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 07/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect swap entries against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 08/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 09/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reserved Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 10/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 11/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 12/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 13/79] x86/bugs: Move the l1tf function and define pr_fmt properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 14/79] sched/smt: Update sched_smt_present at runtime Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 15/79] x86/smp: Provide topology_is_primary_thread() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 16/79] x86/topology: Provide topology_smt_supported() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 17/79] cpu/hotplug: Make bringup/teardown of smp threads symmetric Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 18/79] cpu/hotplug: Split do_cpu_down() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 19/79] cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 20/79] x86/cpu: Remove the pointless CPU printout Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 21/79] x86/cpu/AMD: Remove the pointless detect_ht() call Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 22/79] x86/cpu/common: Provide detect_ht_early() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 23/79] x86/cpu/topology: Provide detect_extended_topology_early() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 24/79] x86/cpu/intel: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 25/79] x86/CPU/AMD: Do not check CPUID max ext level before parsing SMP info Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 26/79] x86/cpu/AMD: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 28/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Extend 64bit swap file size limit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 29/79] x86/cpufeatures: Add detection of L1D cache flush support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 30/79] x86/CPU/AMD: Move TOPOEXT reenablement before reading smp_num_siblings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 31/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PAE swap entries against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 32/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix up pte->pfn conversion for PAE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 33/79] Revert "x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 34/79] cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 35/79] x86/KVM: Warn user if KVM is loaded SMT and L1TF CPU bug being present Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 36/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Add module argument for L1TF mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 37/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush algorithm Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 38/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D MSR based flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 39/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 40/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Split the VMX MSR LOAD structures to have an host/guest numbers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 41/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Add find_msr() helper function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 42/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Separate the VMX AUTOLOAD guest/host number accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 43/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Extend add_atomic_switch_msr() to allow VMENTER only MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 44/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Use MSR save list for IA32_FLUSH_CMD if required Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 45/79] cpu/hotplug: Online siblings when SMT control is turned on Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 46/79] x86/litf: Introduce vmx status variable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 47/79] x86/kvm: Drop L1TF MSR list approach Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 48/79] x86/l1tf: Handle EPT disabled state proper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 49/79] x86/kvm: Move l1tf setup function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 50/79] x86/kvm: Add static key for flush always Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 51/79] x86/kvm: Serialize L1D flush parameter setter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 52/79] x86/kvm: Allow runtime control of L1D flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 53/79] cpu/hotplug: Expose SMT control init function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 54/79] cpu/hotplug: Set CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED early Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 55/79] x86/bugs, kvm: Introduce boot-time control of L1TF mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 56/79] Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 57/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Unbreak !__HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED architectures Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 58/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Initialize the vmx_l1d_flush_pages content Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 59/79] Documentation/l1tf: Fix typos Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 60/79] cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 61/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Dont set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 62/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Replace vmx_l1d_flush_always with vmx_l1d_flush_cond Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 63/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 64/79] x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 65/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 66/79] x86: Dont include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 67/79] x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 68/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Dont set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 69/79] Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 70/79] x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 71/79] x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 72/79] KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 73/79] cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 74/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 75/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 76/79] x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 77/79] x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 78/79] tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 79/79] x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15 6:12 ` [PATCH 4.18 00/79] 4.18.1-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15 13:16 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-08-15 15:32 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15 20:12 ` Dan Rue
2018-08-15 17:24 Byron Stanoszek
2018-08-15 17:32 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-16 4:39 ` Byron Stanoszek
2018-08-16 10:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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