From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
To: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: ast@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, jannh@google.com, keescook@chromium.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations
Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2018 17:17:13 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181026001711.w55n5au2vx3sepmb@ast-mbp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181022231104.3443-1-daniel@iogearbox.net>
On Tue, Oct 23, 2018 at 01:11:04AM +0200, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module
> space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later
> attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for
> example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then
> before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
> we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case
> where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort
> with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out.
>
> Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case
> of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached
> or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter
> was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can
> be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit
> is reached.
>
> Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
> Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
> Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
> ---
> Hi Rick, I've reworked the original patch into something much simpler
> which is only focussing on the actual main issue we want to resolve right
> now as a first step to make some forward progress, that is, limiting usage
> on the JIT for unprivileged users. Tested the below on x86 and arm64.
> (Trimmed down massive Cc list as well a bit and Cc'ed people related to
> commits referenced and netdev where BPF patches are usually discussed.)
> Thanks a lot!
Applied to bpf tree. Thanks Daniel.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-26 0:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-22 23:11 [PATCH bpf] bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations Daniel Borkmann
2018-10-26 0:17 ` Alexei Starovoitov [this message]
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