From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1AE3CC43387 for ; Tue, 15 Jan 2019 02:43:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E969C20651 for ; Tue, 15 Jan 2019 02:43:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727912AbfAOCmy (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Jan 2019 21:42:54 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:37092 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727200AbfAOCmy (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Jan 2019 21:42:54 -0500 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx02.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.12]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D38D93DE03; Tue, 15 Jan 2019 02:42:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com (ovpn-12-57.pek2.redhat.com [10.72.12.57]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3AF3B84ED; Tue, 15 Jan 2019 02:42:47 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 10:42:43 +0800 From: Dave Young To: Mimi Zohar Cc: Kairui Song , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, jwboyer@fedoraproject.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, bauerman@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify Message-ID: <20190115024243.GA9199@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> References: <20190109164824.19708-1-kasong@redhat.com> <20190109164824.19708-3-kasong@redhat.com> <20190111134303.GA12760@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> <1547223220.19931.471.camel@linux.ibm.com> <20190113013958.GA14019@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> <1547482251.4156.127.camel@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <1547482251.4156.127.camel@linux.ibm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.9.5 (2018-04-13) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.12 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.29]); Tue, 15 Jan 2019 02:42:54 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 01/14/19 at 11:10am, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Sun, 2019-01-13 at 09:39 +0800, Dave Young wrote: > > Hi, > > > > On 01/11/19 at 11:13am, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > On Fri, 2019-01-11 at 21:43 +0800, Dave Young wrote: > > > [snip] > > > > > > > Personally I would like to see platform key separated from integrity. > > > > But for the kexec_file part I think it is good at least it works with > > > > this fix. > > > > > > > > Acked-by: Dave Young > > > > > > The original "platform" keyring patches that Nayna posted multiple > > > times were in the certs directory, but nobody commented/responded.  So > > > she reworked the patches, moving them to the integrity directory and > > > posted them (cc'ing the kexec mailing list).  It's a bit late to be > > > asking to move it, isn't it? > > > > Hmm, apologize for being late, I did not get chance to have a look the > > old series. Since we have the needs now, it should be still fine > > > > Maybe Kairui can check Nayna's old series, see if he can do something > > again? > > Whether the platform keyring is defined in certs/ or in integrity/ the > keyring id needs to be accessible to the other, without making the > keyring id global.  Moving where the platform keyring is defined is > not the problem. Agreed, but just feel kexec depends on IMA sounds not good. > > Commit a210fd32a46b ("kexec: add call to LSM hook in original > kexec_load syscall") introduced a new LSM hook.  Assuming > CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is enabled, with commit b5ca117365d9 ("ima: > prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag") we can > now block the kexec_load syscall.  Without being able to block the > kexec_load syscall, verifying the kexec image signature via the > kexec_file_load syscall is kind of pointless. > > Unless you're planning on writing an LSM to prevent the kexec_load > syscall, I assume you'll want to enable integrity anyway. User can disable kexec_load in kernel config, and only allow kexec_file_load. But yes, this can be improved separately in case no IMA enabled. For the time being we can leave with it and fix like this series do. > > Mimi > Thanks Dave