From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, rkrcmar@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
mst@redhat.com, yu-cheng.yu@intel.com,
Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/8] KVM:CPUID: Add CPUID support for Guest CET
Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 10:28:36 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190304182836.GB17120@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190303093645.GB31538@local-michael-cet-test.sh.intel.com>
On Sun, Mar 03, 2019 at 05:36:45PM +0800, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 01, 2019 at 06:53:23AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 04:28:32PM +0800, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> > > On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 07:59:40AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0800, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> > > > > Guest CET SHSTK and IBT capability are reported via
> > > > > CPUID.(EAX=7, ECX=0):ECX[bit 7] and EDX[bit 20] respectively.
> > > > > Guest user mode and supervisor mode xsaves component size
> > > > > is reported via CPUID.(EAX=0xD, ECX=1):ECX[bit 11] and ECX[bit 12]
> > > > > respectively.
> > > > >
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
> > > > > ---
> > > > > arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> > > > > arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 4 +++
> > > > > 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> > > > > index cb1aece25b17..5e05756cc6db 100644
> > > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> > > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> > > > > @@ -65,6 +65,16 @@ u64 kvm_supported_xcr0(void)
> > > > > return xcr0;
> > > > > }
> > > > >
> > > > > +u64 kvm_supported_xss(void)
> > > > > +{
> > > > > + u64 xss;
> > > > > +
> > > > > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, xss);
> > > > > + xss &= KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS;
> > > > > + return xss;
> > > > > +}
> > > > > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvm_supported_xss);
> > > > > +
> > > > > #define F(x) bit(X86_FEATURE_##x)
> > > > >
> > > > > /* For scattered features from cpufeatures.h; we currently expose none */
> > > > > @@ -323,6 +333,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
> > > > > u32 index, int *nent, int maxnent)
> > > > > {
> > > > > int r;
> > > > > + u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> > > > > unsigned f_nx = is_efer_nx() ? F(NX) : 0;
> > > > > #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> > > > > unsigned f_gbpages = (kvm_x86_ops->get_lpage_level() == PT_PDPE_LEVEL)
> > > > > @@ -503,6 +514,20 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
> > > > > * if the host doesn't support it.
> > > > > */
> > > > > entry->edx |= F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
> > > > > +
> > > > > + /*
> > > > > + * Guest OS CET enabling is designed independent to
> > > > > + * host enabling, it only has dependency on Host HW
> > > > > + * capability, if it has, report CET support to
> > > > > + * Guest.
> > > > > + */
> > > > > + cpuid_count(7, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> > > > > + if (ecx & F(SHSTK))
> > > > > + entry->ecx |= F(SHSTK);
> > > > > +
> > > > > + if (edx & F(IBT))
> > > > > + entry->edx |= F(IBT);
> > > >
> > > > There's no need to manually add these flags. They will be automatically
> > > > kept if supported in hardware because your previous patch, 02/08, added
> > > > them to the mask of features that can be exposed to the guest,
> > > > i.e. set them in kvm_cpuid_7_0_e{c,d}x_x86_features.
> > > >
> > > I shared the same thought as you before, but after I took a closer look at the
> > > kernel code, actually, when host CET feature is disabled by user via
> > > cmdline options(no_cet_shstk and no_cet_ibt), it'll mask out CET feature bits in
> > > boot_cpu_data.x86_capbility[] array, and cpuid_mask() will make the bits
> > > in previous definition lost, so these lines actually add them back when
> > > host CET is disabled.
> >
> > 'entry' is filled by do_cpuid_1_ent(), which does cpuid_count(), same as
> > your code, i.e. it's not affected by whether or not the host kernel is
> > using each feature.
> >
> I checked CET kernel patch:
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> static __init int setup_disable_shstk(char *s) {
> /* require an exact match without trailing characters */
> if (s[0] != '\0')
> return 0;
>
> if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> return 1;
>
> setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> pr_info("x86: 'no_cet_shstk' specified, disabling Shadow Stack\n");
> return 1;
> }
> __setup("no_cet_shstk", setup_disable_shstk); #endif
>
> setup_disable_shstk()->setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)->do_clear_cpu_cap(NULL,
> feature)->clear_feature(c, feature)->clear_cpu_cap(&boot_cpu_data, feature);
>
> this path will clear boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_SHSTK] if "no_cet_shstk" is set.
> but in cpuid_mask(), it will "AND" the bit with SHSTK bit set
> in kvm_cpuid_7_0_ecx_x86_features, so the bit in ecx is cleared,
> need to add the bit back according to host cpuid_count().
> the CET kernel patch can be seen in below patch link.
Ah, I see. In this case we need to honor boot_cpu_data. The idea is
that a feature should not be exposed to the guest, i.e. actually used,
if it has been explicitly disabled by the user, e.g. to workaround a
hardware or firmware issue. The cases where a feature is exposed to
the guest even when disabled in host is when said feature is emulated
by KVM in software.
>
> > > please check CET kernel patch here:
> > > https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/11/20/204
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-04 18:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-25 13:27 [PATCH v3 0/8] This patch-set is to enable Guest CET support Yang Weijiang
2019-02-25 13:27 ` [PATCH v3 1/8] KVM:VMX: Define CET VMCS fields and bits Yang Weijiang
2019-02-26 19:31 ` Jim Mattson
2019-02-26 7:52 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-02-28 15:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-02-28 9:51 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-02-25 13:27 ` [PATCH v3 2/8] KVM:CPUID: Define CET CPUID bits and CR4.CET master enable bit Yang Weijiang
2019-02-26 19:48 ` Jim Mattson
2019-02-26 7:57 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-01 2:15 ` Xiaoyao Li
2019-02-28 16:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-02-28 8:10 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-02-25 13:27 ` [PATCH v3 3/8] KVM:CPUID: Add CPUID support for Guest CET Yang Weijiang
2019-02-28 15:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-02-28 8:28 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-01 14:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-03 9:36 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-04 18:28 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2019-03-04 12:17 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-04 18:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-04 10:01 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-04 18:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-04 10:11 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-08 11:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-03-10 12:18 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-02-25 13:27 ` [PATCH v3 4/8] KVM:CPUID: Fix xsaves area size calculation for CPUID.(EAX=0xD,ECX=1) Yang Weijiang
2019-02-25 13:27 ` [PATCH v3 5/8] KVM:VMX: Pass through host CET related MSRs to Guest Yang Weijiang
2019-03-04 18:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-04 10:07 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-05 3:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-02-25 13:27 ` [PATCH v3 6/8] KVM:VMX: Load Guest CET via VMCS when CET is enabled in Guest Yang Weijiang
2019-02-28 16:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-02-28 8:38 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-01 14:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-03 12:26 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-04 18:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-04 9:56 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-05 3:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-04 12:36 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-08 16:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-03-08 16:36 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-02-25 13:27 ` [PATCH v3 7/8] KVM:X86: Add XSS bit 11 and 12 support for CET xsaves/xrstors Yang Weijiang
2019-02-28 16:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-02-28 8:44 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-08 11:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-03-10 12:20 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-10 13:35 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-11 15:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-03-12 14:30 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-08 10:49 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-03-11 1:29 ` Kang, Luwei
2019-02-25 13:27 ` [PATCH v3 8/8] KVM:X86: Add user-space read/write interface for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2019-02-28 16:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-02-28 9:41 ` Yang Weijiang
2019-03-08 17:30 ` Sean Christopherson
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