linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, will.deacon@arm.com,
	marc.zyngier@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
	Dave.Martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org,
	julien.thierry@arm.com, mlangsdo@redhat.com,
	stefan.wahren@i2e.com, Andre.Przywara@arm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/10] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 12:22:47 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190325122247.5zyinkqmixmqg425@mbp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190321230557.45107-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com>

On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:47PM -0500, Jeremy Linton wrote:
> Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable
> vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in
> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities 
> 
> This series enables that behavior by providing the expected
> functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature
> states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately
> to display the overall machine status. This means that in a
> heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated
> or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or
> mitigated.
> 
> v5->v6:
> 	Invert meltdown logic to display that a core is safe rather
> 	       than mitigated if the mitigation has been enabled on
> 	       machines that are safe. This can happen when the
> 	       mitigation was forced on via command line or KASLR.
> 	       This means that in order to detect if kpti is enabled
> 	       other methods must be used (look at dmesg) when the
> 	       machine isn't itself susceptible to meltdown.
> 	Trivial whitespace tweaks.

The v6 logic looks fine to me. For the whole series:

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

      parent reply	other threads:[~2019-03-25 12:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-21 23:05 [PATCH v6 00/10] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 01/10] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 02/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 03/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Jeremy Linton
2019-03-25 10:32   ` Andre Przywara
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 04/10] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Jeremy Linton
2019-03-25 10:59   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 05/10] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 06/10] arm64: Always enable spectrev2 vulnerability detection Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 07/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 08/10] arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 09/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Jeremy Linton
2019-04-03 16:50   ` Will Deacon
2019-04-05 10:10     ` Andre Przywara
2019-04-05 14:43       ` Will Deacon
2019-04-05 15:18         ` Andre Przywara
2019-04-05 16:01           ` Jeremy Linton
2019-03-21 23:05 ` [PATCH v6 10/10] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Jeremy Linton
2019-03-22 17:49   ` Stefan Wahren
2019-03-25 10:33 ` [PATCH v6 00/10] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Andre Przywara
2019-03-25 12:22 ` Catalin Marinas [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20190325122247.5zyinkqmixmqg425@mbp \
    --to=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=Andre.Przywara@arm.com \
    --cc=Dave.Martin@arm.com \
    --cc=jeremy.linton@arm.com \
    --cc=julien.thierry@arm.com \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=marc.zyngier@arm.com \
    --cc=mlangsdo@redhat.com \
    --cc=shankerd@codeaurora.org \
    --cc=stefan.wahren@i2e.com \
    --cc=suzuki.poulose@arm.com \
    --cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).