From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.9 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C76DC04A6B for ; Wed, 8 May 2019 14:45:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 67CDA2175B for ; Wed, 8 May 2019 14:45:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728808AbfEHOpR (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 May 2019 10:45:17 -0400 Received: from mga02.intel.com ([134.134.136.20]:19928 "EHLO mga02.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726583AbfEHOoy (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 May 2019 10:44:54 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga002.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.26]) by orsmga101.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 May 2019 07:44:53 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.60,446,1549958400"; d="scan'208";a="169656575" Received: from black.fi.intel.com ([10.237.72.28]) by fmsmga002.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 08 May 2019 07:44:49 -0700 Received: by black.fi.intel.com (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 88BA31186; Wed, 8 May 2019 17:44:31 +0300 (EEST) From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" To: Andrew Morton , x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Borislav Petkov , Peter Zijlstra , Andy Lutomirski , David Howells Cc: Kees Cook , Dave Hansen , Kai Huang , Jacob Pan , Alison Schofield , linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Kirill A . Shutemov" Subject: [PATCH, RFC 57/62] x86/mktme: Overview of Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 17:44:17 +0300 Message-Id: <20190508144422.13171-58-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> References: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Alison Schofield Provide an overview of MKTME on Intel Platforms. Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov --- Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst | 8 +++ Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst diff --git a/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1614b52dd3e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/x86/mktme/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + +========================================= +Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME) +========================================= + +.. toctree:: + + mktme_overview diff --git a/Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst b/Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..59c023965554 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/x86/mktme/mktme_overview.rst @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +Overview +========= +Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME)[1] is a technology that +allows transparent memory encryption in upcoming Intel platforms. +It uses a new instruction (PCONFIG) for key setup and selects a +key for individual pages by repurposing physical address bits in +the page tables. + +Support for MKTME is added to the existing kernel keyring subsystem +and via a new mprotect_encrypt() system call that can be used by +applications to encrypt anonymous memory with keys obtained from +the keyring. + +This architecture supports encrypting both normal, volatile DRAM +and persistent memory. However, persistent memory support is +not included in the Linux kernel implementation at this time. +(We anticipate adding that support next.) + +Hardware Background +=================== + +MKTME is built on top of an existing single-key technology called +TME. TME encrypts all system memory using a single key generated +by the CPU on every boot of the system. TME provides mitigation +against physical attacks, such as physically removing a DIMM or +watching memory bus traffic. + +MKTME enables the use of multiple encryption keys[2], allowing +selection of the encryption key per-page using the page tables. +Encryption keys are programmed into each memory controller and +the same set of keys is available to all entities on the system +with access to that memory (all cores, DMA engines, etc...). + +MKTME inherits many of the mitigations against hardware attacks +from TME. Like TME, MKTME does not mitigate vulnerable or +malicious operating systems or virtual machine managers. MKTME +offers additional mitigations when compared to TME. + +TME and MKTME use the AES encryption algorithm in the AES-XTS +mode. This mode, typically used for block-based storage devices, +takes the physical address of the data into account when +encrypting each block. This ensures that the effective key is +different for each block of memory. Moving encrypted content +across physical address results in garbage on read, mitigating +block-relocation attacks. This property is the reason many of +the discussed attacks require control of a shared physical page +to be handed from the victim to the attacker. + +-- +1. https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/a5/16/Multi-Key-Total-Memory-Encryption-Spec.pdf +2. The MKTME architecture supports up to 16 bits of KeyIDs, so a + maximum of 65535 keys on top of the “TME key” at KeyID-0. The + first implementation is expected to support 5 bits, making 63 + keys available to applications. However, this is not guaranteed. + The number of available keys could be reduced if, for instance, + additional physical address space is desired over additional + KeyIDs. -- 2.20.1