From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 241/266] Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation
Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 12:55:48 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190515090731.157143722@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190515090722.696531131@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
commit 5999bbe7a6ea3c62029532ec84dc06003a1fa258 upstream.
Add the initial MDS vulnerability documentation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
- Drop the index updates
- Adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/hw-vuln/mds.rst | 307 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 2
2 files changed, 309 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/hw-vuln/mds.rst
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/mds.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+MDS - Microarchitectural Data Sampling
+======================================
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows
+unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in various CPU
+internal buffers.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
+vulnerability is not present on:
+
+ - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
+
+ - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
+
+ - Some Atoms (Bonnell, Saltwell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus)
+
+ - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO bit set in the
+ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the MDS
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`mds_sys_info`.
+
+Not all processors are affected by all variants of MDS, but the mitigation
+is identical for all of them so the kernel treats them as a single
+vulnerability.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries are related to the MDS vulnerability:
+
+ ============== ===== ==============================================
+ CVE-2018-12126 MSBDS Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
+ CVE-2018-12130 MFBDS Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
+ CVE-2018-12127 MLPDS Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
+ ============== ===== ==============================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+When performing store, load, L1 refill operations, processors write data
+into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in the
+buffer can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
+
+Under certain conditions, usually a fault/assist caused by a load
+operation, data unrelated to the load memory address can be speculatively
+forwarded from the buffers. Because the load operation causes a fault or
+assist and its result will be discarded, the forwarded data will not cause
+incorrect program execution or state changes. But a malicious operation
+may be able to forward this speculative data to a disclosure gadget which
+allows in turn to infer the value via a cache side channel attack.
+
+Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
+Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
+
+Deeper technical information is available in the MDS specific x86
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/mds.rst <mds>`.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the MDS vulnerabilities can be mounted from malicious non
+priviledged user space applications running on hosts or guest. Malicious
+guest OSes can obviously mount attacks as well.
+
+Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS vulnerability
+does not allow the attacker to control the memory target address. As a
+consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but as demonstrated with
+the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully.
+
+Web-Browsers
+^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ It's unclear whether attacks through Web-Browsers are possible at
+ all. The exploitation through Java-Script is considered very unlikely,
+ but other widely used web technologies like Webassembly could possibly be
+ abused.
+
+
+.. _mds_sys_info:
+
+MDS system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current MDS
+status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+ ========================================= =================================
+ 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
+
+ 'Vulnerable' The processor is vulnerable,
+ but no mitigation enabled
+
+ 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted' The processor is vulnerable but
+ microcode is not updated.
+ The mitigation is enabled on a
+ best effort basis.
+ See :ref:`vmwerv`
+
+ 'Mitigation: CPU buffer clear' The processor is vulnerable and the
+ CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
+ enabled.
+ ========================================= =================================
+
+If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended
+to the above information:
+
+ ======================== ============================================
+ 'SMT vulnerable' SMT is enabled
+ 'SMT mitigated' SMT is enabled and mitigated
+ 'SMT disabled' SMT is disabled
+ 'SMT Host state unknown' Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown
+ ======================== ============================================
+
+.. _vmwerv:
+
+Best effort mitigation mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode based
+ mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
+ effort mitigation mode. This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
+ without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
+
+ This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
+ microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose
+ the CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection
+ takes effect otherwise a few cpu cycles are wasted pointlessly.
+
+ The state in the mds sysfs file reflects this situation accordingly.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode
+which is required.
+
+If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
+enables the mitigation by default. The mitigation can be controlled at boot
+time via a kernel command line option. See
+:ref:`mds_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+.. _cpu_buffer_clear:
+
+CPU buffer clearing
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The mitigation for MDS clears the affected CPU buffers on return to user
+ space and when entering a guest.
+
+ If SMT is enabled it also clears the buffers on idle entry when the CPU
+ is only affected by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant, because the
+ other variants cannot be protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks.
+
+ For CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS the user space, guest and idle
+ transition mitigations are sufficient and SMT is not affected.
+
+.. _virt_mechanism:
+
+Virtualization mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The protection for host to guest transition depends on the L1TF
+ vulnerability of the CPU:
+
+ - CPU is affected by L1TF:
+
+ If the L1D flush mitigation is enabled and up to date microcode is
+ available, the L1D flush mitigation is automatically protecting the
+ guest transition.
+
+ If the L1D flush mitigation is disabled then the MDS mitigation is
+ invoked explicit when the host MDS mitigation is enabled.
+
+ For details on L1TF and virtualization see:
+ :ref:`Documentation/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <mitigation_control_kvm>`.
+
+ - CPU is not affected by L1TF:
+
+ CPU buffers are flushed before entering the guest when the host MDS
+ mitigation is enabled.
+
+ The resulting MDS protection matrix for the host to guest transition:
+
+ ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+ L1TF MDS VMX-L1FLUSH Host MDS MDS-State
+
+ Don't care No Don't care N/A Not affected
+
+ Yes Yes Disabled Off Vulnerable
+
+ Yes Yes Disabled Full Mitigated
+
+ Yes Yes Enabled Don't care Mitigated
+
+ No Yes N/A Off Vulnerable
+
+ No Yes N/A Full Mitigated
+ ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+
+ This only covers the host to guest transition, i.e. prevents leakage from
+ host to guest, but does not protect the guest internally. Guests need to
+ have their own protections.
+
+.. _xeon_phi:
+
+XEON PHI specific considerations
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The XEON PHI processor family is affected by MSBDS which can be exploited
+ cross Hyper-Threads when entering idle states. Some XEON PHI variants allow
+ to use MWAIT in user space (Ring 3) which opens an potential attack vector
+ for malicious user space. The exposure can be disabled on the kernel
+ command line with the 'ring3mwait=disable' command line option.
+
+ XEON PHI is not affected by the other MDS variants and MSBDS is mitigated
+ before the CPU enters a idle state. As XEON PHI is not affected by L1TF
+ either disabling SMT is not required for full protection.
+
+.. _mds_smt_control:
+
+SMT control
+^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ All MDS variants except MSBDS can be attacked cross Hyper-Threads. That
+ means on CPUs which are affected by MFBDS or MLPDS it is necessary to
+ disable SMT for full protection. These are most of the affected CPUs; the
+ exception is XEON PHI, see :ref:`xeon_phi`.
+
+ Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but the impact
+ depends on the type of workloads.
+
+ See the relevant chapter in the L1TF mitigation documentation for details:
+ :ref:`Documentation/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst <smt_control>`.
+
+
+.. _mds_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the MDS mitigations at boot
+time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+ ============ =============================================================
+ full If the CPU is vulnerable, enable all available mitigations
+ for the MDS vulnerability, CPU buffer clearing on exit to
+ userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are
+ protected as well if SMT is enabled.
+
+ It does not automatically disable SMT.
+
+ off Disables MDS mitigations completely.
+
+ ============ =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full".
+
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ If all userspace applications are from a trusted source and do not
+ execute untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation
+ can be disabled.
+
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The same considerations as above versus trusted user space apply.
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+ The protection depends on the state of the L1TF mitigations.
+ See :ref:`virt_mechanism`.
+
+ If the MDS mitigation is enabled and SMT is disabled, guest to host and
+ guest to guest attacks are prevented.
+
+.. _mds_default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+ The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
+
+ - Enable CPU buffer clearing
+
+ The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
+ SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted code. The same rationale as
+ for L1TF applies.
+ See :ref:`Documentation/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <default_mitigations>`.
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2057,6 +2057,8 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
mds=full.
+ For details see: Documentation/hw-vuln/mds.rst
+
mem=nn[KMG] [KNL,BOOT] Force usage of a specific amount of memory
Amount of memory to be used when the kernel is not able
to see the whole system memory or for test.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-05-15 11:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 282+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-05-15 10:51 [PATCH 4.4 000/266] 4.4.180-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:51 ` [PATCH 4.4 001/266] kbuild: simplify ld-option implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:51 ` [PATCH 4.4 002/266] KVM: fail KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS with invalid exception number Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:51 ` [PATCH 4.4 003/266] cifs: do not attempt cifs operation on smb2+ rename error Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:51 ` [PATCH 4.4 004/266] MIPS: scall64-o32: Fix indirect syscall number load Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:51 ` [PATCH 4.4 005/266] trace: Fix preempt_enable_no_resched() abuse Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:51 ` [PATCH 4.4 006/266] sched/numa: Fix a possible divide-by-zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:51 ` [PATCH 4.4 007/266] ceph: ensure d_name stability in ceph_dentry_hash() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:51 ` [PATCH 4.4 008/266] ceph: fix ci->i_head_snapc leak Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:51 ` [PATCH 4.4 009/266] nfsd: Dont release the callback slot unless it was actually held Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:51 ` [PATCH 4.4 010/266] sunrpc: dont mark uninitialised items as VALID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:51 ` [PATCH 4.4 011/266] USB: Add new USB LPM helpers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:51 ` [PATCH 4.4 012/266] USB: Consolidate LPM checks to avoid enabling LPM twice Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 013/266] powerpc/xmon: Add RFI flush related fields to paca dump Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 014/266] powerpc/64s: Improve RFI L1-D cache flush fallback Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 015/266] powerpc/pseries: Support firmware disable of RFI flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 016/266] powerpc/powernv: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 017/266] powerpc/rfi-flush: Move the logic to avoid a redo into the debugfs code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 018/266] powerpc/rfi-flush: Make it possible to call setup_rfi_flush() again Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 019/266] powerpc/rfi-flush: Always enable fallback flush on pseries Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 020/266] powerpc/rfi-flush: Differentiate enabled and patched flush types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 021/266] powerpc/pseries: Add new H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 022/266] powerpc/rfi-flush: Call setup_rfi_flush() after LPM migration Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 023/266] powerpc: Add security feature flags for Spectre/Meltdown Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 024/266] powerpc/pseries: Set or clear security feature flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 025/266] powerpc/powernv: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 026/266] powerpc/64s: Move cpu_show_meltdown() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 027/266] powerpc/64s: Enhance the information in cpu_show_meltdown() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 028/266] powerpc/powernv: Use the security flags in pnv_setup_rfi_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 029/266] powerpc/pseries: Use the security flags in pseries_setup_rfi_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 030/266] powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v1() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 031/266] powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v2() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 032/266] powerpc/pseries: Fix clearing of security feature flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 033/266] powerpc: Move default " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 034/266] powerpc/pseries: Restore default security feature flags on setup Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 035/266] powerpc/64s: Fix section mismatch warnings from setup_rfi_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 036/266] powerpc/64s: Add support for a store forwarding barrier at kernel entry/exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 037/266] powerpc/64s: Add barrier_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 038/266] powerpc/64s: Add support for ori barrier_nospec patching Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 039/266] powerpc/64s: Patch barrier_nospec in modules Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 040/266] powerpc/64s: Enable barrier_nospec based on firmware settings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 041/266] powerpc/64: Use barrier_nospec in syscall entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 042/266] powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 043/266] powerpc/64s: Enhance the information in cpu_show_spectre_v1() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 044/266] powerpc64s: Show ori31 availability in spectre_v1 sysfs file not v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 045/266] powerpc/64: Disable the speculation barrier from the command line Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 046/266] powerpc/64: Make stf barrier PPC_BOOK3S_64 specific Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 047/266] powerpc/64: Add CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 048/266] powerpc/64: Call setup_barrier_nospec() from setup_arch() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 049/266] powerpc/64: Make meltdown reporting Book3S 64 specific Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 050/266] powerpc/fsl: Add barrier_nospec implementation for NXP PowerPC Book3E Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 051/266] powerpc/asm: Add a patch_site macro & helpers for patching instructions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 052/266] powerpc/64s: Add new security feature flags for count cache flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 053/266] powerpc/64s: Add support for software " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 054/266] powerpc/pseries: Query hypervisor for count cache flush settings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 055/266] powerpc/powernv: Query firmware " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 056/266] powerpc: Avoid code patching freed init sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 057/266] powerpc/fsl: Add infrastructure to fixup branch predictor flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 058/266] powerpc/fsl: Add macro to flush the branch predictor Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 059/266] powerpc/fsl: Fix spectre_v2 mitigations reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 060/266] powerpc/fsl: Add nospectre_v2 command line argument Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 061/266] powerpc/fsl: Flush the branch predictor at each kernel entry (64bit) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 062/266] powerpc/fsl: Update Spectre v2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 063/266] powerpc/security: Fix spectre_v2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 064/266] powerpc/fsl: Fix the flush of branch predictor Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 065/266] tipc: handle the err returned from cmd header function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 066/266] slip: make slhc_free() silently accept an error pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 067/266] intel_th: gth: Fix an off-by-one in output unassigning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 068/266] fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c: Fix a NULL pointer dereference Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 069/266] NFS: Forbid setting AF_INET6 to "struct sockaddr_in"->sin_family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 070/266] netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: drop a bogus WARN_ON Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 071/266] tipc: check bearer name with right length in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 072/266] tipc: check link name with right length in tipc_nl_compat_link_set Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 073/266] bpf: reject wrong sized filters earlier Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 074/266] Revert "block/loop: Use global lock for ioctl() operation." Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 075/266] ipv4: add sanity checks in ipv4_link_failure() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 076/266] team: fix possible recursive locking when add slaves Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 077/266] net: stmmac: move stmmac_check_ether_addr() to driver probe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 078/266] ipv4: set the tcp_min_rtt_wlen range from 0 to one day Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 079/266] powerpc/fsl: Enable runtime patching if nospectre_v2 boot arg is used Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 080/266] powerpc/fsl: Flush branch predictor when entering KVM Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 081/266] powerpc/fsl: Emulate SPRN_BUCSR register Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 082/266] powerpc/fsl: Flush the branch predictor at each kernel entry (32 bit) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 083/266] powerpc/fsl: Sanitize the syscall table for NXP PowerPC 32 bit platforms Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 084/266] powerpc/fsl: Fixed warning: orphan section `__btb_flush_fixup Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 085/266] powerpc/fsl: Add FSL_PPC_BOOK3E as supported arch for nospectre_v2 boot arg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 086/266] Documentation: Add nospectre_v1 parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 087/266] usbnet: ipheth: prevent TX queue timeouts when device not ready Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 088/266] usbnet: ipheth: fix potential null pointer dereference in ipheth_carrier_set Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 089/266] qlcnic: Avoid potential NULL pointer dereference Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 090/266] netfilter: bridge: set skb transport_header before entering NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 091/266] sc16is7xx: missing unregister/delete driver on error in sc16is7xx_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 092/266] usb: gadget: net2280: Fix overrun of OUT messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 093/266] usb: gadget: net2280: Fix net2280_dequeue() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 094/266] usb: gadget: net2272: Fix net2272_dequeue() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 095/266] ARM: dts: pfla02: increase phy reset duration Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 096/266] net: ks8851: Dequeue RX packets explicitly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 097/266] net: ks8851: Reassert reset pin if chip ID check fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 098/266] net: ks8851: Delay requesting IRQ until opened Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 099/266] net: ks8851: Set initial carrier state to down Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 100/266] net: xilinx: fix possible object reference leak Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 101/266] net: ibm: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 102/266] net: ethernet: ti: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 103/266] scsi: qla4xxx: fix a potential NULL pointer dereference Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 104/266] usb: u132-hcd: fix resource leak Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 105/266] ceph: fix use-after-free on symlink traversal Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 106/266] scsi: zfcp: reduce flood of fcrscn1 trace records on multi-element RSCN Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 107/266] libata: fix using DMA buffers on stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 108/266] kconfig/[mn]conf: handle backspace (^H) key Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 109/266] vfio/type1: Limit DMA mappings per container Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 110/266] ALSA: line6: use dynamic buffers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 111/266] ipv4: ip_do_fragment: Preserve skb_iif during fragmentation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 112/266] ipv6/flowlabel: wait rcu grace period before put_pid() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 113/266] ipv6: invert flowlabel sharing check in process and user mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 114/266] bnxt_en: Improve multicast address setup logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 115/266] packet: validate msg_namelen in send directly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 116/266] USB: yurex: Fix protection fault after device removal Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 117/266] USB: w1 ds2490: Fix bug caused by improper use of altsetting array Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 118/266] USB: core: Fix unterminated string returned by usb_string() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 119/266] USB: core: Fix bug caused by duplicate interface PM usage counter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 120/266] HID: debug: fix race condition with between rdesc_show() and device removal Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 121/266] rtc: sh: Fix invalid alarm warning for non-enabled alarm Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 122/266] igb: Fix WARN_ONCE on runtime suspend Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 123/266] bonding: show full hw address in sysfs for slave entries Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 124/266] jffs2: fix use-after-free on symlink traversal Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 125/266] debugfs: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 126/266] rtc: da9063: set uie_unsupported when relevant Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 127/266] vfio/pci: use correct format characters Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 128/266] scsi: storvsc: Fix calculation of sub-channel count Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 129/266] net: hns: Use NAPI_POLL_WEIGHT for hns driver Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 130/266] net: hns: Fix WARNING when remove HNS driver with SMMU enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 131/266] hugetlbfs: fix memory leak for resv_map Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:53 ` [PATCH 4.4 132/266] xsysace: Fix error handling in ace_setup Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 133/266] ARM: orion: dont use using 64-bit DMA masks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 134/266] ARM: iop: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 135/266] usb: usbip: fix isoc packet num validation in get_pipe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 136/266] staging: iio: adt7316: allow adt751x to use internal vref for all dacs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 137/266] staging: iio: adt7316: fix the dac read calculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 138/266] staging: iio: adt7316: fix the dac write calculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 139/266] Input: snvs_pwrkey - initialize necessary driver data before enabling IRQ Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 140/266] selinux: never allow relabeling on context mounts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 141/266] x86/mce: Improve error message when kernel cannot recover, p2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 142/266] media: v4l2: i2c: ov7670: Fix PLL bypass register values Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 143/266] scsi: libsas: fix a race condition when smp task timeout Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 144/266] ASoC:soc-pcm:fix a codec fixup issue in TDM case Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 145/266] ASoC: cs4270: Set auto-increment bit for register writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 146/266] ASoC: tlv320aic32x4: Fix Common Pins Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 147/266] perf/x86/intel: Fix handling of wakeup_events for multi-entry PEBS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 148/266] scsi: csiostor: fix missing data copy in csio_scsi_err_handler() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 149/266] iommu/amd: Set exclusion range correctly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 150/266] genirq: Prevent use-after-free and work list corruption Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 151/266] usb: dwc3: Fix default lpm_nyet_threshold value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 152/266] scsi: qla2xxx: Fix incorrect region-size setting in optrom SYSFS routines Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 153/266] Bluetooth: hidp: fix buffer overflow Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 154/266] Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 155/266] UAS: fix alignment of scatter/gather segments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 156/266] ipv6: fix a potential deadlock in do_ipv6_setsockopt() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 157/266] ASoC: Intel: avoid Oops if DMA setup fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 158/266] timer/debug: Change /proc/timer_stats from 0644 to 0600 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 159/266] netfilter: compat: initialize all fields in xt_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 160/266] mm, vmstat: make quiet_vmstat lighter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 161/266] platform/x86: sony-laptop: Fix unintentional fall-through Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 162/266] iio: adc: xilinx: fix potential use-after-free on remove Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 163/266] HID: input: add mapping for Expose/Overview key Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 164/266] HID: input: add mapping for keyboard Brightness Up/Down/Toggle keys Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 165/266] libnvdimm/btt: Fix a kmemdup failure check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 166/266] s390/dasd: Fix capacity calculation for large volumes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 167/266] s390/3270: fix lockdep false positive on view->lock Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 168/266] KVM: x86: avoid misreporting level-triggered irqs as edge-triggered in tracing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 169/266] tools lib traceevent: Fix missing equality check for strcmp Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 170/266] init: initialize jump labels before command line option parsing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 171/266] ipvs: do not schedule icmp errors from tunnels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 172/266] s390: ctcm: fix ctcm_new_device error return code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 173/266] selftests/net: correct the return value for run_netsocktests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 174/266] gpu: ipu-v3: dp: fix CSC handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 175/266] cw1200: fix missing unlock on error in cw1200_hw_scan() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 176/266] x86/vdso: Pass --eh-frame-hdr to the linker Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 177/266] Dont jump to compute_result state from check_result state Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 178/266] locking/static_keys: Provide DECLARE and well as DEFINE macros Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 179/266] x86/microcode/intel: Add a helper which gives the microcode revision Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 180/266] x86: stop exporting msr-index.h to userland Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-17 8:06 ` Pavel Machek
2019-05-17 9:42 ` Ben Hutchings
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 181/266] bitops: avoid integer overflow in GENMASK(_ULL) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 182/266] x86/microcode/intel: Check microcode revision before updating sibling threads Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 183/266] x86/MCE: Save microcode revision in machine check records Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 184/266] x86/cpufeatures: Hide AMD-specific speculation flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 185/266] x86/speculation: Support Enhanced IBRS on future CPUs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 186/266] x86/speculation: Simplify the CPU bug detection logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 187/266] x86/bugs: Add AMDs variant of SSB_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 188/266] x86/bugs: Add AMDs SPEC_CTRL MSR usage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 189/266] x86/bugs: Switch the selection of mitigation from CPU vendor to CPU features Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 190/266] locking/atomics, asm-generic: Move some macros from <linux/bitops.h> to a new <linux/bits.h> file Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 191/266] x86/bugs: Fix the AMD SSBD usage of the SPEC_CTRL MSR Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:54 ` [PATCH 4.4 192/266] x86/speculation: Remove SPECTRE_V2_IBRS in enum spectre_v2_mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 193/266] x86/microcode: Make sure boot_cpu_data.microcode is up-to-date Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 194/266] x86/microcode: Update the new microcode revision unconditionally Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 195/266] x86/cpu: Sanitize FAM6_ATOM naming Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 196/266] KVM: x86: SVM: Call x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest/host() with interrupts disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 197/266] x86/mm: Use WRITE_ONCE() when setting PTEs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 198/266] x86/speculation: Apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 199/266] x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 200/266] x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 201/266] x86/speculation: Update the TIF_SSBD comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 202/266] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 203/266] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 204/266] x86/speculation: Move STIPB/IBPB string conditionals out of cpu_show_common() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 205/266] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 206/266] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 207/266] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 208/266] x86/Kconfig: Select SCHED_SMT if SMP enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 209/266] sched: Add sched_smt_active() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 210/266] x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 211/266] x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 212/266] x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 213/266] x86/speculataion: Mark command line parser data __initdata Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 214/266] x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 215/266] x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 216/266] x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 217/266] x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 218/266] x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 219/266] x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 220/266] x86/speculation: Split out TIF update Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 221/266] x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 222/266] x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 223/266] x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 224/266] x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 225/266] x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 226/266] x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 227/266] kvm: x86: Report STIBP on GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 228/266] x86/msr-index: Cleanup bit defines Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 229/266] x86/speculation: Consolidate CPU whitelists Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 230/266] x86/speculation/mds: Add basic bug infrastructure for MDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 231/266] x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 232/266] x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 233/266] x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 234/266] x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 235/266] x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 236/266] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 237/266] x86/speculation/l1tf: Document l1tf in sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 238/266] x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 239/266] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 240/266] Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 242/266] x86/cpu/bugs: Use __initconst for const init data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 243/266] x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 244/266] x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 245/266] x86/speculation/mds: Fix comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 246/266] x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 247/266] cpu/speculation: Add mitigations= cmdline option Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-16 7:04 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 248/266] x86/speculation: Support " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 249/266] x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigations= support for MDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 250/266] x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 251/266] Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:55 ` [PATCH 4.4 252/266] x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:56 ` [PATCH 4.4 253/266] x86/bugs: Change L1TF mitigation string to match upstream Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:56 ` [PATCH 4.4 254/266] USB: serial: use variable for status Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:56 ` [PATCH 4.4 255/266] USB: serial: fix unthrottle races Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:56 ` [PATCH 4.4 256/266] powerpc/64s: Include cpu header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:56 ` [PATCH 4.4 257/266] bridge: Fix error path for kobject_init_and_add() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:56 ` [PATCH 4.4 258/266] net: ucc_geth - fix Oops when changing number of buffers in the ring Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:56 ` [PATCH 4.4 259/266] packet: Fix error path in packet_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:56 ` [PATCH 4.4 260/266] vlan: disable SIOCSHWTSTAMP in container Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:56 ` [PATCH 4.4 261/266] vrf: sit mtu should not be updated when vrf netdev is the link Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:56 ` [PATCH 4.4 262/266] ipv4: Fix raw socket lookup for local traffic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:56 ` [PATCH 4.4 263/266] bonding: fix arp_validate toggling in active-backup mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:56 ` [PATCH 4.4 264/266] drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c: dereferencing error pointers in ioctl Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:56 ` [PATCH 4.4 265/266] drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c: prevent integer overflow " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 10:56 ` [PATCH 4.4 266/266] powerpc/booke64: set RI in default MSR Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-15 14:47 ` [PATCH 4.4 000/266] 4.4.180-stable review kernelci.org bot
2019-05-15 15:13 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-16 22:47 ` Kevin Hilman
2019-05-17 6:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-16 3:34 ` Guenter Roeck
2019-05-16 4:39 ` Naresh Kamboju
2019-05-16 10:57 ` Jon Hunter
2019-05-16 11:59 ` Daniel Wagner
2019-05-16 16:49 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-05-17 7:44 ` Daniel Wagner
2019-05-17 8:19 ` Jon Hunter
2019-05-16 14:23 ` shuah
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