From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V38 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2019 19:47:32 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190814174732.GD1841@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACdnJuuOhuw71GDwQOrPQxUexpvpZNJocr6m0dYzJw+MMaVKWQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Aug 14, 2019 at 10:14:54AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> We explicitly don't want to pay attention to the acpi_rsdp kernel
> parameter in early boot except for the case of finding the SRAT table,
> and we only need that if CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE and
> CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE are set. However, we *do* want to tell the
> actual kernel where the RSDP is if we found it via some other means,
> so we can't just clear the boot parameters value.
Ok.
> The kernel proper will parse the command line again and will then (if
> lockdown isn't enabled) override the actual value we passed up in boot
> params.
Yeah, ok, I see what you're doing there. AFAICT, you do that in
setup_arch->acpi_boot_table_init-> ... -> acpi_os_get_root_pointer()
I hope nothing needs it earlier because then we'll have to restructure
again...
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-14 17:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-08 0:06 [PATCH V38 00/29] security: Add support for locking down the kernel Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:06 ` [PATCH V38 01/29] security: Support early LSMs Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:06 ` [PATCH V38 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:06 ` [PATCH V38 03/29] security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:06 ` [PATCH V38 04/29] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:06 ` [PATCH V38 05/29] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:06 ` [PATCH V38 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:06 ` [PATCH V38 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 10/29] hibernate: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 11/29] PCI: Lock down BAR access " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 12/29] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 13/29] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 14/29] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 15/29] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-14 2:51 ` Dave Young
2019-08-14 7:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-14 17:14 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-14 17:47 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2019-08-14 18:02 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-14 7:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 16/29] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 17/29] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 18/29] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 11:12 ` Jessica Yu
2019-08-08 16:33 ` James Morris
2019-08-09 20:58 ` [PATCH V39] " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 21/29] Lock down /proc/kcore Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 22/29] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 24/29] Lock down perf when " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 26/29] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 28/29] efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load " Matthew Garrett
2019-08-08 0:07 ` [PATCH V38 29/29] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages Matthew Garrett
2019-08-10 6:08 ` [PATCH V38 00/29] security: Add support for locking down the kernel James Morris
2019-08-12 17:06 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-08-12 17:39 ` James Morris
2019-08-12 22:29 ` James Morris
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