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From: "Thomas Hellström (VMware)" <thomas_os@shipmail.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, pv-drivers@vmware.com
Cc: "Thomas Hellstrom" <thellstrom@vmware.com>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Christoph Hellwig" <hch@infradead.org>,
	"Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>,
	"Marek Szyprowski" <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>,
	"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 1/2] x86: Don't let pgprot_modify() change the page encryption bit
Date: Thu,  5 Sep 2019 12:35:40 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190905103541.4161-2-thomas_os@shipmail.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190905103541.4161-1-thomas_os@shipmail.org>

From: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>

When SEV or SME is enabled and active, vm_get_page_prot() typically
returns with the encryption bit set. This means that users of
pgprot_modify(, vm_get_page_prot()) (mprotect_fixup, do_mmap) typically
unintentionally sets encrypted page protection even on mmap'd coherent
memory where the mmap callback has cleared the bit. Fix this by not
allowing pgprot_modify() to change the encryption bit, similar to
how it's done for PAT bits.

Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 0bc530c4eb13..8e507169fd90 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -624,12 +624,16 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_modify(pmd_t pmd, pgprot_t newprot)
 	return __pmd(val);
 }
 
-/* mprotect needs to preserve PAT bits when updating vm_page_prot */
+/*
+ * mprotect needs to preserve PAT and encryption bits when updating
+ * vm_page_prot
+ */
 #define pgprot_modify pgprot_modify
 static inline pgprot_t pgprot_modify(pgprot_t oldprot, pgprot_t newprot)
 {
-	pgprotval_t preservebits = pgprot_val(oldprot) & _PAGE_CHG_MASK;
-	pgprotval_t addbits = pgprot_val(newprot);
+	pgprotval_t preservebits = pgprot_val(oldprot) &
+		(_PAGE_CHG_MASK | sme_me_mask);
+	pgprotval_t addbits = pgprot_val(newprot) & ~sme_me_mask;
 	return __pgprot(preservebits | addbits);
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1


  reply	other threads:[~2019-09-05 10:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-05 10:35 [RFC PATCH 0/2] Fix SEV user-space mapping of unencrypted coherent memory Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 10:35 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware) [this message]
2019-09-05 14:15   ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] x86: Don't let pgprot_modify() change the page encryption bit Dave Hansen
2019-09-05 15:21     ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 15:24       ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-05 16:40         ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 17:05         ` dma_mmap_fault discussion Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-06  6:32           ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-06  7:10             ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-06  7:20               ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-10  8:37                 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-10 16:11         ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] x86: Don't let pgprot_modify() change the page encryption bit Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-10 19:26           ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-11  4:18             ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-11  7:49               ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-11 18:03                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-12  8:29                   ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-11  9:08             ` Koenig, Christian
2019-09-11 10:10               ` TTM huge page-faults WAS: " Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-11 14:06                 ` Koenig, Christian
2019-09-11 15:08                   ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-24 12:03                     ` Koenig, Christian
2019-09-05 15:59       ` Dave Hansen
2019-09-05 16:29         ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 10:35 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] dma-mapping: Fix dma_pgprot() for unencrypted coherent pages Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-05 11:23 ` [RFC PATCH 0/2] Fix SEV user-space mapping of unencrypted coherent memory Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-10  6:11   ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-10  6:25     ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)

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