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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>,
	Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>, Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: [patch V3 17/20] x86/iopl: Restrict iopl() permission scope
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2019 19:13:24 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191114181324.GD7222@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191113210105.369055550@linutronix.de>

On Wed, Nov 13, 2019 at 09:42:57PM +0100, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> 
> The access to the full I/O port range can be also provided by the TSS I/O
> bitmap, but that would require to copy 8k of data on scheduling in the
> task. As shown with the sched out optimization TSS.io_bitmap_base can be
> used to switch the incoming task to a preallocated I/O bitmap which has all
> bits zero, i.e. allows access to all I/O ports.
> 
> Implementing this allows to provide an iopl() emulation mode which restricts
> the IOPL level 3 permissions to I/O port access but removes the STI/CLI
> permission which is coming with the hardware IOPL mechansim.
> 
> Provide a config option to switch IOPL to emulation mode, make it the
> default and while at it also provide an option to disable IOPL completely.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> ---
> V3:	Folded the missing NULL pointer check, reduced preempt disable
> 	scope (Ingo)
> 
> V2:	Fixed the 32bit build fail by increasing the cpu entry area size
> 	Move the TSS update out of the iopl() emulation code.
> ---
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                        |   32 +++++++++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h |    2 
>  arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h        |   28 +++++++---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c            |    5 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c                |   87 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  arch/x86/kernel/process.c               |   28 ++++++----
>  6 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
> 
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -1254,6 +1254,38 @@ config X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION
>  	 Disabling this option saves about 7K of kernel size and
>  	 possibly 4K of additional runtime pagetable memory.
>  
> +choice
> +	prompt "IOPL"
> +	default X86_IOPL_EMULATION
> +
> +config X86_IOPL_EMULATION
> +	bool "IOPL Emulation"
> +	---help---
> +	  Legacy IOPL support is an overbroad mechanism which allows user
> +	  space aside of accessing all 65536 I/O ports also to disable
> +	  interrupts. To gain this access the caller needs CAP_SYS_RAWIO
> +	  capabilities and permission from eventually active security

I think you mean here: s/eventually/potentially/ or so. "eventually" is
one of the false friends. :)

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2019-11-14 18:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-11-13 20:42 [patch V3 00/20] x86/iopl: Prevent user space from using CLI/STI with iopl(3) Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 01/20] x86/ptrace: Prevent truncation of bitmap size Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 02/20] x86/process: Unify copy_thread_tls() Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 21:10   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-11-13 21:41     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 22:10       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-11-13 22:33         ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 21:44     ` Brian Gerst
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 03/20] x86/cpu: Unify cpu_init() Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 04/20] x86/tss: Fix and move VMX BUILD_BUG_ON() Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 05/20] x86/iopl: Cleanup include maze Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 06/20] x86/ioperm: Simplify first ioperm() invocation logic Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 07/20] x86/ioperm: Avoid bitmap allocation if no permissions are set Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 08/20] x86/io: Speedup schedule out of I/O bitmap user Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 09/20] x86/tss: Move I/O bitmap data into a seperate struct Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 10/20] x86/ioperm: Move iobitmap data into a struct Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 11/20] x86/ioperm: Add bitmap sequence number Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 12/20] x86/ioperm: Move TSS bitmap update to exit to user work Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 21:19   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-11-13 21:21     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-11-13 21:44       ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 13/20] x86/ioperm: Remove bitmap if all permissions dropped Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 14/20] x86/ioperm: Share I/O bitmap if identical Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 15/20] selftests/x86/ioperm: Extend testing so the shared bitmap is exercised Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 16/20] x86/iopl: Fixup misleading comment Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 17/20] x86/iopl: Restrict iopl() permission scope Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-14 18:13   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2019-11-14 18:39     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 18/20] x86/iopl: Remove legacy IOPL option Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:42 ` [patch V3 19/20] x86/ioperm: Extend IOPL config to control ioperm() as well Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-13 20:43 ` [patch V3 20/20] selftests/x86/iopl: Extend test to cover IOPL emulation Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-15 21:12   ` [tip: x86/iopl] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2019-11-14  8:43 ` [patch V3 00/20] x86/iopl: Prevent user space from using CLI/STI with iopl(3) Peter Zijlstra

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