Re: [REVIEW PATCH v2] ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials in ptrace_has_cap()

[Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>]

On Thu, Jan 16, 2020 at 06:29:26PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 16, 2020 at 11:45:18PM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > As one example where this might be particularly problematic, Jann pointed
> > out that in combination with the upcoming IORING_OP_OPENAT feature, this
> > bug might allow unprivileged users to bypass the capability checks while
> > asynchronously opening files like /proc/*/mem, because the capability
> > checks for this would be performed against kernel credentials.

To follow up on this part of your mail. No, afaict, it's not
aboutwinning a race. It's way simpler...
When io uring creates a new kernel context it records the subjective
credentials of the caller:

	ctx = io_ring_ctx_alloc(p);
	if (!ctx) {
		if (account_mem)
			io_unaccount_mem(user, ring_pages(p->sq_entries,
								p->cq_entries));
		free_uid(user);
		return -ENOMEM;
	}
	ctx->compat = in_compat_syscall();
	ctx->account_mem = account_mem;
	ctx->user = user;
------> ctx->creds = get_current_cred(); <------

Later on, when it starts to do work it creates a kernel thread:

			ctx->sqo_thread = kthread_create_on_cpu(io_sq_thread,
							ctx, cpu,
							"io_uring-sq");
		} else {
			ctx->sqo_thread = kthread_create(io_sq_thread, ctx,
							"io_uring-sq");
		}

and registers io_sq_thread as "callback". The callback io_sq_thread()
runs __with kernel creds__. To prevent this from becoming an issue
io_sq_thread() will override the __subjective credentials__ with the
callers credentials:

	old_cred = override_creds(ctx->creds);

But ptrace_has_cap() currently looks at __task_cred(current) aka
__real_cred__. This means once IORING_OP_OPENAT and IORING_OP_OPENAT2
lands in v5.5-rc6 it is more or less trivial for an unprivileged user to
bypass ptrace_may_access().

Christian