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From: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
To: "Lev R. Oshvang ." <levonshe@gmail.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
	"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Christian Heimes" <christian@python.org>,
	"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	"Deven Bowers" <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"Eric Chiang" <ericchiang@google.com>,
	"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Lakshmi Ramasubramanian" <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"Matthew Garrett" <mjg59@google.com>,
	"Matthew Wilcox" <willy@infradead.org>,
	"Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mickael.salaun@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Philippe Trébuchet" <philippe.trebuchet@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	"Scott Shell" <scottsh@microsoft.com>,
	"Sean Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"Steve Dower" <steve.dower@python.org>,
	"Steve Grubb" <sgrubb@redhat.com>,
	"Thibaut Sautereau" <thibaut.sautereau@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	"Vincent Strubel" <vincent.strubel@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	"LSM List" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC
Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 01:41:17 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200506154117.gibiibfytrdl4exo@yavin.dot.cyphar.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAP22eLHres_shVWEC+2=wcKXRsQzfNKDAnyRd8yuO_gJ3Wi_JA@mail.gmail.com>

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On 2020-05-06, Lev R. Oshvang . <levonshe@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 6:36 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 05/05/2020 17:31, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > This fifth patch series add new kernel configurations (OMAYEXEC_STATIC,
> > > OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_MOUNT, and OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_FILE) to enable to
> > > configure the security policy at kernel build time.  As requested by
> > > Mimi Zohar, I completed the series with one of her patches for IMA.
> > >
> > > The goal of this patch series is to enable to control script execution
> > > with interpreters help.  A new O_MAYEXEC flag, usable through
> > > openat2(2), is added to enable userspace script interpreter to delegate
> > > to the kernel (and thus the system security policy) the permission to
> > > interpret/execute scripts or other files containing what can be seen as
> > > commands.
> > >
> > > A simple system-wide security policy can be enforced by the system
> > > administrator through a sysctl configuration consistent with the mount
> > > points or the file access rights.  The documentation patch explains the
> > > prerequisites.
> > >
> > > Furthermore, the security policy can also be delegated to an LSM, either
> > > a MAC system or an integrity system.  For instance, the new kernel
> > > MAY_OPENEXEC flag closes a major IMA measurement/appraisal interpreter
> > > integrity gap by bringing the ability to check the use of scripts [1].
> > > Other uses are expected, such as for openat2(2) [2], SGX integration
> > > [3], bpffs [4] or IPE [5].
> > >
> > > Userspace needs to adapt to take advantage of this new feature.  For
> > > example, the PEP 578 [6] (Runtime Audit Hooks) enables Python 3.8 to be
> > > extended with policy enforcement points related to code interpretation,
> > > which can be used to align with the PowerShell audit features.
> > > Additional Python security improvements (e.g. a limited interpreter
> > > withou -c, stdin piping of code) are on their way.
> > >
> > > The initial idea come from CLIP OS 4 and the original implementation has
> > > been used for more than 12 years:
> > > https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_doc
> > >
> > > An introduction to O_MAYEXEC was given at the Linux Security Summit
> > > Europe 2018 - Linux Kernel Security Contributions by ANSSI:
> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=chNjCRtPKQY&t=17m15s
> > > The "write xor execute" principle was explained at Kernel Recipes 2018 -
> > > CLIP OS: a defense-in-depth OS:
> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PjRE0uBtkHU&t=11m14s
> > >
> > > This patch series can be applied on top of v5.7-rc4.  This can be tested
> > > with CONFIG_SYSCTL.  I would really appreciate constructive comments on
> > > this patch series.
> > >
> > > Previous version:
> > > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200428175129.634352-1-mic@digikod.net/
> >
> > The previous version (v4) is
> > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200430132320.699508-1-mic@digikod.net/
> 
> 
> Hi Michael
> 
> I have couple of question
> 1. Why you did not add O_MAYEXEC to open()?
> Some time ago (around v4.14) open() did not return EINVAL when
> VALID_OPEN_FLAGS check failed.
> Now it does, so I do not see a problem that interpreter will use
> simple open(),  ( Although that path might be manipulated, but file
> contents will be verified by IMA)

You don't get -EINVAL from open() in the case of unknown flags, that's
something only openat2() does in the open*() family. Hence why it's only
introduced for openat2().

> 2. When you apply a new flag to mount, it means that IMA will check
> all files under this mount and it does not matter whether the file in
> question is a script or not.
> IMHO it is too hard overhead for performance reasons.
> 
> Regards,
> LEv


-- 
Aleksa Sarai
Senior Software Engineer (Containers)
SUSE Linux GmbH
<https://www.cyphar.com/>

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  reply	other threads:[~2020-05-06 15:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-05 15:31 [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on openat2(2) Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-12 21:05   ` Kees Cook
2020-05-12 21:40     ` Christian Heimes
2020-05-12 22:56       ` Kees Cook
2020-05-13 10:13     ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] fs: Add a MAY_EXECMOUNT flag to infer the noexec mount property Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-12 21:09   ` Kees Cook
2020-05-14  8:14     ` Lev R. Oshvang .
2020-05-14 15:48       ` Kees Cook
2020-05-17 16:57         ` Lev R. Oshvang .
2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-05 15:44   ` Randy Dunlap
2020-05-05 16:55     ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-05 17:40       ` Randy Dunlap
2020-05-12 21:48   ` Kees Cook
2020-05-13 11:09     ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-13 15:37   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-13 23:27     ` Kees Cook
2020-05-14  3:05       ` Kees Cook
2020-05-14 10:12         ` David Laight
2020-05-14 12:22         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-14 14:41           ` Kees Cook
2020-05-14 15:52             ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-14 15:45           ` Kees Cook
2020-05-14 16:10             ` Stephen Smalley
2020-05-14 19:16               ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-15  0:58                 ` Tetsuo Handa
2020-05-15  8:01                 ` How about just O_EXEC? (was Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC) Kees Cook
2020-05-15  8:43                   ` Florian Weimer
2020-05-15 14:37                     ` Kees Cook
2020-05-15 14:43                       ` Florian Weimer
2020-05-15 15:50                         ` Kees Cook
2020-05-18  7:26                           ` Florian Weimer
2020-05-19  2:23                           ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-05-19 10:13                             ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-15 11:04                   ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-15 15:46                     ` Kees Cook
2020-05-15 18:24                       ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-14 19:21       ` [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] selftest/openat2: Add tests for O_MAYEXEC enforcing Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-12 21:57   ` Kees Cook
2020-05-13 11:18     ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] doc: Add documentation for the fs.open_mayexec_enforce sysctl Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-12 22:00   ` Kees Cook
2020-05-13 11:20     ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-05 15:31 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] ima: add policy support for the new file open MAY_OPENEXEC flag Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-05 15:36 ` [PATCH v5 0/6] Add support for O_MAYEXEC Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-06 13:58   ` Lev R. Oshvang .
2020-05-06 15:41     ` Aleksa Sarai [this message]
2020-05-07  8:30     ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-07  8:05 ` David Laight
2020-05-07  8:36   ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-07  9:00     ` David Laight
2020-05-07  9:30       ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-07  9:44         ` David Laight
2020-05-07 13:38           ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-05-08  7:15             ` Lev R. Oshvang .
2020-05-08 14:01               ` Mimi Zohar

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