From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>
Cc: Jesse Barnes <jsbarnes@google.com>,
Rajat Jain <rajatxjain@gmail.com>,
Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>,
"Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
"Krishnakumar,
Lalithambika" <lalithambika.krishnakumar@intel.com>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
linux-pci <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>,
Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>,
Prashant Malani <pmalani@google.com>,
Benson Leung <bleung@google.com>, Todd Broch <tbroch@google.com>,
Alex Levin <levinale@google.com>,
Mattias Nissler <mnissler@google.com>,
Zubin Mithra <zsm@google.com>,
Bernie Keany <bernie.keany@intel.com>,
Aaron Durbin <adurbin@google.com>,
Diego Rivas <diegorivas@google.com>,
Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@google.com>,
Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>,
Christian Kellner <christian@kellner.me>,
Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Restrict the untrusted devices, to bind to only a set of "whitelisted" drivers
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2020 11:54:44 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200609095444.GA533843@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACK8Z6GZprVZMM=JQ-9zjosYQ6OLpifp_g8RmSTa3HwWWTB8Lw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Jun 08, 2020 at 11:41:19AM -0700, Rajat Jain wrote:
> Hi Jesse and Greg,
>
> On Mon, Jun 8, 2020 at 11:30 AM Jesse Barnes <jsbarnes@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > > > I think your suggestion to disable driver binding once the initial
> > > > bus/slot devices have been bound will probably work for this
> > > > situation. I just wanted to be clear that without some auditing,
> > > > fuzzing, and additional testing, we simply have to assume that drivers
> > > > are *not* secure and avoid using them on untrusted devices until we're
> > > > fairly confident they can handle them (whether just misbehaving or
> > > > malicious), in combination with other approaches like IOMMUs of
> > > > course. And this isn't because we don't trust driver authors or
> > > > kernel developers to dtrt, it's just that for many devices (maybe USB
> > > > is an exception) I think driver authors haven't had to consider this
> > > > case much, and so I think it's prudent to expect bugs in this area
> > > > that we need to find & fix.
> > >
> > > For USB, yes, we have now had to deal with "untrusted devices" lieing
> > > about their ids and sending us horrible data. That's all due to the
> > > fuzzing tools that have been written over the past few years, and now we
> > > have some of those in the kernel tree itself to help with that testing.
>
> This is great to hear! I tried to look up but didn't find anything
> else in-kernel, except the kcov support to export coverage info for
> userspace fuzzers. Can you please give us some pointers for in-kernel
> fuzzing tools?
For USB, it's a combination of using syzbot with the "raw gadget" driver
and the loopback gadget/host controller. See many posts from Andrey
Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> on the linux-usb@vger.kernel.org list
for details as to how he does this.
> > > For PCI, heh, good luck, those assumptions about "devices sending valid
> > > data" are everywhere, if our experience with USB is any indication.
> > >
> > > But, to take USB as an example, this is exactly what the USB
> > > "authorized" flag is there for, it's a "trust" setting that userspace
> > > has control over. This came from the wireless USB spec, where it was
> > > determined that you could not trust devices. So just use that same
> > > model here, move it to the driver core for all busses to use and you
> > > should be fine.
> > >
> > > If that doesn't meet your needs, please let me know the specifics of
> > > why, with patches :)
> >
> > Yeah will do for sure. I don't want to carry a big infra for this on our own!
> >
> > > Now, as to you all getting some sort of "Hardware flag" to determine
> > > "inside" vs. "outside" devices, hah, good luck! It took us a long time
> > > to get that for USB, and even then, BIOSes lie and get it wrong all the
> > > time. So you will have to also deal with that in some way, for your
> > > userspace policy.
> >
> > I think that's inherently platform specific to some extent. We can do
> > it with our coreboot based firmware, but there's no guarantee other
> > vendors will adopt the same approach. But I think at least for the
> > ChromeOS ecosystem we can come up with something that'll work, and
> > allow us to dtrt in userspace wrt driver binding.
>
> Agree, we can work with our firmware teams to get that right, and then
> expose it from kernel to userspace to help it implement the policy we
> want.
This is already in the spec for USB, I suggest working to get this added
to the other bus type specs that you care about as well (UEFI, PCI,
etc.)
thanks,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-09 9:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <CACK8Z6F3jE-aE+N7hArV3iye+9c-COwbi3qPkRPxfrCnccnqrw@mail.gmail.com>
2020-06-01 23:25 ` [RFC] Restrict the untrusted devices, to bind to only a set of "whitelisted" drivers Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-02 5:06 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-03 2:27 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-03 6:07 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-03 11:51 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-03 12:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-03 12:57 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-03 13:29 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-04 19:38 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-05 8:02 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-06 1:08 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-07 11:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-08 17:03 ` Jesse Barnes
2020-06-08 17:50 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-08 18:29 ` Jesse Barnes
2020-06-08 18:41 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-09 9:54 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2020-06-30 21:46 ` Pavel Machek
2020-06-09 5:57 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-30 21:45 ` Pavel Machek
2020-07-01 6:54 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-01 8:47 ` Pavel Machek
2020-07-01 10:57 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-01 11:08 ` Pavel Machek
2020-06-09 21:04 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-09 23:23 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-10 0:04 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-10 0:30 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-10 20:17 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-10 23:09 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-10 23:01 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-10 23:46 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-10 7:13 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-10 1:34 ` Oliver O'Halloran
2020-06-10 19:57 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-16 1:24 ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-10 7:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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