From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5CC38C5519F for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 19:08:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E6513216C4 for ; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 19:08:45 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="AJ2VewNY" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726605AbgKLTIp (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 14:08:45 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54958 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726096AbgKLTIo (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Nov 2020 14:08:44 -0500 Received: from kernel.org (unknown [77.125.7.142]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A8D5220B80; Thu, 12 Nov 2020 19:08:31 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1605208123; bh=xV//yxXQnSWrF+/xUfBz0sg6IFqo/YMvvh+jTSmycog=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=AJ2VewNYER4w3booQ/KucmJAPZK4Nm1reG5FJeJdC37e1oDo0gYmUR751y+nFk/Fk KTZnkXVxvIaPUC+PE+K9dv1EbVW82mMGVB67vT5tdx3BmBSmhgCrAaqtZp5v8kMCfS p3TcAbQ8jXyADENOO6QdpyUsgBOodjaN9MdE79nU= Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 21:08:27 +0200 From: Mike Rapoport To: David Hildenbrand Cc: Andrew Morton , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Rick Edgecombe , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 2/9] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Message-ID: <20201112190827.GP4758@kernel.org> References: <20201110151444.20662-1-rppt@kernel.org> <20201110151444.20662-3-rppt@kernel.org> <9e2fafd7-abb0-aa79-fa66-cd8662307446@redhat.com> <20201110180648.GB4758@kernel.org> <3194b507-a85f-965a-e0eb-512a79ede6a9@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <3194b507-a85f-965a-e0eb-512a79ede6a9@redhat.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 05:22:00PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote: > On 10.11.20 19:06, Mike Rapoport wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 10, 2020 at 06:17:26PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote: > > > On 10.11.20 16:14, Mike Rapoport wrote: > > > > From: Mike Rapoport > > > > > > > > It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation. > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport > > > > --- > > > > mm/internal.h | 3 +++ > > > > mm/mmap.c | 5 ++--- > > > > 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > diff --git a/mm/internal.h b/mm/internal.h > > > > index c43ccdddb0f6..ae146a260b14 100644 > > > > --- a/mm/internal.h > > > > +++ b/mm/internal.h > > > > @@ -348,6 +348,9 @@ static inline void munlock_vma_pages_all(struct vm_area_struct *vma) > > > > extern void mlock_vma_page(struct page *page); > > > > extern unsigned int munlock_vma_page(struct page *page); > > > > +extern int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags, > > > > + unsigned long len); > > > > + > > > > /* > > > > * Clear the page's PageMlocked(). This can be useful in a situation where > > > > * we want to unconditionally remove a page from the pagecache -- e.g., > > > > diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c > > > > index 61f72b09d990..c481f088bd50 100644 > > > > --- a/mm/mmap.c > > > > +++ b/mm/mmap.c > > > > @@ -1348,9 +1348,8 @@ static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint) > > > > return hint; > > > > } > > > > -static inline int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, > > > > - unsigned long flags, > > > > - unsigned long len) > > > > +int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags, > > > > + unsigned long len) > > > > { > > > > unsigned long locked, lock_limit; > > > > > > > > > > So, an interesting question is if you actually want to charge secretmem > > > pages against mlock now, or if you want a dedicated secretmem cgroup > > > controller instead? > > > > Well, with the current implementation there are three limits an > > administrator can use to control secretmem limits: mlock, memcg and > > kernel parameter. > > > > The kernel parameter puts a global upper limit for secretmem usage, > > memcg accounts all secretmem allocations, including the unused memory in > > large pages caching and mlock allows per task limit for secretmem > > mappings, well, like mlock does. > > > > I didn't consider a dedicated cgroup, as it seems we already have enough > > existing knobs and a new one would be unnecessary. > > To me it feels like the mlock() limit is a wrong fit for secretmem. But > maybe there are other cases of using the mlock() limit without actually > doing mlock() that I am not aware of (most probably :) )? Secretmem does not explicitly calls to mlock() but it does what mlock() does and a bit more. Citing mlock(2): mlock(), mlock2(), and mlockall() lock part or all of the calling process's virtual address space into RAM, preventing that memory from being paged to the swap area. So, based on that secretmem pages are not swappable, I think that RLIMIT_MEMLOCK is appropriate here. > I mean, my concern is not earth shattering, this can be reworked later. As I > said, it just feels wrong. > > -- > Thanks, > > David / dhildenb > -- Sincerely yours, Mike.