From: Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
tony.luck@intel.com, npmccallum@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 2021 13:28:33 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210604112833.poejnvqchjtp4wns@mhamilton> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210602140416.23573-22-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
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On Wed, Jun 02, 2021 at 09:04:15AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> Version 2 of GHCB specification provides NAEs that can be used by the SNP
> guest to communicate with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor
> who wishes to read, alter, drop or replay the messages sent.
>
> The hypervisor uses the SNP_GUEST_REQUEST command interface provided by
> the SEV-SNP firmware to forward the guest messages to the PSP.
>
> In order to communicate with the PSP, the guest need to locate the secrets
> page inserted by the hypervisor during the SEV-SNP guest launch. The
> secrets page contains the communication keys used to send and receive the
> encrypted messages between the guest and the PSP.
>
> The secrets page is located either through the setup_data cc_blob_address
> or EFI configuration table.
>
> Create a platform device that the SNP guest driver can bind to get the
> platform resources. The SNP guest driver can provide userspace interface
> to get the attestation report, key derivation etc.
>
> The helper snp_issue_guest_request() will be used by the drivers to
> send the guest message request to the hypervisor. The guest message header
> contains a message count. The message count is used in the IV. The
> firmware increments the message count by 1, and expects that next message
> will be using the incremented count.
>
> The helper snp_msg_seqno() will be used by driver to get and message
> sequence counter, and it will be automatically incremented by the
> snp_issue_guest_request(). The incremented value is be saved in the
> secrets page so that the kexec'ed kernel knows from where to begin.
>
> See SEV-SNP and GHCB spec for more details.
>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 12 +++
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 176 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 +
> include/linux/efi.h | 1 +
> include/linux/sev-guest.h | 76 ++++++++++++++
> 6 files changed, 269 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 include/linux/sev-guest.h
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> index 640108402ae9..da2f757cd9bc 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> @@ -59,6 +59,18 @@ extern void vc_no_ghcb(void);
> extern void vc_boot_ghcb(void);
> extern bool handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs);
>
> +/* AMD SEV Confidential computing blob structure */
> +#define CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC 0x45444d41
> +struct cc_blob_sev_info {
> + u32 magic;
> + u16 version;
> + u16 reserved;
> + u64 secrets_phys;
> + u32 secrets_len;
> + u64 cpuid_phys;
> + u32 cpuid_len;
> +};
> +
> /* Software defined (when rFlags.CF = 1) */
> #define PVALIDATE_FAIL_NOUPDATE 255
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
> index c0152186a008..bd64f2b98ac7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
> @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@
> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_SET_AP_JUMP_TABLE 0
> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_GET_AP_JUMP_TABLE 1
> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC 0x80000010
> +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST 0x80000011
> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATION 0x80000013
> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE_ON_INIT 0
> #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE 1
> @@ -222,6 +223,7 @@
> { SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE, "vmgexit_ap_jump_table" }, \
> { SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC, "vmgexit_page_state_change" }, \
> { SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATION, "vmgexit_ap_creation" }, \
> + { SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST, "vmgexit_guest_request" }, \
> { SVM_EXIT_ERR, "invalid_guest_state" }
>
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> index 8f7ef35a25ef..8aae1166f52e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
>
> #define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-ES: " fmt
>
> +#include <linux/platform_device.h>
> #include <linux/sched/debug.h> /* For show_regs() */
> #include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
> #include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
> @@ -16,10 +17,13 @@
> #include <linux/printk.h>
> #include <linux/mm_types.h>
> #include <linux/set_memory.h>
> +#include <linux/sev-guest.h>
> #include <linux/memblock.h>
> #include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/efi.h>
> #include <linux/mm.h>
> #include <linux/cpumask.h>
> +#include <linux/io.h>
>
> #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>
> #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
> @@ -33,6 +37,7 @@
> #include <asm/smp.h>
> #include <asm/cpu.h>
> #include <asm/apic.h>
> +#include <asm/setup.h> /* For struct boot_params */
>
> #include "sev-internal.h"
>
> @@ -47,6 +52,8 @@ static struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
> */
> static struct ghcb __initdata *boot_ghcb;
>
> +static unsigned long snp_secrets_phys;
> +
> /* #VC handler runtime per-CPU data */
> struct sev_es_runtime_data {
> struct ghcb ghcb_page;
> @@ -105,6 +112,10 @@ struct ghcb_state {
> struct ghcb *ghcb;
> };
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
> +extern unsigned long cc_blob_phys;
> +#endif
> +
> static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_es_runtime_data*, runtime_data);
> DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_es_enable_key);
>
> @@ -1909,3 +1920,168 @@ bool __init handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs)
> while (true)
> halt();
> }
> +
> +static struct resource guest_req_res[0];
> +static struct platform_device guest_req_device = {
> + .name = "snp-guest",
> + .id = -1,
> + .resource = guest_req_res,
> + .num_resources = 1,
> +};
Perhaps I'm missing something, but I can't find where the memory for
"guest_req_res" is allocated. In my tests I had to turn this
zero-length array into a single struct to prevent the kernel from
crashing.
Thanks,
Sergio.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-04 11:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 99+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-02 14:03 [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:03 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 01/22] x86/sev: shorten GHCB terminate macro names Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 15:54 ` Venu Busireddy
2021-06-02 14:03 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 02/22] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 15:59 ` Venu Busireddy
2021-06-08 16:51 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:03 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 03/22] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 19:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-08 17:35 ` Venu Busireddy
2021-06-02 14:03 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 04/22] x86/mm: Add sev_feature_enabled() helper Brijesh Singh
2021-06-05 10:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:03 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 05/22] x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 14:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-07 14:58 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 06/22] x86/sev: check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 14:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-07 16:01 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-17 18:46 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-18 5:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 07/22] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 15:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 08/22] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 11:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-08 15:58 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 10:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 09/22] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-06-09 17:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 12:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 10/22] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-10 5:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 12:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2021-06-10 15:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 12:45 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-14 19:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 21:01 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 10:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-16 11:00 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 12:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-16 12:49 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 13:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-16 13:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 14:36 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 14:37 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 13:06 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 12/22] x86/kernel: Make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-06-10 16:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 13/22] x86/kernel: Validate rom memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 14/22] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit Brijesh Singh
2021-06-11 9:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 13:05 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-14 19:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 15/22] KVM: SVM: define new SEV_FEATURES field in the VMCB Save State Area Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 16/22] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2021-06-14 10:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 19:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-14 19:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 17/22] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 18/22] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 19/22] x86/sev-snp: SEV-SNP AP creation support Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 13:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-16 16:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header Brijesh Singh
2021-06-18 6:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-18 13:57 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-18 15:05 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <162442264313.98837.16983159316116149849@amd.com>
2021-06-23 10:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-24 3:19 ` Michael Roth
2021-06-24 7:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-24 12:26 ` Michael Roth
2021-06-24 12:34 ` Michael Roth
2021-06-24 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-24 14:11 ` Michael Roth
2021-06-25 14:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-25 15:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-25 17:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-25 18:14 ` Michael Roth
2021-06-28 13:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-24 13:09 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 11:28 ` Sergio Lopez [this message]
2021-06-09 19:24 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-11 13:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-14 17:15 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-14 18:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-14 13:20 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-14 17:23 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-14 20:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-18 9:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-18 13:59 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 22/22] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 13:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-30 16:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-01 18:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-01 21:32 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-03 16:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-05 10:39 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Venu Busireddy
2021-06-07 19:17 ` Borislav Petkov
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