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From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Siddharth Chandrasekaran <sidcha@amazon.de>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Check access to hypercall before reading XMM registers
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 2021 14:26:22 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210730122625.112848-2-vkuznets@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210730122625.112848-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>

In case guest doesn't have access to the particular hypercall we can avoid
reading XMM registers.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
index b07592ca92f0..cb7e045905a5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
@@ -2173,9 +2173,6 @@ int kvm_hv_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	hc.rep_idx = (hc.param >> HV_HYPERCALL_REP_START_OFFSET) & 0xfff;
 	hc.rep = !!(hc.rep_cnt || hc.rep_idx);
 
-	if (hc.fast && is_xmm_fast_hypercall(&hc))
-		kvm_hv_hypercall_read_xmm(&hc);
-
 	trace_kvm_hv_hypercall(hc.code, hc.fast, hc.rep_cnt, hc.rep_idx,
 			       hc.ingpa, hc.outgpa);
 
@@ -2184,6 +2181,9 @@ int kvm_hv_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		goto hypercall_complete;
 	}
 
+	if (hc.fast && is_xmm_fast_hypercall(&hc))
+		kvm_hv_hypercall_read_xmm(&hc);
+
 	switch (hc.code) {
 	case HVCALL_NOTIFY_LONG_SPIN_WAIT:
 		if (unlikely(hc.rep)) {
-- 
2.31.1


  reply	other threads:[~2021-07-30 12:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-30 12:26 [PATCH 0/4] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Check if guest is allowed to use XMM registers for hypercall input Vitaly Kuznetsov
2021-07-30 12:26 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov [this message]
2021-07-30 14:29   ` [PATCH 1/4] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Check access to hypercall before reading XMM registers Siddharth Chandrasekaran
2021-07-30 12:26 ` [PATCH 2/4] KVM: x86: Introduce trace_kvm_hv_hypercall_done() Vitaly Kuznetsov
2021-07-30 14:30   ` Siddharth Chandrasekaran
2021-07-30 12:26 ` [PATCH 3/4] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Check if guest is allowed to use XMM registers for hypercall input Vitaly Kuznetsov
2021-07-30 14:30   ` Siddharth Chandrasekaran
2021-07-30 12:26 ` [PATCH 4/4] KVM: selftests: Test access to XMM fast hypercalls Vitaly Kuznetsov
2021-07-30 14:35   ` Siddharth Chandrasekaran
2021-07-30 14:50     ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2021-07-30 15:01       ` Siddharth Chandrasekaran
2021-08-03 10:10       ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-03 10:10 ` [PATCH 0/4] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Check if guest is allowed to use XMM registers for hypercall input Paolo Bonzini
2021-08-03 10:17 ` Paolo Bonzini

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