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From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
	jarkko@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com
Cc: eric.snowberg@oracle.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	scott.branden@broadcom.com, weiyongjun1@huawei.com,
	nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com,
	konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Subject: [PATCH v5 07/12] KEYS: Introduce link restriction to include builtin, secondary and machine keys
Date: Tue,  7 Sep 2021 12:01:05 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210907160110.2699645-8-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210907160110.2699645-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>

Introduce a new link restriction that includes the trusted builtin,
secondary and machine keys. The restriction is based on the key to be added
being vouched for by a key in any of these three keyrings.

Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
v3: Initial version
v4: moved code under CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MOK_KEYRING
v5: Rename to machine keyring
---
 certs/system_keyring.c        | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/keys/system_keyring.h |  6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)

diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
index 08ea542c8096..955bd57815f4 100644
--- a/certs/system_keyring.c
+++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
@@ -99,6 +99,29 @@ void __init set_machine_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
 {
 	machine_trusted_keys = keyring;
 }
+
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_ca_trusted
+ *
+ * Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
+ * being vouched for by a key in either the built-in, the secondary, or
+ * the machine keyrings.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_ca_trusted(
+	struct key *dest_keyring,
+	const struct key_type *type,
+	const union key_payload *payload,
+	struct key *restrict_key)
+{
+	if (machine_trusted_keys && type == &key_type_keyring &&
+	    dest_keyring == secondary_trusted_keys &&
+	    payload == &machine_trusted_keys->payload)
+		/* Allow the machine keyring to be added to the secondary */
+		return 0;
+
+	return restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(dest_keyring, type,
+							      payload, restrict_key);
+}
 #endif
 
 /*
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 98c9b10cdc17..fe4be10e66ef 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -39,8 +39,14 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
+extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_ca_trusted(
+	struct key *dest_keyring,
+	const struct key_type *type,
+	const union key_payload *payload,
+	struct key *restrict_key);
 extern void __init set_machine_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring);
 #else
+#define restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_ca_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
 static inline void __init set_machine_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
 {
 }
-- 
2.18.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-09-07 16:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-07 16:00 [PATCH v5 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:00 ` [PATCH v5 01/12] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 13:55   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-09 15:19   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-09 17:32     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 02/12] integrity: Do not allow machine keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 13:43   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 03/12] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 04/12] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 13:49   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-09 17:25   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-09 17:53     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 18:19       ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 05/12] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 06/12] KEYS: add a reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2021-09-09 17:26   ` [PATCH v5 07/12] KEYS: Introduce link restriction to include builtin, secondary and machine keys Mimi Zohar
2021-09-09 18:03     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 18:19       ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 08/12] KEYS: integrity: change link restriction to trust the machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 17:27   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 09/12] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to machine trusted keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 10/12] integrity: store reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 11/12] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 12/12] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 13:58   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-08 16:03 ` [PATCH v5 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-08 16:49   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-08 22:25     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 13:02       ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-08 17:09   ` Eric Snowberg

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