From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8372BC433EF for ; Wed, 9 Feb 2022 02:42:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231840AbiBICmq (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Feb 2022 21:42:46 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:52460 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S242692AbiBIBUH (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Feb 2022 20:20:07 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E2CF7C061576; Tue, 8 Feb 2022 17:20:05 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AFF2AB81E10; Wed, 9 Feb 2022 01:20:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0CC11C004E1; Wed, 9 Feb 2022 01:20:02 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=zx2c4.com header.i=@zx2c4.com header.b="RxIrU9fy" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zx2c4.com; s=20210105; t=1644369601; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=Jy1paGdVreYskR9ImlaMIVLBxY1lBag0eGim/MfjAUo=; b=RxIrU9fyQdQevoVn/qY8p3mzsvW7xETGSJzK+ww5JByzVGt6DKfrYlLNCEHGXXrrKHQrvY fV8MTUe2XQRO4VTlglj23KfO686AySoayeUjcW7/Q+Q+IeA78IwjMB76YO/T2A6sMNR6uB 45y0F7kU5q6kKsukGoLdyWcWpdZoC2E= Received: by mail.zx2c4.com (ZX2C4 Mail Server) with ESMTPSA id ca55a3c2 (TLSv1.3:AEAD-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256:NO); Wed, 9 Feb 2022 01:20:01 +0000 (UTC) From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: tytso@mit.edu, linux@dominikbrodowski.net, ebiggers@kernel.org, "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Eric Biggers Subject: [PATCH v2 4/9] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 02:19:14 +0100 Message-Id: <20220209011919.493762-5-Jason@zx2c4.com> In-Reply-To: <20220209011919.493762-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> References: <20220209011919.493762-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Continuing the reasoning of "random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction" from this series, at init time we also don't want to be xoring RDSEED directly into the crng. Instead it's safer to put it into our entropy collector and then re-extract it, so that it goes through a hash function with preimage resistance. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Dominik Brodowski Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld --- drivers/char/random.c | 14 ++++---------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 81786bef0a8e..75dc370d83b5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1218,24 +1218,18 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) bool arch_init = true; unsigned long rv; + mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now)); for (i = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) { - if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) - rv = random_get_entropy(); - mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv)); - } - mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); - - extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); - for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) { if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) && !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) { rv = random_get_entropy(); arch_init = false; } - primary_crng.state[i] ^= rv; + mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv)); } + + extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12); if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 2; -- 2.35.0