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From: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
To: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
	kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org,
	jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com,
	christina.schimpe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 19/39] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 16:09:47 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230214000947.GB4016181@debug.ba.rivosinc.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230119212317.8324-20-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

Since I've a general question on outcome of discussion of how to handle
`pte_mkwrite`, so I am top posting.

I have posted patches yesterday targeting riscv zisslpcfi extension.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230213045351.3945824-1-debug@rivosinc.com/

Since there're similarities in extension(s), patches have similarity too.
One of the similarity was updating `maybe_mkwrite`. I was asked (by dhildenb
on my patch #11) to look at x86 approach on how to approach this so that
core-mm approach fits multiple architectures along with the need to
update `pte_mkwrite` to consume vma flags.
In x86 CET patch series, I see that locations where `pte_mkwrite` is
invoked are updated to check for shadow stack vma and not necessarily
`pte_mkwrite` itself is updated to consume vma flags. Let me know if my
understanding is correct and that's the current direction (to update
call sites for vma check where `pte_mkwrite` is invoked)

Being said that as I've mentioned in my patch series that there're
similarities between x86, arm and now riscv for implementing shadow stack
and indirect branch tracking, overall it'll be a good thing if we can
collaborate and come up with common bits.


Rest inline.


On Thu, Jan 19, 2023 at 01:22:57PM -0800, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
>From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
>
>The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
>type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
>unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
>properly.
>
>With the introduction of shadow stack memory there are two ways a pte can
>be writable: regular writable memory and shadow stack memory.
>
>In past patches, maybe_mkwrite() has been updated to apply pte_mkwrite()
>or pte_mkwrite_shstk() depending on the VMA flag. This covers most cases
>where a PTE is made writable. However, there are places where pte_mkwrite()
>is called directly and the logic should now also create a shadow stack PTE
>in the case of a shadow stack VMA.
>
>- do_anonymous_page() and migrate_vma_insert_page() check VM_WRITE
>  directly and call pte_mkwrite(). Teach it about pte_mkwrite_shstk()
>
>- When userfaultfd is creating a PTE after userspace handles the fault
>  it calls pte_mkwrite() directly. Teach it about pte_mkwrite_shstk()
>
>To make the code cleaner, introduce is_shstk_write() which simplifies
>checking for VM_WRITE | VM_SHADOW_STACK together.
>
>In other cases where pte_mkwrite() is called directly, the VMA will not
>be VM_SHADOW_STACK, and so shadow stack memory should not be created.
> - In the case of pte_savedwrite(), shadow stack VMA's are excluded.
> - In the case of the "dirty_accountable" optimization in mprotect(),
>   shadow stack VMA's won't be VM_SHARED, so it is not necessary.
>
>Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
>Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
>Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
>Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
>Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
>Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>---
>
>v5:
> - Fix typo in commit log
>
>v3:
> - Restore do_anonymous_page() that accidetally moved commits (Kirill)
> - Open code maybe_mkwrite() cases from v2, so the behavior doesn't change
>   to mark that non-writable PTEs dirty. (Nadav)
>
>v2:
> - Updated commit log with comment's from Dave Hansen
> - Dave also suggested (I understood) to maybe tweak vm_get_page_prot()
>   to avoid having to call maybe_mkwrite(). After playing around with
>   this I opted to *not* do this. Shadow stack memory memory is
>   effectively writable, so having the default permissions be writable
>   ended up mapping the zero page as writable and other surprises. So
>   creating shadow stack memory needs to be done with manual logic
>   like pte_mkwrite().
> - Drop change in change_pte_range() because it couldn't actually trigger
>   for shadow stack VMAs.
> - Clarify reasoning for skipped cases of pte_mkwrite().
>
>Yu-cheng v25:
> - Apply same changes to do_huge_pmd_numa_page() as to do_numa_page().
>
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h |  3 +++
> arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c          |  6 ++++++
> include/linux/pgtable.h        |  7 +++++++
> mm/memory.c                    |  5 ++++-
> mm/migrate_device.c            |  4 +++-
> mm/userfaultfd.c               | 10 +++++++---
> 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
>index 45b1a8f058fe..87d3068734ec 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
>+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
>@@ -951,6 +951,9 @@ static inline pgd_t pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
> }
> #endif  /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
>
>+#define is_shstk_write is_shstk_write
>+extern bool is_shstk_write(unsigned long vm_flags);
>+
> #endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
>
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
>index e4f499eb0f29..d103945ba502 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
>@@ -880,3 +880,9 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
> #endif	/* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */
>+
>+bool is_shstk_write(unsigned long vm_flags)
>+{
>+	return (vm_flags & (VM_SHADOW_STACK | VM_WRITE)) ==
>+	       (VM_SHADOW_STACK | VM_WRITE);
>+}

Can we call this function something along the lines `is_shadow_stack_vma`?
Reason being, we're actually checking for vma property here.

Also can we move this into common code? Common code can then further call  
`arch_is_shadow_stack_vma`. Respective arch can implement their own shadow
stack encoding. I see that x86 is using one of the arch bit. Current riscv
implementation uses presence of only `VM_WRITE` as shadow stack encoding.

Please see patch #11 and #12 in the series I posted (URL at the top of
this e-mail).


>diff --git a/include/linux/pgtable.h b/include/linux/pgtable.h
>index 14a820a45a37..49ce1f055242 100644
>--- a/include/linux/pgtable.h
>+++ b/include/linux/pgtable.h
>@@ -1578,6 +1578,13 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
> }
> #endif /* !_HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED */
>
>+#ifndef is_shstk_write
>+static inline bool is_shstk_write(unsigned long vm_flags)
>+{
>+	return false;
>+}
>+#endif
>+
> /*
>  * Architecture PAGE_KERNEL_* fallbacks
>  *
>diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
>index aad226daf41b..5e5107232a26 100644
>--- a/mm/memory.c
>+++ b/mm/memory.c
>@@ -4088,7 +4088,10 @@ static vm_fault_t do_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
>
> 	entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
> 	entry = pte_sw_mkyoung(entry);
>-	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
>+
>+	if (is_shstk_write(vma->vm_flags))
>+		entry = pte_mkwrite_shstk(pte_mkdirty(entry));
>+	else if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
> 		entry = pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry));
>
> 	vmf->pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd, vmf->address,
>diff --git a/mm/migrate_device.c b/mm/migrate_device.c
>index 721b2365dbca..53d417683e01 100644
>--- a/mm/migrate_device.c
>+++ b/mm/migrate_device.c
>@@ -645,7 +645,9 @@ static void migrate_vma_insert_page(struct migrate_vma *migrate,
> 			goto abort;
> 		}
> 		entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
>-		if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
>+		if (is_shstk_write(vma->vm_flags))
>+			entry = pte_mkwrite_shstk(pte_mkdirty(entry));
>+		else if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
> 			entry = pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry));
> 	}
>
>diff --git a/mm/userfaultfd.c b/mm/userfaultfd.c
>index 0499907b6f1a..832f0250ca61 100644
>--- a/mm/userfaultfd.c
>+++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c
>@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ int mfill_atomic_install_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, pmd_t *dst_pmd,
> 	int ret;
> 	pte_t _dst_pte, *dst_pte;
> 	bool writable = dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE;
>+	bool shstk = dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK;
> 	bool vm_shared = dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED;
> 	bool page_in_cache = page_mapping(page);
> 	spinlock_t *ptl;
>@@ -84,9 +85,12 @@ int mfill_atomic_install_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, pmd_t *dst_pmd,
> 		writable = false;
> 	}
>
>-	if (writable)
>-		_dst_pte = pte_mkwrite(_dst_pte);
>-	else
>+	if (writable) {
>+		if (shstk)
>+			_dst_pte = pte_mkwrite_shstk(_dst_pte);
>+		else
>+			_dst_pte = pte_mkwrite(_dst_pte);
>+	} else
> 		/*
> 		 * We need this to make sure write bit removed; as mk_pte()
> 		 * could return a pte with write bit set.
>-- 
>2.17.1
>

  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-02-14  0:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 120+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-19 21:22 [PATCH v5 00/39] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 01/39] Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  0:38   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 02/39] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  0:40   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 03/39] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  0:44   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 04/39] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  0:46   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 05/39] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  0:46   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 06/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  0:47   ` Kees Cook
2023-02-01 11:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-01 17:31     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-01 18:18       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 07/39] x86: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  0:50   ` Kees Cook
2023-02-03 19:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-03 19:24     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-03 19:44       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-03 23:01         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-04 10:37           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 08/39] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  0:52   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 09/39] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 10/39] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  0:55   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-23  9:16   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-23  9:28   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-23 20:56     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-24 16:28       ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 11/39] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  0:57   ` Kees Cook
2023-02-09 14:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-09 17:09     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-10 13:57       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-10 17:00         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-17 16:11           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-17 16:53             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 12/39] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  0:58   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 13/39] x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 14/39] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 15/39] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 16/39] x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  0:59   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 17/39] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 18/39] mm: Handle faultless write upgrades for shstk Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-23  9:50   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-23 20:47     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-24 16:24       ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-24 18:14         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-25  9:27           ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-25 18:43             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-26  0:59               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-26  8:46                 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-26 20:19                   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-27 16:12                     ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-28  0:51                       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-31  8:46                         ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-31 23:33                           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-01  9:03                             ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-01 17:32                               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-01 18:03                                 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-26  8:57               ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-26 20:16                 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-27 16:19                   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 19/39] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  1:01   ` Kees Cook
2023-02-14  0:09   ` Deepak Gupta [this message]
2023-02-14  1:07     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-14  6:10       ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-14 18:24         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-15  6:37           ` Deepak Gupta
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 20/39] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 21/39] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 22/39] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 23/39] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-23  9:10   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-23 10:45     ` Florian Weimer
2023-01-23 20:46       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-24 16:26         ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-24 18:42           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-24 23:08             ` Kees Cook
2023-01-24 23:41               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-25  9:29                 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-01-25 15:23                   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-25 15:36             ` Schimpe, Christina
2023-01-25 16:43               ` Schimpe, Christina
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 24/39] x86/mm: Introduce MAP_ABOVE4G Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 25/39] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  1:01   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 26/39] x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  1:04   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 27/39] x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  1:05   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 28/39] x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 29/39] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  1:05   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 30/39] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 31/39] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  1:07   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 32/39] x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  1:06   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 33/39] x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 34/39] x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 35/39] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 36/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 37/39] x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  1:08   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 38/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-19 21:23 ` [PATCH v5 39/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-20  1:08   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-19 22:26 ` [PATCH v5 00/39] Shadow stacks for userspace Andrew Morton
2023-01-20 17:27   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-20 19:19     ` Kees Cook
2023-01-25 19:46       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-20 17:48 ` John Allen
2023-01-22  8:20 ` Mike Rapoport

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