From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: joeyli <jlee@suse.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
matthew.garrett@nebula.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jforbes@redhat.com,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, Gary Lin <GLin@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2017 09:08:48 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2582.1508486928@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171020024732.GJ3285@linux-l9pv.suse>
Hi Joey,
Should I just lock down sys_bpf() entirely for now? We can always free it up
somewhat later.
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-20 8:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 151+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-19 14:50 [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-10-20 23:19 ` James Morris
2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-10-19 17:20 ` Randy Dunlap
2017-10-19 22:12 ` David Howells
2017-11-07 17:39 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-11-07 22:56 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:50 ` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-10-20 6:33 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 23:21 ` James Morris
2017-10-27 18:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-30 17:00 ` David Howells
2017-10-30 17:52 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 17:22 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 19:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 21:30 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 21:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 22:01 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 22:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when " David Howells
2017-10-20 6:37 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 23:21 ` James Morris
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if " David Howells
2017-10-20 6:38 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 23:22 ` James Morris
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells
2017-10-20 23:26 ` James Morris
2017-10-23 15:54 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-26 7:42 ` joeyli
2017-10-26 14:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-27 19:30 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-27 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-28 8:34 ` joeyli
2017-10-29 22:26 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-30 9:00 ` David Howells
2017-10-30 12:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-26 15:02 ` David Howells
2017-10-26 15:46 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-10-30 15:49 ` David Howells
2017-10-30 16:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 17:00 ` David Howells
2017-10-26 14:51 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 17:29 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-10-20 6:40 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: " David Howells
2017-10-20 6:41 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 23:29 ` James Morris
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2017-10-20 6:42 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:51 ` [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2017-10-20 6:43 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2017-10-20 6:43 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 18:09 ` Alan Cox
2017-10-20 20:48 ` David Howells
2017-10-21 4:39 ` joeyli
2017-10-23 14:49 ` David Howells
2017-10-25 14:03 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 13/27] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2017-10-20 6:44 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2017-10-20 6:45 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2017-10-20 6:45 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2017-10-20 6:46 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2017-10-20 6:47 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when " David Howells
2017-10-19 22:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-10-20 2:47 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 8:08 ` David Howells [this message]
2017-10-20 15:57 ` jlee
2017-10-20 23:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-10-23 14:51 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 16:03 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 16:43 ` jlee
2017-10-23 14:53 ` David Howells
2017-10-25 7:07 ` joeyli
2017-10-19 22:48 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 23:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-11-09 17:15 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:52 ` [PATCH 19/27] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 20/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 21/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 22/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 23/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 24/27] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore David Howells
2017-10-21 2:11 ` James Morris
2017-10-23 14:56 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode David Howells
2017-10-21 2:19 ` James Morris
2017-10-23 14:58 ` David Howells
2017-10-19 14:53 ` [PATCH 27/27] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in " David Howells
2017-10-19 22:39 ` [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-10-23 14:34 ` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-10-24 10:48 ` Ethan Zhao
2017-10-24 14:56 ` David Howells
2017-11-02 22:01 ` [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown Mimi Zohar
2017-11-02 22:04 ` Firmware signing -- " David Howells
2017-11-02 22:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-07 23:07 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-08 6:15 ` AKASHI, Takahiro
2017-11-08 19:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-09 1:48 ` AKASHI, Takahiro
2017-11-09 2:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-09 4:46 ` AKASHI, Takahiro
2017-11-10 13:37 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-11 2:32 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-13 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-13 17:42 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-13 21:08 ` Alan Cox
2017-12-04 19:51 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-12-07 15:32 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-13 21:44 ` David Howells
2017-11-13 22:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-14 0:20 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-14 12:21 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-14 12:38 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-11-14 13:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-14 17:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-14 19:58 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 20:18 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-14 20:31 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 20:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-14 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 20:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-14 20:55 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 22:14 ` James Bottomley
2017-11-14 22:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-14 22:31 ` James Bottomley
2017-11-14 22:34 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-15 11:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-15 17:52 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-15 19:56 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-15 20:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-16 0:05 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-12-05 10:27 ` Pavel Machek
2017-12-07 23:02 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-12-08 17:11 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-10 1:46 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-10 13:45 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-13 18:50 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-13 19:08 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-08 20:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-08 20:09 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
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