linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: serge@hallyn.com,
	syzbot <syzbot+a9ac39bf55329e206219@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>,
	jmorris@namei.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in task_is_descendant
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 21:23:54 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3423a470-c152-0dbf-c7a7-2775a9679194@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181025155503.GF3725@redhat.com>

On 2018/10/26 0:55, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 10/25, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>>
>> On 2018/10/25 21:17, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>>>>> And yes, task_is_descendant() can hit the dead child, if nothing else it can
>>>>> be killed. This can explain the kasan report.
>>>>
>>>> The kasan is reporting that child->real_parent (or maybe child->real_parent->real_parent
>>>> or child->real_parent->real_parent->real_parent ...) was pointing to already freed memory,
>>>> isn't it?
>>>
>>> Yes. and you know, I am all confused. I no longer can understand you :/
>>
>> Why don't we need to check every time like shown below?
>> Why checking only once is sufficient?
> 
> Why do you think it is not sufficient?
> 
> Again, I can be easily wrong, rcu is not simple, but so far I think we need
> a single check at the start.
> 

Hmm, this report is difficult to guess what happened.

Since the "child" passed to task_is_descendant() has at least one reference
count taken by find_get_task_by_vpid(), rcu_dereference(walker->real_parent)
in the first iteration

  while (child->pid > 0) {
    if (!thread_group_leader(child))
      walker = rcu_dereference(child->group_leader);
    if (walker == parent) {
      rc = 1;
      break;
    }
    walker = rcu_dereference(walker->real_parent);
  }

must not trigger use-after-free bug. Thus, when this use-after-free was
detected at rcu_dereference(walker->real_parent), the memory pointed by
"walker" must have been released between

  while (walker->pid > 0) {
    if (!thread_group_leader(walker))
      walker = rcu_dereference(walker->group_leader);

and

    walker = rcu_dereference(walker->real_parent);
  }

because otherwise use-after-free would have been reported at walker->pid
or thread_group_leader(walker) or rcu_dereference(walker->group_leader).

Is my understanding correct?



Then, what pid_alive(child) is testing? It is not memory pointed by "child" but
memory pointed by "walker" (i.e. parent of "child" or parent of parent of "child"
or ... ) which is triggering use-after-free.

Suppose p1 == p2->real_parent and p2 == p3->real_parent, and p1 exited
when p2 tried to attach on p1, p2->real_parent was pointing to already
(or about to be) freed p1.

Even if pid_alive(p2) test can guarantee that p1 won't be released,
how can pid_alive(p3) test guarantee that p1 won't be released?
p1 can be released any moment because it has already waited for RCU
grace period, can't it?


ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, vpid_of_p2) {
  p2 = find_get_task_by_vpid(vpid_of_p2);
  ptrace_attach(p2, PTRACE_ATTACH, addr, data) {
    mutex_lock_interruptible(&p2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
    // p1 starts exit()ing here.
    task_lock(p2);
    __ptrace_may_access(p2) {
      // p2->real_parent starts pointing to already freed p1.
      security_ptrace_access_check(p2, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
        yama_ptrace_access_check() {
           task_is_descendant(current, p2) {
             walker = p2;
             rcu_read_lock();
             if (pid_alive(p2)) { // If true
               if (p2->pid > 0) { // will be true
                 p1 = rcu_dereference(p2->real_parent); // might be OK due to pid_alive(p2) == true?
               }
             }
             rcu_read_unlock();
           }
        }
      }
    }
    task_unlock(p2);
    mutex_unlock(&p2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
  }
  put_task_struct(p2);
}

ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, vpid_of_p3) {
  p3 = find_get_task_by_vpid(vpid_of_p3);
  ptrace_attach(p3, PTRACE_ATTACH, addr, data) {
    mutex_lock_interruptible(&p3->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
    // p1 starts exit()ing here.
    task_lock(p3);
    __ptrace_may_access(p3) {
      // p2->real_parent starts pointing to already freed p1.
      security_ptrace_access_check(p3, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
        yama_ptrace_access_check() {
           task_is_descendant(current, p3) {
             walker = p3;
             rcu_read_lock();
             if (pid_alive(p3)) { // If true
               if (p3->pid > 0) { // will be true
                 p2 = rcu_dereference(p3->real_parent); // will be OK if above assumption is OK.
                 if (p2->pid > 0) { // will be true
                   p1 = rcu_dereference(p2->real_parent); // will read already (or about to be) freed p1 address
                   if (p1->pid > 0) { // Oops here or
                     if (!thread_group_leader(p1)) // oops here or
                       p1 = rcu_dereference(p1->group_leader); // oops here or
                     p0 = rcu_dereference(p1->real_parent); // oops here, or not oops because releasing after this
                   }
                 }
               }
             }
             rcu_read_unlock();
           }
        }
      }
    }
    task_unlock(p3);
    mutex_unlock(&p3->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
  }
  put_task_struct(p3);
}


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-10-26 12:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-21  7:10 KASAN: use-after-free Read in task_is_descendant syzbot
2018-10-21  7:12 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-10-22  9:54   ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-22 10:06     ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-10-22 13:46       ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-25  2:15         ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-10-25 11:13           ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-25 11:36             ` Kees Cook
2018-10-25 12:05               ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-25 11:47             ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-10-25 12:17               ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-25 13:01                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-26 16:09                   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-29 12:23                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-29 15:05                       ` yama: unsafe usage of ptrace_relation->tracer Oleg Nesterov
2019-01-10 11:05                         ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-01-10 18:47                           ` Kees Cook
2019-01-16 17:40                           ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-25 13:14                 ` KASAN: use-after-free Read in task_is_descendant Tetsuo Handa
2018-10-25 15:55                   ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-25 16:25                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-26 12:23                     ` Tetsuo Handa [this message]
2018-10-26 13:04                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-26 13:51                         ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-10-26 14:39                           ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-26 15:04                             ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-10-26 15:22                               ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-10-25  8:19     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-25 11:52       ` Oleg Nesterov
2018-11-10  3:25 ` syzbot
2018-11-10 11:46 ` syzbot

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=3423a470-c152-0dbf-c7a7-2775a9679194@i-love.sakura.ne.jp \
    --to=penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=syzbot+a9ac39bf55329e206219@syzkaller.appspotmail.com \
    --cc=syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).