From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
To: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>,
dhowells@redhat.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, marcel@holtmann.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, dwmw2@infradead.org,
davem@davemloft.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] crypto: AF_ALG -- add asymmetric cipher interface
Date: Thu, 09 Jun 2016 11:28:55 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8115473.hELPVzZyL0@tauon.atsec.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.OSX.2.20.1606081135160.16651@mjmartin-mac01.local>
Am Mittwoch, 8. Juni 2016, 12:14:49 schrieb Mat Martineau:
Hi Mat,
> On Wed, 8 Jun 2016, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > Am Dienstag, 7. Juni 2016, 17:28:07 schrieb Mat Martineau:
> >
> > Hi Mat,
> >
> >>> + used = ctx->used;
> >>> +
> >>> + /* convert iovecs of output buffers into scatterlists */
> >>> + while (iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter)) {
> >>> + /* make one iovec available as scatterlist */
> >>> + err = af_alg_make_sg(&ctx->rsgl[cnt], &msg->msg_iter,
> >>> + iov_iter_count(&msg->msg_iter));
> >>> + if (err < 0)
> >>> + goto unlock;
> >>> + usedpages += err;
> >>> + /* chain the new scatterlist with previous one */
> >>> + if (cnt)
> >>> + af_alg_link_sg(&ctx->rsgl[cnt - 1], &ctx->rsgl[cnt]);
> >>> +
> >>> + iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, err);
> >>> + cnt++;
> >>> + }
> >>> +
> >>> + /* ensure output buffer is sufficiently large */
> >>> + if (usedpages < akcipher_calcsize(ctx)) {
> >>> + err = -EMSGSIZE;
> >>> + goto unlock;
> >>> + }
> >>
> >> Why is the size of the output buffer enforced here instead of depending
> >> on
> >> the algorithm implementation?
> >
> > akcipher_calcsize calls crypto_akcipher_maxsize to get the maximum size
> > the
> > algorithm generates as output during its operation.
> >
> > The code ensures that the caller provided at least that amount of memory
> > for the kernel to store its data in. This check therefore is present to
> > ensure the kernel does not overstep memory boundaries in user space.
>
> Yes, it's understood that the userspace buffer length must not be
> exceeded. But dst_len is part of the akcipher_request struct, so why does
> it need to be checked *here* when it is also checked later?
I am always uneasy when the kernel has a user space interface and expects
layers deep down inside the kernel to check for user space related boundaries.
Note, we do not hand the __user flag down, so sparse and other tools cannot
detect whether a particular cipher implementation has the right checks.
I therefore always would like to check parameters at the interface handling
logic. Cryptographers rightly should worry about their code implementing the
cipher correctly. But I do not think that the cipher implementations should
worry about security implications since they may be called from user space.
>
> > What is your concern?
>
> Userspace must allocate larger buffers than it knows are necessary for
> expected results.
>
> It looks like the software rsa implementation handles shorter output
> buffers ok (mpi_write_to_sgl will return EOVERFLOW if the the buffer is
> too small), however I see at least one hardware rsa driver that requires
> the output buffer to be the maximum size. But this inconsistency might be
> best addressed within the software cipher or drivers rather than in
> recvmsg.
Is your concern that we have a double check check for lengths here? If yes, I
think we can live with an additional if() here.
Or is your concern that the user space interface restricts things too much and
thus prevents a valid use case?
Ciao
Stephan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-06-09 9:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-05-05 19:50 [PATCH RESEND v5 0/6] crypto: algif - add akcipher Tadeusz Struk
2016-05-05 19:50 ` [PATCH RESEND v5 1/6] crypto: AF_ALG -- add sign/verify API Tadeusz Struk
2016-05-06 10:36 ` Stephan Mueller
2016-05-05 19:50 ` [PATCH RESEND v5 2/6] crypto: AF_ALG -- add setpubkey setsockopt call Tadeusz Struk
2016-05-05 19:51 ` [PATCH RESEND v5 3/6] crypto: AF_ALG -- add asymmetric cipher interface Tadeusz Struk
2016-05-05 19:51 ` [PATCH RESEND v5 4/6] crypto: algif_akcipher - enable compilation Tadeusz Struk
2016-05-05 19:51 ` [PATCH RESEND v5 5/6] crypto: algif_akcipher - add ops_nokey Tadeusz Struk
2016-05-05 19:51 ` [PATCH RESEND v5 6/6] crypto: AF_ALG - add support for key_id Tadeusz Struk
2016-05-06 11:46 ` Stephan Mueller
2016-05-13 23:32 ` Mat Martineau
2016-05-16 14:23 ` Tadeusz Struk
2016-05-11 14:25 ` [PATCH RESEND v5 0/6] crypto: algif - add akcipher David Howells
2016-05-15 4:16 ` [PATCH v6 " Tadeusz Struk
2016-05-15 4:16 ` [PATCH v6 1/6] crypto: AF_ALG -- add sign/verify API Tadeusz Struk
2016-05-15 4:16 ` [PATCH v6 2/6] crypto: AF_ALG -- add setpubkey setsockopt call Tadeusz Struk
2016-05-15 4:17 ` [PATCH v6 3/6] crypto: AF_ALG -- add asymmetric cipher interface Tadeusz Struk
2016-06-08 0:28 ` Mat Martineau
2016-06-08 5:31 ` Stephan Mueller
2016-06-08 19:14 ` Mat Martineau
2016-06-09 9:28 ` Stephan Mueller [this message]
2016-06-09 18:18 ` Mat Martineau
2016-06-09 18:24 ` Stephan Mueller
2016-06-09 18:27 ` Mat Martineau
2016-06-09 18:36 ` Stephan Mueller
2016-06-10 14:42 ` Tadeusz Struk
2016-06-22 22:45 ` Mat Martineau
2016-06-23 5:07 ` Stephan Mueller
2016-06-23 15:22 ` Denis Kenzior
2016-06-13 22:16 ` Andrew Zaborowski
2016-06-14 5:12 ` Stephan Mueller
2016-06-14 7:42 ` Andrew Zaborowski
2016-06-16 8:05 ` Stephan Mueller
2016-06-16 14:59 ` Andrew Zaborowski
2016-06-16 15:38 ` Stephan Mueller
2016-06-17 0:39 ` Andrew Zaborowski
2016-06-14 17:22 ` Mat Martineau
2016-06-15 7:04 ` Stephan Mueller
2016-05-15 4:17 ` [PATCH v6 4/6] crypto: algif_akcipher - enable compilation Tadeusz Struk
2016-05-15 4:17 ` [PATCH v6 5/6] crypto: algif_akcipher - add ops_nokey Tadeusz Struk
2016-05-15 4:17 ` [PATCH v6 6/6] crypto: AF_ALG - add support for key_id Tadeusz Struk
2016-05-26 0:45 ` Mat Martineau
2016-05-31 17:44 ` Tadeusz Struk
2016-05-15 11:59 ` [PATCH v6 0/6] crypto: algif - add akcipher Stephan Mueller
2016-05-16 20:46 ` Tadeusz Struk
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