From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] proc: Allow pid_revalidate() during LOOKUP_RCU
Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2020 08:22:32 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <877dpln5uf.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201212205522.GF2443@casper.infradead.org> (Matthew Wilcox's message of "Sat, 12 Dec 2020 20:55:22 +0000")
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> writes:
> On Thu, Dec 03, 2020 at 04:02:12PM -0800, Stephen Brennan wrote:
>> -void pid_update_inode(struct task_struct *task, struct inode *inode)
>> +static int do_pid_update_inode(struct task_struct *task, struct inode *inode,
>> + unsigned int flags)
>
> I'm really nitpicking here, but this function only _updates_ the inode
> if flags says it should. So I was thinking something like this
> (compile tested only).
>
> I'd really appreocate feedback from someone like Casey or Stephen on
> what they need for their security modules.
Just so we don't have security module questions confusing things
can we please make this a 2 patch series? With the first
patch removing security_task_to_inode?
The justification for the removal is that all security_task_to_inode
appears to care about is the file type bits in inode->i_mode. Something
that never changes. Having this in a separate patch would make that
logical change easier to verify.
Eric
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index b362523a9829..771f330bfce7 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -1968,6 +1968,25 @@ void pid_update_inode(struct task_struct *task, struct inode *inode)
> security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
> }
>
> +/* See if we can avoid the above call. Assumes RCU lock held */
> +static bool inode_needs_pid_update(struct task_struct *task,
> + const struct inode *inode)
> +{
> + kuid_t uid;
> + kgid_t gid;
> +
> + if (inode->i_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))
> + return true;
> + task_dump_owner(task, inode->i_mode, &uid, &gid);
> + if (!uid_eq(uid, inode->i_uid) || !gid_eq(gid, inode->i_gid))
> + return true;
> + /*
> + * XXX: Do we need to call the security system here to see if
> + * there's a pending update?
> + */
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Rewrite the inode's ownerships here because the owning task may have
> * performed a setuid(), etc.
> @@ -1978,8 +1997,15 @@ static int pid_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
> struct inode *inode;
> struct task_struct *task;
>
> - if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
> + if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
> + inode = d_inode_rcu(dentry);
> + task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
> + if (!task)
> + return 0;
> + if (!inode_needs_pid_update(task, inode))
> + return 1;
> return -ECHILD;
> + }
>
> inode = d_inode(dentry);
> task = get_proc_task(inode);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-13 14:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-12-04 0:02 [PATCH v2] proc: Allow pid_revalidate() during LOOKUP_RCU Stephen Brennan
2020-12-12 20:55 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-12-13 14:22 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2020-12-13 16:29 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-12-13 23:00 ` Paul Moore
2020-12-15 18:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-12-15 22:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-12-15 22:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-12-16 1:05 ` Stephen Brennan
2020-12-14 18:45 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-12-14 18:15 ` Stephen Brennan
2020-12-13 14:30 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-12-13 16:32 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-12-14 17:19 ` Stephen Brennan
2020-12-15 21:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
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