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From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@arm.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
	"Dmitry V . Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>,
	Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
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	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com>,
	Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>,
	Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v9 4/7] x86/entry: Erase kernel stack in syscall_trace_enter()
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2018 13:40:21 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFxpzgQiJg8XyQTH-hDHd7A0jRAtOJ8b6krrvNDQX96Vrw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+-AjMKxOYDOpbmJ4X357JRGWViAOmqyqd6bu_w47mffw@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 1:02 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> This specific class of flaw ("uninitialized" stack contents being used
> or leaked) is already being looked for by tons of tools like KASan.
> There are teams of people working on it, and they still haven't found
> all the cases where these flaws appear.

Right.

So let's do the *smart* thing, not the *stupid* thing.

This "mindlessly clear stack after use" is stupid.

There are smart things we can do, and it's not just about "find the
problems" like KASAN, but also "avoid undefined behavior".

I absolutely detest undefined compiler behavior. We should fix it. One
of the biggest mistakes C ever did was to have "undefined" in the
standard, and we already obviously limit that kind of broken behavior
with -fwrapv and -fno-strict-alias.

Both of those disable what I consider to be just bugs in the C
standard that should not be allowed for system software - it's a class
of "stupid compiler tricks to generate bad code", which by definition
a compiler shouldn't do. A compiler should generate *good* code, not
random bad code.

And yes:

> We've already seen multiple cases of this just with the by-ref
> initialization plugin, where a stack content leak goes away because we
> asked the compiler to please initialize the memory for us when we
> forgot to do it ourselves. Getting the compiler to help us seems like
> the obviously correct thing to do, since we're using such a
> memory-safety-unfriendly language. :)

This is more of the *smart* kind of behavior - I'm also perfectly
willing to say that automatic variables should just always initialize
to zero, exactly the same way static variables do.

And it doesn't necessarily generate any worse code.

Why? Because it's the _intelligent_ thing to do - unlike some
completely mindless idiotic "clear the stack" patch.

Now, I haven't actually seen the patches, I've only seen signs of
them, but the signs I have seen very much seem to say "this is the
mindless and *stupid* kind of crap that we should not do".

Things like adding hundreds of lines of new asm code, just because.

So by all means, push the zero initializations of automatic variables.
That's just good sense.

But don't push this crap.

              Linus

  reply	other threads:[~2018-03-05 21:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-03-03 20:00 [PATCH RFC v9 0/7] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Alexander Popov
2018-03-03 20:00 ` [PATCH RFC v9 1/7] gcc-plugins: Clean up the cgraph_create_edge* macros Alexander Popov
2018-03-03 20:00 ` [PATCH RFC v9 2/7] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls Alexander Popov
2018-03-05 16:41   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-05 19:43     ` Laura Abbott
2018-03-05 19:50       ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-05 20:25       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-03-05 21:21         ` Alexander Popov
2018-03-05 21:36           ` Kees Cook
2018-03-21 11:04         ` Alexander Popov
2018-03-21 15:33           ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-22 20:56             ` Alexander Popov
2018-03-26 17:32               ` Kees Cook
2018-03-26 17:43                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-03 20:00 ` [PATCH RFC v9 3/7] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack Alexander Popov
2018-03-03 20:00 ` [PATCH RFC v9 4/7] x86/entry: Erase kernel stack in syscall_trace_enter() Alexander Popov
2018-03-05 19:40   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-05 20:06     ` Kees Cook
2018-03-05 20:15       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-05 21:02         ` Alexander Popov
2018-03-05 21:02         ` Kees Cook
2018-03-05 21:40           ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2018-03-05 22:07             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06  0:56             ` Kees Cook
2018-03-06  4:30               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 17:58                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-06  7:56               ` [OLD PATCH] net: recvmsg: Unconditionally zero struct sockaddr_storage " Ingo Molnar
2018-03-06  8:08           ` Ingo Molnar
2018-03-06 15:16             ` Daniel Micay
2018-03-06 15:28               ` Daniel Micay
2018-03-06 18:56               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 19:07                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-03-06 19:07                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-03-06 19:16                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 20:42                     ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-03-06 21:01                       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 21:21                         ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-03-06 21:29                           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 22:09                             ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-03-06 22:24                               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 21:36                         ` Steven Rostedt
2018-03-06 21:41                           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 21:47                             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 22:29                               ` Steven Rostedt
2018-03-06 22:41                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 22:52                                   ` Steven Rostedt
2018-03-06 23:09                                     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-12  8:22                               ` Ingo Molnar
2018-03-12  9:00                                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-03-12  9:21                                   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-03-06 21:47                           ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-03-06 22:19                             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-05 20:26       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-03-03 20:00 ` [PATCH RFC v9 5/7] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK Alexander Popov
2018-03-03 20:00 ` [PATCH RFC v9 6/7] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system Alexander Popov
2018-03-03 20:00 ` [PATCH RFC v9 7/7] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature Alexander Popov
2018-03-05 19:34 ` [PATCH RFC v9 0/7] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Kees Cook
2018-03-05 19:42   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-05 20:02     ` Kees Cook

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