From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
To: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
Daniel Colascione <dancol@dancol.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com>,
Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>,
Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
Aaron Goidel <acgoide@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>,
Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
kaleshsingh@google.com, calin@google.com, surenb@google.com,
Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>,
Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
kernel-team@android.com, Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2020 14:05:43 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAEjxPJ7rsyw=AkRUmnshF5gWygHEN1ahKi5uD9FtYovz0JRKCQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200827063522.2563293-3-lokeshgidra@google.com>
On Thu, Aug 27, 2020 at 2:35 AM Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com> wrote:
>
> From: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
>
> This change uses the anon_inodes and LSM infrastructure introduced in
> the previous patch to give SELinux the ability to control
> anonymous-inode files that are created using the new anon_inode_getfd_secure()
> function.
>
> A SELinux policy author detects and controls these anonymous inodes by
> adding a name-based type_transition rule that assigns a new security
> type to anonymous-inode files created in some domain. The name used
> for the name-based transition is the name associated with the
> anonymous inode for file listings --- e.g., "[userfaultfd]" or
> "[perf_event]".
>
> Example:
>
> type uffd_t;
> type_transition sysadm_t sysadm_t : anon_inode uffd_t "[userfaultfd]";
> allow sysadm_t uffd_t:anon_inode { create };
>
> (The next patch in this series is necessary for making userfaultfd
> support this new interface. The example above is just
> for exposition.)
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> ---
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 ++
> 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index a340986aa92e..b83f56e5ef40 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -2926,6 +2926,58 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
> + const struct qstr *name,
> + const struct inode *context_inode)
> +{
> + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
> + struct common_audit_data ad;
> + struct inode_security_struct *isec;
> + int rc;
> +
> + if (unlikely(!selinux_state.initialized))
This should use selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) instead.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-31 18:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-27 6:35 [PATCH v8 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Lokesh Gidra
2020-08-27 6:35 ` [PATCH v8 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Lokesh Gidra
2020-09-01 12:41 ` Christian Brauner
2020-09-07 7:45 ` Lokesh Gidra
2020-08-27 6:35 ` [PATCH v8 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Lokesh Gidra
2020-08-31 18:05 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2020-08-31 18:21 ` Lokesh Gidra
2020-08-27 6:35 ` [PATCH v8 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Lokesh Gidra
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