From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1829DC43143 for ; Mon, 1 Oct 2018 12:28:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C4AC02089D for ; Mon, 1 Oct 2018 12:28:34 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="SXnlKWvl" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org C4AC02089D Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=reject dis=none) header.from=google.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729267AbeJATGG (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Oct 2018 15:06:06 -0400 Received: from mail-oi1-f195.google.com ([209.85.167.195]:38299 "EHLO mail-oi1-f195.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729166AbeJATGF (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Oct 2018 15:06:05 -0400 Received: by mail-oi1-f195.google.com with SMTP id u197-v6so10995745oif.5 for ; Mon, 01 Oct 2018 05:28:31 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=rzcmUr/rQVIrMQq+LwEcrc2tBipkiKRrMFA6QScA0/I=; b=SXnlKWvlVtqPhlPrsrBgZKX/A4qe1XqGBxK5yMvVWEIKrQKmCthlOoFe/7U++Yv/CT 9KnkfmH1iJsXdykjZ0bXOSnj04RvrFykuNNitF4bRzyjGuxscdouopSJvSi6zFutcEg3 y46HTeHu+hGuIPAyP5DJ6r/1nKynMkdJwI50LN4blMKQVD3sDrX70q5tr51a/ke6yQg3 hVRdIujkRtcL4DnRywYzoKaVP8m5ct7LUHjz8pBqxkJpP9rPATZPAwt/EXYbbqAtoLVo q3XO6Cncl6m1OqLMV6dfSg8y7M5h6P3LGTVWL8GgTxqUgQmvbNVs1JISwa8zoivc9rVP krSw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=rzcmUr/rQVIrMQq+LwEcrc2tBipkiKRrMFA6QScA0/I=; b=Ss+fAwIbO1sSSQzar+zPOBnhJC19tqSXa+Zm09d9ohGgBgZgffyK+Ru/V5W9f/FFQg RZLqmMThPWcOin5Uo6u80o7USHpY+H7FQA1DKGAM4bq4Tfr9cixH4m+t5URDB4hYx8Ay veSZrVrRbe0PFKyHiywFdDXJVvQkDUAUbtx4ecuVLniOBzE0jAHcckltWTAsapuRARAA Bo0LLik5yzufVhxHJ3wu7+/WGl4JhY6Ipf4WDo0l/wDVof+kFbSXkVJp0qUIG75iMPoi TXUTMI0rCUuneN1mZ+977c9dp9b0H9dsQYzSvXMhh+fiDWR3GqLuMoGSQBnVqv99RPvr jbyQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ABuFfogk/xi842ApWJqdqozxyXETkkwg9RFsK3ibHsm4H5yM5gxfHGlO wud+O3uS6iK9cz2ao4LPRISYvNZoCeA0vjF03BM8uQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACcGV62ig2Y4IvYEEvRnYezB+MtWhb5tG/AmsLT2I9rCzf8lsBsDaZOBZ5d1yD1PZiLb9lInu/AOKAeASk1bcfPCgVM= X-Received: by 2002:aca:b844:: with SMTP id i65-v6mr4691305oif.177.1538396910549; Mon, 01 Oct 2018 05:28:30 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20180929103453.12025-1-cyphar@cyphar.com> <20180929103453.12025-2-cyphar@cyphar.com> In-Reply-To: <20180929103453.12025-2-cyphar@cyphar.com> From: Jann Horn Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2018 14:28:03 +0200 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] namei: implement O_BENEATH-style AT_* flags To: cyphar@cyphar.com, Al Viro , "Eric W. Biederman" , Andy Lutomirski Cc: jlayton@kernel.org, Bruce Fields , Arnd Bergmann , shuah@kernel.org, David Howells , christian@brauner.io, Tycho Andersen , kernel list , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch , linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, dev@opencontainers.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Sat, Sep 29, 2018 at 4:28 PM Aleksa Sarai wrote: > Add the following flags for path resolution. The primary justification > for these flags is to allow for programs to be far more strict about how > they want path resolution to handle symlinks, mountpoint crossings, and > paths that escape the dirfd (through an absolute path or ".." > shenanigans). > > This is of particular concern to container runtimes that want to be very > careful about malicious root filesystems that a container's init might > have screwed around with (and there is no real way to protect against > this in userspace if you consider potential races against a malicious > container's init). > > * AT_BENEATH: Disallow ".." or absolute paths (either in the path or > found during symlink resolution) to escape the starting point of name > resolution, though ".." is permitted in cases like "foo/../bar". > Relative symlinks are still allowed (as long as they don't escape the > starting point). As I said on the other thread, I would strongly prefer an API that behaves along the lines of David Drysdale's old patch https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1439458366-8223-2-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com/ : Forbid any use of "..". This would also be more straightforward to implement safely. If that doesn't work for you, I would like it if you could at least make that an option. I would like it if this API could mitigate straightforward directory traversal bugs such as https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1583, where a confused deputy attempts to access a path like "/mnt/media_rw/../../data" while intending to access a directory under "/mnt/media_rw". > * AT_XDEV: Disallow mount-point crossing (both *down* into one, or *up* > from one). The primary "scoping" use is to blocking resolution that > crosses a bind-mount, which has a similar property to a symlink (in > the way that it allows for escape from the starting-point). Since it > is not possible to differentiate bind-mounts However since > bind-mounting requires privileges (in ways symlinks don't) this has > been split from LOOKUP_BENEATH. The naming is based on "find -xdev" > (though find(1) doesn't walk upwards, the semantics seem obvious). > > * AT_NO_PROCLINK: Disallows ->get_link "symlink" jumping. This is a very > specific restriction, and it exists because /proc/$pid/fd/... > "symlinks" allow for access outside nd->root and pose risk to > container runtimes that don't want to be tricked into accessing a host > path (but do want to allow no-funny-business symlink resolution). AT_BENEATH has to imply AT_NO_PROCLINK, right? Especially with the semantics you picked for AT_BENEATH. With the original O_BENEATH_ONLY semantics, it might be okay to not imply AT_NO_PROCLINK... > * AT_NO_SYMLINK: Disallows symlink jumping *of any kind*. Implies > AT_NO_PROCLINK (obviously). > > The AT_NO_*LINK flags return -ELOOP if path resolution would violates > their requirement, while the others all return -EXDEV. Currently these > are only enabled for the stat(2) family and the openat(2) family (the > latter has its own brand of O_* flags with the same semantics). Ideally > these flags would be supported by all *at(2) syscalls, but this will > require adding flags arguments to many of them (and will be done in a > separate patchset).