Re: [PATCH] [v2] docs: clarify security-bugs disclosure policy

[Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>]

On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 1:46 PM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
>
> I think we need to soften the language a bit.  It might scare folks
> off, especially the:
>
>          We prefer to fully disclose the bug as soon as possible.
>
> which is not really the case.  Linus says:
>
>         It's not full disclosure, it's not coordinated disclosure,
>         and it's not "no disclosure".  It's more like just "timely
>         open fixes".
>
> I changed a bit of the wording in here, but mostly to remove the word
> "disclosure" since it seems to mean very specific things to people
> that we do not mean here.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> ---
>
>  b/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst |   24 +++++++++++++-----------
>  1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff -puN Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst~embargo2 Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst~embargo2      2018-03-07 13:23:49.390228208 -0800
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst       2018-03-07 13:42:37.618225395 -0800
> @@ -29,18 +29,20 @@ made public.
>  Disclosure
>  ----------
>
> -The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the
> -bug submitter to bug resolution as well as disclosure.  We prefer
> -to fully disclose the bug as soon as possible.  It is reasonable to
> -delay disclosure when the bug or the fix is not yet fully understood,
> -the solution is not well-tested or for vendor coordination.  However, we
> -expect these delays to be short, measurable in days, not weeks or months.
> -A disclosure date is negotiated by the security team working with the
> -bug submitter as well as vendors.  However, the kernel security team
> -holds the final say when setting a disclosure date.  The timeframe for
> -disclosure is from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known)
> +The goal of the Linux kernel security team is to work with the bug
> +submitter to understand and fix the bug.  We prefer to publish the fix as
> +soon as possible, but try to avoid public discussion of the bug itself
> +and leave that to others.
> +
> +Publishing the fix may be delayed when the bug or the fix is not yet
> +fully understood, the solution is not well-tested or for vendor
> +coordination.  However, we expect these delays to be short, measurable in
> +days, not weeks or months.  A release date is negotiated by the security
> +team working with the bug submitter as well as vendors.  However, the
> +kernel security team holds the final say when setting a timeframe.  The
> +timeframe varies from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known bug)

Nit: I think "a" is missing. I was expecting: "... already a publicly known ...

>  to a few weeks.  As a basic default policy, we expect report date to
> -disclosure date to be on the order of 7 days.
> +release date to be on the order of 7 days.

Otherwise, yeah, looks good.

Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security