From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@inai.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] proc: allow killing processes via file descriptors
Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 09:42:35 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrUeNZPfrSYa9vH5Ukrk1Y+Kb9GkZOh6LkqG6Z9NpK5P0w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKOZuesCKo4GH9fdum2EUFLrtTWam3aizcDQUn3-vCYg4T1P8w@mail.gmail.com>
On Sun, Nov 18, 2018 at 9:24 AM Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> wrote:
> Assuming we don't broaden exit status readability (which would make a
> lot of things simpler), the exit notification mechanism must work like
> this: if you can see a process in /proc, you should be able to wait on
> it. If you learn that process's exit status through some other means
> --- e.g., you're the process's parent, you can ptrace the process, you
> have CAP_WHATEVER_IT_IS_ --- then you should be able to learn the fate
> of the process. Otherwise you just be able to learn that the process
> exited.
Sounds reasonable to me. Except for the obvious turd that, if you
open /proc/PID/whatever, and the process calls execve(), then the
resulting semantics are awkward at best.
>
> > Windows has an easy time of it because
>
> Windows has an easier time of it because it doesn't use an ad-hoc
> ambient authority permission model. In Windows, if you can open a
> handle to do something, that handle lets you do the thing. Period.
> There's none of this "well, I opened this process FD, but since I
> opened it, the process called setuid, so now I can't get its exit
> status" nonsense. Privilege elevation is always accomplished via a
> separate call to CreateProcessWithToken, which creates a *new* process
> with the elevated privileges. An existing process can't suddenly and
> magically become this special thing that you can't inspect, but that
> has the same PID and identity as this other process that you used to
> be able to inspect. The model is just better, because permission is
> baked into the HANDLE. Now, that ship has sailed. We're stuck with
> setreuid and exec. But let's be clear about what's causing the
> complexity.
I'm not entirely sure that ship has sailed. In the kernel, we already
have a bit of a distinction between a pid (and tid, etc -- I'm
referring to struct pid) and a task. If we make a new
process-management API, we could put a distinction like this into the
API. As a straw-man proposal (highly incomplete and probably wrong,
but maybe it gets the idea across):
Have a way to get an fd that refers to a "running program". (I'm
calling it that to distinguish it from "task" and "pid", both of which
already mean something.) You'd be able to open such an fd given a
pid, and your permissions would be checked at that time. R access
means you can read the running program's memory and otherwise
introspect it. W means you can modify it's memory and otherwise mess
with it. X means you can send it signals. We might need more bits to
really do this right.
Now here's the kicker: if the "running program" calls execve(), it
goes away. The fd gets some sort of notification that this happened
and there's an API to get a handle to the new running program *if the
caller has the appropriate permissions*. setresuid() has no effect
here -- if you have W access to the process and the process calls
setresuid(), you still have W access.
To make this fully useful, we'd probably want to elaborate it with a
race-free way to track all descendents and, if needed, kill them all,
subject to permissions.
This API ought to be extensible to replace ptrace() eventually.
Does this seem like a reasonable direction to go in?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-18 17:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-18 11:17 [PATCH] proc: allow killing processes via file descriptors Christian Brauner
2018-11-18 13:59 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-18 15:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-18 15:53 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-18 16:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-18 16:29 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-18 17:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-18 17:17 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-18 17:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-11-18 17:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-18 17:56 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-18 16:33 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-11-18 16:48 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-18 17:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-18 17:24 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-18 17:42 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-11-18 17:51 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-18 18:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-18 18:43 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-18 19:05 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-11-18 19:44 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-18 20:15 ` Christian Brauner
2018-11-18 20:21 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-18 20:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-18 20:32 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-19 1:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-18 20:43 ` Christian Brauner
2018-11-18 20:54 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-18 21:23 ` Christian Brauner
2018-11-18 21:30 ` Christian Brauner
2018-11-19 0:31 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-19 0:40 ` Christian Brauner
2018-11-19 0:09 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-11-19 0:53 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-19 1:16 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-19 16:13 ` Dmitry Safonov
2018-11-19 16:26 ` [PATCH] proc: allow killing processes via file descriptors (Larger pids) Eric W. Biederman
2018-11-19 16:27 ` [PATCH] proc: allow killing processes via file descriptors Daniel Colascione
2018-11-19 20:21 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-11-19 2:47 ` Al Viro
2018-11-19 3:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-18 17:41 ` Christian Brauner
2018-11-18 17:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-18 18:07 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-18 18:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-18 18:31 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-18 19:24 ` Christian Brauner
2018-11-19 0:08 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-11-19 1:14 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-18 16:03 ` Daniel Colascione
2018-11-19 10:56 ` kbuild test robot
2018-11-19 14:15 ` David Laight
2018-11-19 15:49 ` Dave Martin
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