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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>,
	aliguori@amazon.com, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 31/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add mapping helper functions
Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 14:27:57 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrX0udgL=00a-trceOVXCTqRMfTieBDJKdnYacoH9-9kSg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171204150607.391576490@linutronix.de>

On Mon, Dec 4, 2017 at 6:07 AM, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
>
> Add the pagetable helper functions do manage the separate user space page
> tables.
>
> [ tglx: Split out from the big combo kaiser patch ]

> +/*
> + * Take a PGD location (pgdp) and a pgd value that needs to be set there.
> + * Populates the user and returns the resulting PGD that must be set in
> + * the kernel copy of the page tables.
> + */
> +static inline pgd_t kpti_set_user_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
> +       if (!static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_SECURE_MODE_KPTI))
> +               return pgd;
> +
> +       if (pgd_userspace_access(pgd)) {
> +               if (pgdp_maps_userspace(pgdp)) {
> +                       /*
> +                        * The user page tables get the full PGD,
> +                        * accessible from userspace:
> +                        */
> +                       kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgdp)->pgd = pgd.pgd;
> +                       /*
> +                        * For the copy of the pgd that the kernel uses,
> +                        * make it unusable to userspace.  This ensures on
> +                        * in case that a return to userspace with the
> +                        * kernel CR3 value, userspace will crash instead
> +                        * of running.
> +                        *
> +                        * Note: NX might be not available or disabled.
> +                        */
> +                       if (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)
> +                               pgd.pgd |= _PAGE_NX;
> +               }
> +       } else if (pgd_userspace_access(*pgdp)) {
> +               /*
> +                * We are clearing a _PAGE_USER PGD for which we presumably
> +                * populated the user PGD.  We must now clear the user PGD
> +                * entry.
> +                */
> +               if (pgdp_maps_userspace(pgdp)) {
> +                       kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgdp)->pgd = pgd.pgd;
> +               } else {
> +                       /*
> +                        * Attempted to clear a _PAGE_USER PGD which is in
> +                        * the kernel porttion of the address space.  PGDs
> +                        * are pre-populated and we never clear them.
> +                        */
> +                       WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> +               }
> +       } else {
> +               /*
> +                * _PAGE_USER was not set in either the PGD being set or
> +                * cleared.  All kernel PGDs should be pre-populated so
> +                * this should never happen after boot.
> +                */
> +               WARN_ON_ONCE(system_state == SYSTEM_RUNNING);
> +       }
> +#endif
> +       /* return the copy of the PGD we want the kernel to use: */
> +       return pgd;
> +}
> +

I mentioned this earlier, but I think this should be:


  VM_BUG_ON(pgdp points to a usermode table);

  if (pgdp_maps_userspace(pgdp)) {
    /* Install the pgd as requested into the usermode tables. */
    kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgdp)->pgd = pgd.pgd;

    if (pgd_val(pgd) & _PAGE_USER) {
      /*
       * This is a normal user pgd -- the kernelmode mapping should have NX
       * set to prevent erroneous usermode execution with the kernel tables.
       */
      return __pgd(pgd_val(pgd) | _PAGE_NX;
    } else {
      /* This is a weird mapping, e.g. EFI.  Map it straight through. */
      return pgd;
    }
  } else {
    /*
     * We can get here due to vmalloc, a vmalloc fault, memory
hot-add, or initial setup
     * of kernelmode page tables.  Regardless of which particular code
path we're in,
     * these mappings should not be automatically propagated to the
usermode tables.
     */
    return pgd;
  }
}

That should make all the VSYSCALL nastiness go away.

  reply	other threads:[~2017-12-04 22:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 118+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-04 14:07 [patch 00/60] x86/kpti: Kernel Page Table Isolation (was KAISER) Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 01/60] x86/entry/64/paravirt: Use paravirt-safe macro to access eflags Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 12:17   ` Juergen Gross
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 02/60] x86/unwinder/orc: Dont bail on stack overflow Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 20:31   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 21:31     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 03/60] x86/unwinder: Handle stack overflows more gracefully Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 04/60] x86/irq: Remove an old outdated comment about context tracking races Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 05/60] x86/irq/64: Print the offending IP in the stack overflow warning Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 06/60] x86/entry/64: Allocate and enable the SYSENTER stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 07/60] x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for " Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 08/60] x86/entry/gdt: Put per-CPU GDT remaps in ascending order Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 09/60] x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 10/60] x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 11/60] x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 12/60] x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 13/60] x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 14/60] x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 18:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 15/60] x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0 Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 16/60] x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 17/60] x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 18/60] x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 19/60] x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:30   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 20/60] x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 21/60] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 22/60] x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 19:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 23/60] x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 20:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 24/60] x86/paravirt: Dont patch flush_tlb_single Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 12:18   ` Juergen Gross
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 25/60] x86/paravirt: Provide a way to check for hypervisors Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 12:19   ` Juergen Gross
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 26/60] x86/cpufeature: Make cpu bugs sticky Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 27/60] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 23:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 28/60] x86/mm/kpti: Disable global pages if KERNEL_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 14:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 29/60] x86/mm/kpti: Prepare the x86/entry assembly code for entry/exit CR3 switching Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 30/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add infrastructure for page table isolation Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 15:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 31/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add mapping helper functions Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:27   ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2017-12-05 16:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-07  8:33     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 32/60] x86/mm/kpti: Allow NX poison to be set in p4d/pgd Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 17:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 33/60] x86/mm/kpti: Allocate a separate user PGD Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 18:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-06 20:56     ` Ingo Molnar
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 34/60] x86/mm/kpti: Populate " Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 19:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 35/60] x86/espfix: Ensure that ESPFIX is visible in " Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:28   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 36/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add functions to clone kernel PMDs Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 15:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 37/60] x86mm//kpti: Force entry through trampoline when KPTI active Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 16:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 38/60] x86/fixmap: Move cpu entry area into a separate PMD Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 18:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 39/60] x86/mm/kpti: Share cpu_entry_area PMDs Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-06 21:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 40/60] x86: PMD align entry text Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-07  8:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 41/60] x86/mm/kpti: Share entry text PMD Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-07  8:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 42/60] x86/fixmap: Move IDT fixmap into the cpu_entry_area range Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 43/60] x86/fixmap: Add debugstore entries to cpu_entry_area Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-07  9:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 44/60] x86/events/intel/ds: Map debug buffers in fixmap Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 45/60] x86/fixmap: Add ldt entries to user shared fixmap Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 46/60] x86/ldt: Rename ldt_struct->entries member Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 47/60] x86/ldt: Map LDT entries into fixmap Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:33   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:51     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 48/60] x86/mm: Move the CR3 construction functions to tlbflush.h Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 49/60] x86/mm: Remove hard-coded ASID limit checks Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 50/60] x86/mm: Put MMU to hardware ASID translation in one place Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 51/60] x86/mm: Allow flushing for future ASID switches Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:22   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:34     ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-04 22:36       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:47     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-04 22:54       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 23:06         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 52/60] x86/mm: Abstract switching CR3 Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:07 ` [patch 53/60] x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05 21:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-05 22:05     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-05 22:08       ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 54/60] x86/mm: Optimize RESTORE_CR3 Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 55/60] x86/mm: Use INVPCID for __native_flush_tlb_single() Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:25   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 22:51     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-05 13:51       ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-05 14:08         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 56/60] x86/mm/kpti: Disable native VSYSCALL Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 22:33   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 57/60] x86/mm/kpti: Add Kconfig Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 16:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 16:57     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-05  9:34       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 58/60] x86/mm/debug_pagetables: Add page table directory Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 59/60] x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Check user space page table for WX pages Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 14:08 ` [patch 60/60] x86/mm/debug_pagetables: Allow dumping current pagetables Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 18:02 ` [patch 00/60] x86/kpti: Kernel Page Table Isolation (was KAISER) Linus Torvalds
2017-12-04 18:18   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-04 18:21     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-12-04 18:28     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-05 21:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-05 21:57   ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-05 23:19     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-19 20:56 ` Andrew Morton
2018-01-19 21:06   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-20 19:59   ` Thomas Gleixner

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