From: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
To: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc>
Cc: "jarkko@kernel.org" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
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Subject: RE: [EXT] Re: [RFC PATCH HBK: 0/8] HW BOUND KEY as TRUSTED KEY
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2022 07:22:45 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <DU2PR04MB8630C63609D6D785F12DEC6E95419@DU2PR04MB8630.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <047746e1134d5bdce699d8c021f849b6@walle.cc>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc>
> Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2022 12:43 PM
> To: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
> Cc: jarkko@kernel.org; a.fatoum@pengutronix.de; Jason@zx2c4.com;
> jejb@linux.ibm.com; zohar@linux.ibm.com; dhowells@redhat.com;
> sumit.garg@linaro.org; david@sigma-star.at; john.ernberg@actia.se;
> jmorris@namei.org; serge@hallyn.com; herbert@gondor.apana.org.au;
> davem@davemloft.net; j.luebbe@pengutronix.de; ebiggers@kernel.org;
> richard@nod.at; keyrings@vger.kernel.org; linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org;
> linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org; linux-
> security-module@vger.kernel.org; Sahil Malhotra
> <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>; Kshitiz Varshney <kshitiz.varshney@nxp.com>;
> Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@nxp.com>; Varun Sethi <V.Sethi@nxp.com>
> Subject: [EXT] Re: [RFC PATCH HBK: 0/8] HW BOUND KEY as TRUSTED KEY
>
> Caution: EXT Email
>
> Hi,
>
> Am 2022-09-06 08:51, schrieb Pankaj Gupta:
> > Hardware Bound key(HBK), is never acessible as plain key outside of
> > the hardware boundary. Thus, it is un-usable, even if somehow fetched
> > from kernel memory. It ensures run-time security.
> >
> > This patchset adds generic support for classing the Hardware Bound
> > Key, based on:
> >
> > - Newly added flag-'is_hbk', added to the tfm.
> >
> > Consumer of the kernel crypto api, after allocating
> > the transformation, sets this flag based on the basis
> > of the type of key consumer has.
> >
> > - This helps to influence the core processing logic
> > for the encapsulated algorithm.
> >
> > - This flag is set by the consumer after allocating
> > the tfm and before calling the function crypto_xxx_setkey().
> >
> > First implementation is based on CAAM.
> >
> > NXP built CAAM IP is the Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance
> > Module.
> > This is contain by the i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
> >
> > CAAM is a suitable backend (source) for kernel trusted keys.
> > This backend source can be used for run-time security as well by
> > generating the hardware bound key.
> >
> > Along with plain key, the CAAM generates black key. A black key is an
> > encrypted key, which can only be decrypted inside CAAM. Hence, CAAM's
> > black key can only be used by CAAM. Thus it is declared as a hardware
> > bound key.
>
> What is the difference to the current trusted keys with CAAM?
> When I tested the patch series back then, I wasn't able to import a sealed
> key on another board with the same SoC.
>
Currently, keys that are part of trusted key-ring, contains plain key.
With this patch-set, these key will become Hw Bound Key, which is not a plain key anymore.
After this patch-set, if somehow the HB-key is retrieved from the keyring, the retrieved key would be un-usable without hw.
> -michael
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-09-07 7:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-09-06 6:51 [RFC PATCH HBK: 0/8] HW BOUND KEY as TRUSTED KEY Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06 6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 1/8] keys-trusted: new cmd line option added Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06 13:01 ` Ben Boeckel
2022-09-07 7:22 ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06 6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 2/8] hw-bound-key: flag-is_hbk added to the tfm Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06 6:43 ` Herbert Xu
2022-09-07 7:22 ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-07 7:26 ` Herbert Xu
2022-09-07 9:58 ` Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-07 10:10 ` Herbert Xu
2022-09-12 17:19 ` Varun Sethi
2022-09-13 2:05 ` Herbert Xu
2022-09-13 10:01 ` Varun Sethi
2022-09-13 10:28 ` Herbert Xu
2022-09-21 11:07 ` Varun Sethi
2022-09-06 6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 3/8] sk_cipher: checking for hw bound operation Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06 6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 4/8] keys-trusted: re-factored caam based trusted key Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06 6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 5/8] caam blob-gen: moving blob_priv to caam_drv_private Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06 6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 6/8] KEYS: trusted: caam based black key Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06 13:03 ` Ben Boeckel
2022-09-07 7:22 ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06 6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 7/8] caam alg: symmetric key ciphers are updated Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06 6:51 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 8/8] dm-crypt: consumer-app setting the flag-is_hbk Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06 7:12 ` [RFC PATCH HBK: 0/8] HW BOUND KEY as TRUSTED KEY Michael Walle
2022-09-07 7:22 ` Pankaj Gupta [this message]
2022-09-07 7:29 ` [EXT] " Michael Walle
2022-09-07 7:46 ` [EXT] " David Gstir
2022-09-07 8:11 ` Michael Walle
2022-09-07 9:57 ` Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-06 8:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-09-07 7:22 ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2022-09-07 8:10 ` Jan Lübbe
2022-09-07 9:57 ` Pankaj Gupta
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