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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	rjw@rjwysocki.net, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/9] security: keys: trusted: Parse out individual components of the key blob
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2021 19:22:45 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YDaLZW+27o6Cgutk@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210222073627.GB30403@codon.org.uk>

On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 07:36:27AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 20, 2021 at 05:05:36AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Sat, Feb 20, 2021 at 01:32:49AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > Performing any sort of state validation of a sealed TPM blob requires
> > > being able to access the individual members in the response. Parse the
> > > blob sufficiently to be able to stash pointers to each member, along
> > > with the length.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> > 
> > I'll just say LGTM for now. Did not see anything obviously wrong in
> > the code change (and does make sense to nitpick minor things just
> > yet).
> > 
> > Need to understand the whole use case just a little bit better.
> 
> I wrote this up with some more detail at 
> https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/55845.html - it seemed longer than
> appropriate for a commit message, but if you'd like more detail
> somewhere I can certainly add it.

Thanks (bookmarked). I'll read it before reviewing +1 version.

Requiring a config flag is something that slows down adoption in the
stock kernels.

Since we are talking about hibernate the decision whether to have this
feature set, does not have to be something that needs to be changed
dynamically to a running system.

So: maybe the best compromise would be to have it kernel command line
option? That way it's easier feature to adapt (e.g. with GRUB
configuration) and to enable in the kernel.

/Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2021-02-24 17:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-20  1:32 [PATCH 0/9] Enable hibernation when Lockdown is enabled Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 1/9] tpm: Add support for in-kernel resetting of PCRs Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  2:52   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 2/9] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  3:02   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-24 17:12   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-24 18:00   ` James Bottomley
2021-02-28  7:59     ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 3/9] security: keys: trusted: Parse out individual components of the key blob Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  3:05   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-22  7:36     ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-24 17:22       ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 4/9] security: keys: trusted: Store the handle of a loaded key Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  3:06   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 5/9] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in creation data Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  3:09   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-21 19:44     ` Ben Boeckel
2021-02-22  7:41     ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 6/9] pm: hibernate: Optionally store and verify a hash of the image Matthew Garrett
2021-05-05 18:18   ` Evan Green
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 7/9] pm: hibernate: Optionally use TPM-backed keys to protect image integrity Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  2:20   ` Randy Dunlap
2021-02-22  7:41     ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 8/9] pm: hibernate: Verify the digest encryption key Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20  1:32 ` [PATCH 9/9] pm: hibernate: seal the encryption key with a PCR policy Matthew Garrett
2021-05-04 21:56 ` [PATCH 0/9] Enable hibernation when Lockdown is enabled Evan Green
2021-05-05  3:18   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-05-05  3:19     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-05-05 18:02       ` Evan Green

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