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From: Eiichi Tsukata <devel@etsukata.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>,
	Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] x86/mm, tracing: Fix CR2 corruption
Date: Sat, 6 Jul 2019 20:07:22 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a4a50e28-d972-3cef-b668-1e49d5b5496f@etsukata.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wiJ4no+TW-8KTfpO-Q5+aaTGVoBJzrnFTvj_zGpVbrGfA@mail.gmail.com>



On 2019/07/05 11:18, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 5, 2019 at 5:03 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:
>>
>> Despire the current efforts to read CR2 before tracing happens there
>> still exist a number of possible holes:
> 
> So this whole series disturbs me for the simple reason that I thought
> tracing was supposed to save/restore cr2 and make it unnecessary to
> worry about this in non-tracing code.
> 
> That is very much what the NMI code explicitly does. Why shouldn't all
> the other tracing code do the same thing in case they can take page
> faults?
> 
> So I don't think the patches are wrong per se, but this seems to solve
> it at the wrong level.
> 
>                  Linus
> 

Steven previously tried to fix it by saving CR2 in TRACE_IRQS_OFF:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190320221534.165ab87b@oasis.local.home/

But hit the following WARNING:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190321095502.47b51356@gandalf.local.home/

I tried to find out the root cause of the WARNING, and found that it is
caused by touching trace point(TRACE_IRQS_OFF) before search_binary_handler()
at exeve.

To prevent userstack trace code from reading user stack before it becomes ready,
checking current->in_execve in stack_trace_save_user() can help Steven's approach,
though trace_sched_process_exec() is called before current->in_execve = 0 so it changes
current behavior.

The PoC code is as follows:

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c
index 2abf27d7df6b..30fa6e1b7a87 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c
@@ -116,10 +116,12 @@ void arch_stack_walk_user(stack_trace_consume_fn consume_entry, void *cookie,
                          const struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
        const void __user *fp = (const void __user *)regs->bp;
+       unsigned long address;
 
        if (!consume_entry(cookie, regs->ip, false))
                return;
 
+       address = read_cr2();
        while (1) {
                struct stack_frame_user frame;
 
@@ -131,11 +133,14 @@ void arch_stack_walk_user(stack_trace_consume_fn consume_entry, void *cookie,
                        break;
                if (frame.ret_addr) {
                        if (!consume_entry(cookie, frame.ret_addr, false))
-                               return;
+                               break;
                }
                if (fp == frame.next_fp)
                        break;
                fp = frame.next_fp;
        }
+
+       if (address != read_cr2())
+               write_cr2(address);
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/stacktrace.c b/kernel/stacktrace.c
index 36139de0a3c4..489d33bb5d28 100644
--- a/kernel/stacktrace.c
+++ b/kernel/stacktrace.c
@@ -230,6 +230,9 @@ unsigned int stack_trace_save_user(unsigned long *store, unsigned int size)
        /* Trace user stack if not a kernel thread */
        if (!current->mm)
                return 0;
+       /* current can reach some trace points before its stack is ready */
+       if (current->in_execve)
+               return 0;
 
        arch_stack_walk_user(consume_entry, &c, task_pt_regs(current));
        return c.len;
  




  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-07-06 11:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-04 19:55 [PATCH v2 0/7] Tracing vs CR2 (and cleanups) Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-04 19:55 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] x86/paravirt: Make read_cr2() CALLEE_SAVE Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-04 21:49   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-10 19:53   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-07-04 19:55 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] x86/entry/32: Simplify common_exception Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-04 21:51   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-10 20:11   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-07-10 20:14     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-04 19:55 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] x86/entry/64: Simplify idtentry a little Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-04 21:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-10 20:23   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-07-04 19:55 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] x86/entry/64: Update comments and sanity tests for create_gap Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-04 21:55   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-10 20:24   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-07-04 19:56 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] x86/mm, tracing: Fix CR2 corruption Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-05  2:18   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-07-05  3:16     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-05  3:27       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-07-05 13:49     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-06 21:41       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-07-06 22:27         ` Steven Rostedt
2019-07-06 22:41           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-07-07  0:08             ` Linus Torvalds
2019-07-07  0:36               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-06 23:50           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-07  3:44           ` Eiichi Tsukata
2019-07-06 11:07     ` Eiichi Tsukata [this message]
2019-07-08  7:48       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-08  8:58         ` Eiichi Tsukata
2019-07-08  9:42           ` Eiichi Tsukata
2019-07-09  5:17             ` Eiichi Tsukata
2019-07-07 15:10   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-07 15:11     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-07 18:17       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-07-10 20:27         ` Steven Rostedt
2019-07-11  6:45           ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-07-11 12:12           ` Sasha Levin
2019-07-11 12:21           ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-04 19:56 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] x86/entry/64: Remove TRACE_IRQS_*_DEBUG Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-11  3:24   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-07-11  8:05     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-04 19:56 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 7/7] x86/entry/64: Pull bits into C Peter Zijlstra

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